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ABSTRACT 
 
Oil resources are the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy, but also a major source of affliction to 
the village communities in which they are located. This study uses the oil village 
communities in Nigeria, with particular focus on Delta state.  It seeks to explore the extent to 
which the presence of oil fuels violent conflicts in these village communities, and how the 
moulding of socio-economic and political structures in local oil village communities by the 
presence of oil resources gives rise to economic opportunism and grievance characteristics. 
The research employs a qualitative approach using semi-structured interviews, focus-group 
discussions and documentary sources to collect and analyse data for the study. It adopts 
structural conflict theory as the anchor theory of the research, with the support of 
environmental scarcity theory and greed vs. grievance theory for the analysis and 
interpretation of data, rather than the single theory approach adopted in many conflict studies. 
The research also applies micro-level analysis and non-state perspectives, which is a 
deviation from previous studies, which have applied macro-level analysis and state-centric 
perspectives in exploring oil resource conflicts.   
 
The research demonstrates that oil resources fuel violent conflicts in oil village communities 
through the changes it bring to local socio-economic conditions: changes such as poverty, 
unemployment and land struggle; and changes from traditional power structures to new ones 
in which there are fierce struggles for power, arising out of the need people feel for access to 
oil opportunities and benefits. The literature posits that behaviours such as rent seeking, greed 
and the pursuit of grievances arise in many oil abundant states. However, little is known 
about the existence of similar characteristics in smaller village communities or the extent of 
the influence of oil resources on socio-economic and power relations in oil village 
communities and how these fuel violent conflicts. The study therefore assumes that the 
elimination of structural violence like social exclusion, poverty, environmental degradation 
will help in reducing the violent struggle for power and oil benefits in oil village 
communities.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1 Introduction   
 
This thesis is about how oil resources1 stimulate violent conflicts2 in local oil communities in 
Nigeria. It adopts a micro-level approach in exploring the effects of oil resources on the 
political and socio-economic structures of village communities3. Like Verwimp, Justino and 
Bruck (2009:307) state that ‘at a fundamental level, conflict originates from individuals’ 
behaviour and their interactions with their immediate surroundings, in other words, from the 
micro-foundations’.  Therefore, this research looks at the causes and effects of oil resources 
fuelled violent conflicts at the community level. This is a deviation from major intellectual 
works on oil resources conflicts, which are state-centred and macro-level, based, such as Karl 
(1997), Ross (1999), Klare (2001). Thus, unlike the macro-level, ‘a micro-level approach 
advances our understanding of conflict by its ability to account for individual and group 
heterogeneity within one country or one conflict’ (Verwimp, Justino and Bruck, 2009:308). 
Therefore, this work is born out of a desire to understand the contribution of oil resources to 
violent conflicts in local oil village communities in Nigeria. Hence, the research is premised on 
the theory that oil resources create community-level economic opportunities and rent-seeking 
                                                 
1 Oil resources are natural resource found beneath the earth. It is also known as petroleum resources or crude oil. 
In this research the terms oil resources and oil resource are used interchangeably to mean the same, so also is 
natural resource and natural resources.      
 
2 In this thesis, unless explicitly defined otherwise, the term violent conflict refers to various intrastate armed 
conflicts, both state and non-state. In Forsberg (2009), intrastate armed conflict is defined as a situation where the 
government of a state and a non-state opposition movement (e.g. a rebel group) have a declared incompatibility 
and the parties use violence to achieve their goals. Intrastate armed conflict also includes non-state armed violence 
which involves groups or parties with declared incompatibilities who thus deploy violent means. 
 
3 The term Oil village communities in this thesis is mainly used to show a cluster of ‘traditional village 
communities in the Niger Delta who are affected by oil exploration and production activities’ (Frynas, 2000:1).It 
further refers to ‘the local people affected by oil operations on the ground. But the term also signifies a common 
identity within a village community due to a number of factors such as common residence; a shared history and 
heritage; cross-cutting ties of neighbourhood, friendship and kinship; a common religious creed;....Membership of 
a village community is defined both in terms of physical residence in a village and in terms of subscription to 
village social norms’ (Frynas, 2000:1). 
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behaviours which lead to violent struggles for power and leadership. These struggles for 
political, traditional or other leadership positions are very keen because of its access to oil 
resources opportunities and benefits. This research is concerned not only with the failure of the 
Nigerian state and multi-national oil companies (MNCs) to apply the right conflict handling 
mechanisms such as collaborating with village communities (Ibeanu, 2002), but with adopting 
a structural violence approach in identifying factors like social exclusion which stimulate 
violent conflicts in oil village communities. 
 
Generally, there is a consensus in the literature that oil as a natural resource has become a kind 
of paradox for developing economies that engage in its production. This growing concern is 
due to the rising and persistent nature of violent conflicts experienced in most of such states. 
Thus, oil revenues have become a threat to the achievement of sustainable democracy, peace 
and development in some oil-rich developing economies like Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, 
Venezuela and Sudan (Le Billion, 2001; Di John, 2005; Ikelegbe, 2006). This has resulted in 
claim that oil exploration activities institute poverty and economic inequalities, due to their 
impact on the environment. Thus, oil resources production fuel environmental scarcity and 
competition, resulting in violent conflict as other resources, such as land and water, become 
scarce for other economic activities (Hagmann, 2005). Percival and Homer-Dixon (1998:279), 
for instance, contextualised such a situation as ‘supply-induced scarcity’4.   
 
Ross (2001) draws attention to the effects of oil resources in fuelling and sustaining 
authoritarian rulers and bad governance, involving corruption and lack of transparency at state 
and corporate business level. According to his ideas, oil fuels grievance or greed amongst local 
oil communities, as they suffer from poverty in the midst of abundant resources (Cramer, 2006; 
                                                 
4 Supply-induced scarcity, as defined by Percival and Homer-Dixon (1998), is caused by the degradation and 
depletion of an environmental resource, for example the erosion of cropland. 
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Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Other negative social effects of oil resources are the change they 
bring to the political and economic situations of such areas.  Therefore, changing the social 
relations of the affected people, pitching members of local oil village communities against each 
other as they fight over recognition and access to oil revenues, and pitching the oil 
communities against the state and the oil producing companies (Idemudia and Uwem, 2006).  
 
 The above conclusions are contrary to earlier held assumptions that oil resources would 
contribute positively to host communities. Mcphail (2000) offers a picture of the extensive 
economic developments and other potential benefits for oil host states. This, according to her, 
is due to the fact that extractive industries can ‘generate sizeable revenues, create jobs and 
business opportunities, and often bring new roads and access to water and power to isolated 
rural areas in which they are typically located’(Mcphail, 2000:1). This situation should bring 
about economic growths and developments such as reduction in poverty and infrastructural 
development to host states. However, in many developing states with oil resources as the main 
source of revenue, their cases are different, as oil resources and their revenue management 
have continually fuelled violent conflicts rather than having a positive impact on the lives of 
the people.  
 
Oil resources-induced conflicts in many cases create two or three parties to the conflict - the 
government of the host state, the oil producing companies (which in most cases are MNCs) and 
the host local communities, which in this research are also referred to as oil village 
communities. The revenues from oil resources are maximized by the state and the MNCs, 
leaving the host oil communities in a state of alienation and deprivation. In many cases, such as 
in Nigeria’s Delta oil region, such negative impact easily manifests in form of environmental 
degradation and poverty and has been a cause for grievance by oil communities (Emeseh, 
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2011). However, beside the physical effects of oil resources on the host communities, there are 
other intense fundamental factors, such as struggles for power and leadership, and access to oil 
resource benefits (Ukiwo, 2011).  Incidentally, the situations of struggle for power, leadership 
and access to the control of oil resources benefits arise out of the nature of the new relationship 
that exists between the parties that are directly or indirectly involved in oil production and 
utilisation.  
 
In addition, recent literature suggests that oil resources in developing states with weak 
governance structures continues to impact negatively on the stability, growth and sustainability 
of such countries, as human rights abuses are continuously on the increase (Ross, 2001). Most 
of these situations have consequently resulted in series of conflicts which have either turned 
violent or resulted in full-blown civil wars. This research, therefore, seeks to examine the 
political economy of oil resources conflicts in the oil village communities of Nigeria.  
 
I will also concentrate on the period 1997 to 2008. This is to cover the last two years of the 
military regime in the country and the outbreak of violent conflicts in Delta state and the Niger 
Delta region as a whole. Delta state is one of the nine states in the Niger Delta oil producing 
region. However, where necessary, references have been made to the period beyond 2008 to 
provide further support to the argument being made. Finally, an emphasis on contextuality and 
history or ‘historical narrative’ constitutes the strength of this study; but this can be a limitation 
with respect to the generalizability or transferability of the results. The results of this study can 
only strictly be applied to the geographical area studied. To overcome this limitation, efforts 
were expended in selecting 10 village communities that were typical of the state being studied. 
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1.1 Statement of the problem and research questions   
 
The initial discovery of oil resources in Nigeria was seen as a ‘blessing’, which judging from 
the revenues to be generated would have led to rapid development. However, in recent years, 
oil resources are turning out to be a curse rather than the anticipated blessing, especially for the 
dwellers in the host communities (Ibeanu, 2008; Watts and Ibaba, 2011), otherwise referred to 
as oil village communities in this research. Human Right Watch in its January 1999 Report- 
The Price of oil wrote that: 
      “While the people of the Niger Delta have faced the adverse effects of oil extraction,they 
have in general also failed to gain from the oil wealth….[however] a minority of politicians, 
traditional leaders and contractors have become rich on the spoils of oil, and hence support the 
oil industry’s activities, the great majority of people from the minority ethnic groups of the oil 
producing areas have remained impoverished; at the same time, the potential benefits of links 
to the oil industry have exacerbated conflicts within and among the oil producing 
communities”(1999:8). 
   
Nigeria, as an oil-rich country, falls among states whose discovery of oil has become a blessing 
for just a few people and a curse for many others. In the oil village communities, oil resources 
serving as an avenue for violent conflicts have changed the existing socio-economic and 
political structures and conditions. Therefore, this research draws on existing oil-resources-
induced conflict researches, most of which focus purely on immediate causes and single factors 
such as environmental issues, autocracy, corruption, grievance and/or greed, lack of 
transparency and a rentier effect to pursue its findings(Boas and Dunn,2007;Rosser,2006).  In 
this context, the study is conducted in the context of the socio-economic, political and 
historical development of the host country, Nigeria, and a holistic examination of the issues at 
stake. This will facilitate a comprehensive understanding of violent conflicts arising out of 
petrobusiness5, and determine the extent of the contribution of oil resources to violent conflicts 
in the host communities in Nigeria. 
                                                 
5Petrobusiness was first conceptualized and used by Ibeanu (2000:19), when he described the entire Nigerian oil 
resource exploration, production, business, business environment and oil-related activities as “petrobusiness”. It 
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 The study, therefore, within the context of the above puzzles, poses a major research question: 
To what extent have oil resources contributed to violent conflicts in oil village communities in 
Nigeria? In addressing this, the following sub-questions are proposed:  
I. What are the effects of oil resources on the socio-economic conditions of oil village 
communities and to what extent have oil resources contributed to cultures of 
grievance, greed and militancy in oil village communities? 
 
II. To what extent have oil resources influenced the nature of politics, leadership and 
power struggles in oil village communities? 
 
III. How has the style of management of oil resources, socio-economic opportunities 
and the interests of oil communities by the Nigerian state and oil MNCs contributed 
to violent conflicts in the oil village communities? 
 
 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the study/Purposes of the study 
 
This study aims to contribute to the knowledge and understanding of oil resources conflicts in 
oil village communities. Understanding the relationship between oil resources and violence 
involves the application of varying knowledge in ‘forms of linkage between oil endowment and 
violent conflicts’, oil and corruption or neo-patrimonalism among ruling states/elites; oil 
MNCs, oil states and elites. The ongoing debates also include oil resources fuelled greed, or 
motivation for conflict involving inequalities among groups (Obi and Rustad, 2011:9-10). 
Often, the discovery of oil resources in abundance is seen as blessing for economic 
development of the host country. However, this assumption seems to have failed many oil-rich 
developing states as they are often times involve in conflicts over the resources. Inequalities 
and social exclusion in the distribution of oil rents, opportunities and benefits in most oil 
resources-rich developing countries have been strongly linked with the resultant conflicts in 
                                                                                                                                                          
means ‘all aspects of the petroleum industry, not just the oil companies that extract and sell the crude oil (e.g., oil 
refineries, oil services)’.      
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these societies. Thus, social inclusion and equitable distribution of oil rents and benefits are 
strongly advocated as a panacea to violent conflicts over oil resources.  
 
In this study, we used structural violence or structural conflict theory to understand oil 
resources conflicts. Varying knowledge, explanations and definitions such as petro-violence 
(Watts, 1999), petrobusinesss (Ibeanu, 2000) have been used to characterise oil resources 
conflicts in the study (see detailed discussion in Chapter 2). Like the various discussion on oil 
resources conflicts, this research integrated environmental scarcity and greed vs. grievance 
assumptions into structural violence/structural conflict theory to be able to understand the oil 
resources conflict (see discussion in Chapter 3).This study highlights the characteristics of oil 
resources and oil resources conflicts in host states, as means of achieving micro-level analysis 
and non-state conflict understanding. Specifically, this study aims to improve the 
understanding of oil resources conflicts especially for host oil village communities.  Therefore, 
the broad objectives of this study include the following:  
-economic conditions and violent conflicts which are influenced by oil 
resources  
stand how leadership and power struggles are fuelled by oil resources; and  
 
1.3    Justification of the research Study 
 
The research questions stated in 1.1 of the research underlie the justification for seeking an 
understanding of oil resources conflicts given that oil resources conflicts like other natural 
resources conflicts have become a reoccurring violent conflict in many parts of the world. 
Elimination of structural violence is critical to reducing oil resources conflicts in societies with 
oil resources. This implies that structural violence fuels oil resources conflicts in oil village 
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communities in Nigeria. The task of the researcher is to understand how structural violence is 
created by presence of oil resources, which in turn triggers oil resources conflicts.  
 
The study will generate empirical evidence on oil resources conflicts among oil village 
communities in Nigeria and how they are fuelled by structural violence. This will contribute to 
the on-going debate on oil resources conflicts in developing countries. The research may also 
generate evidence that is vital for Nigeria as it strives to solve the persistent problems of 
underdevelopment, poverty, criminality, militancy, illegal oil bunkering and, inter and intra 
communal violent conflicts in the oil region of the country. 
 
1.4      Structure of the thesis 
 
This work outlines research on violent conflicts in oil village communities in Nigeria.  The first 
chapter contains the introduction and background to the study, which offers an overall view of 
the research, providing an explanation of the research variables. The chapter also contains a 
statement of the problem and the research questions, research objectives, scope of the research, 
justification of the research and structure of the research.  
 
The second chapter presents a literature review and the theoretical and conceptual frameworks 
that will guide the study. The objectives of the chapter include identifying existing gaps in the 
literature on violent conflicts. The key argument of the chapter revolves around the structures 
and paradoxes presented by the presence of oil resources and oil-fuelled conflicts.  The chapter 
adopts a micro-level analysis in carrying out the review, instead of the kind of macro level 
perspective that is mainly state-centric.  
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Chapter Three explains the theoretical framework of the analysis used for the study. The 
framework was built on structural conflict theory, drawing support from environmental scarcity 
theory and greed vs. grievance theory. Chapter Four explains the research methodology. The 
study uses single case study approach and the use of qualitative data collection methods which 
include in-depth, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussion (FGDs), and documentary 
analysis. Chapter Five reviews the background to the Nigerian political economy of oil. The 
chapter shows the evolution of the oil economy in Nigeria and especially examines the socio-
economic and political effects of oil resources on oil village communities.  The main thrust of 
this chapter is that oil resources restructure existing social relations, socio-economic conditions 
and power relations in these communities. 
 
The empirical evidence and analyses are presented in Chapters Six to Eight. Chapter Six 
analyses the changes in socio-economic conditions and social relations in oil communities, and 
the resultant violent conflicts due to inequality and exclusion. Chapter Seven deals with the 
analysis of power and leadership struggles, showing how the occupation of leadership or 
traditional governing position in oil communities guarantees access to oil resources benefits or 
opportunities. Chapter Eight analyses the management of developments and conflicts resulting 
from the presence of oil. Chapter Nine is the concluding chapter, which presents summaries of 
the findings and draws conclusions. It also highlighted the contributions made by the research 
and suggestions for future research. 
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                                       CHAPTER TWO 
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN OIL RESOURCES, VIOLENCE 
AND CONFLICT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2. Introduction  
 
This chapter reviews the literature on the concepts of conflict and violence, the paradoxes of oil 
resources, oil violence and conflict, with an analytical examination of existing debates and 
assumptions on the so-called oil resources curse. The chapter aims to understand the effects of 
oil resources in fuelling violent conflicts using political economy paradigms. This discussion 
departs from using a macro-level analysis (state-centred perspective) in examining the 
structures and paradoxes of oil resources, but adopts a micro-analysis perspective (community 
perspective). The selected literature provide a base for understanding and instituting my current 
research, and cumulates in the identification and filling of existing gaps as part of the academic 
contribution of this study.  
 
The chapter is about the application of political, economics and sociological scholarships on oil 
resources and socio-economic changes specifically within oil village communities separately 
from the central authorities in oil producing states. The chapter tries to point out the need to 
examine the role of non-state (traditional authorities, recognised and unrecognised groups such 
as chiefs, community development Association, Women’s group and Youth Association) 
governance and struggle for dominance as potential causes of violent conflicts in oil village 
communities. Section 2.1 deals with the definition of the main concepts- violence, conflict and 
resource conflict. Section 2.2 discusses oil resources and their double-sided nature while 
section 2.3 explains resource curses and violent conflicts as the major paradoxes of oil 
resources in the discussion. Section 2.4 gives an insight into oil resource fuelled conflicts and 
violence, examining factors such as rent seeking, grievance, greed and environmental 
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problems. The changes in socio-economic and power structures of oil host societies are 
discussed in sections 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. Section 2.7 is the conclusion. 
 
2.1 Defining Conflict, Violence, Violent Conflict and Resource 
Conflict 
The understanding and conceptualization of conflict and violence as an integral part of human 
existence, knowledge and development have widened considerably after the end of the Cold 
War (Reychler, 1999). This has consequently led to multiplicity of definitions and explanations 
of what really constitutes conflicts. Therefore as societies and people interact, conflicts 
develop, and so are definitions and explanations. Pankhurst (2003:154) explains that ‘Conflict 
is a word often used loosely to mean many different things despite its long history in social 
science. Most types of social, political, and economic changes involve conflict of some sort, 
and one could argue that many of the positive changes in world history have occurred as a 
result of conflict’.  Therefore with incessant nature of conflicts in Africa and part of Asia, and 
most recently, the Balkans, researchers and practitioners are constantly defining and building  
concepts and definitions of conflicts, violence and violent conflicts, seeking to find out causes 
and reasons for such conflicts.  
 
Among the main foremost ideas of conflicts is that it is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of 
social change. Furthermore, it is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and 
beliefs emerging from new formations generated by social change (Miall, et al, 1999). Jeong 
(2000:35) in providing an explanation on the source of conflict opined that “the absence of 
legitimised structures and policies, along with increasing inequalities of income and 
opportunities, serves as the primary source of conflict”.  Fetherston (2000:2) stresses that conflict 
is about interest, and such interest extends to application of violence in order to satisfy the 
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interest. Violence therefore becomes an application of intent or unintended means of achieving 
an interest. 
 
  Therefore, in assessing the conflict resolution process; conflict ‘has an ontological base in 
human needs, the denial of which causes violent conflict. Therefore the objective source of 
conflict is interest and not need’. This assumption of interest being the objective source of 
interest is contentious, especially where such conflict has other contending issues like ethnicity, 
inequality and social exclusion. This is because conflicts and violence, just like other social 
processes can seldom be explained by single cause and that the primary determining cause of 
social change is impossible to prove; instead social change tends to represent a dynamic 
interaction of numerous factors over time (Responding To Conflict, 2005).  
 
As shown by the various definitions, what constitutes a conflict situation could lead to violent 
situation. According to Reychler (2001:4), “when conflicts crosses the threshold of violence, the 
costs and the difficulty of managing them increase significantly. Violence becomes the cause of 
more violence”. It therefore implies that in pursuance of different interests by parties in a 
relationship, conflicts arise. However, where such conflict situations breed violence, or develop 
into a violent conflict, there are concerns. 
 
Consequently, the idea that the existence of different interests fuel conflicts, therefore makes  the  
position of a ‘single cause’ in conflicts or violent conflict a contentious one, as there are 
indications or likelihoods that no conflict will have a single cause, but could have main or major 
factor supported by other minor or secondary factors. Ginty and Williams (2009:26) also 
provided a more robust explanation stating that “conflicts can have primary causes that take 
precedence over secondary causes, but the variegated nature of human politics, economics and 
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society means that a single factor cannot spark a conflict in a vacuum”. In many cases, causes 
such as economics or  social exclusion may be easily be considered as violence, especially where 
they content less or no physical harm.  
 
 As will be explained further in chapter 3, this research understood that it is difficult to explain 
such violent conflict relying on a ‘single- cause factor’, or to adopt a single theory application in 
the explanation of oil resources conflict. This is because there may be other contributory factors 
that need to be explained. In other words, the ‘oil conflict’ in Nigeria is not just about oil, but a 
whole range of factors which may have played a role in the conflict. like Ballantine (2004:7) 
argues “In the case of Bougainville, perceptions of inequitable sharing of natural resource wealth 
was central to the eruption of violence, but resource wealth played no role in sustaining the 
conflict. 
  
In examining what constitutes violence, it is pertinent to understand that violence involves more 
than the absence of physical violence, such as torture, killings, war etc. For instance many 
violent conflict situations today do not start as physical violence; rather they are less visible, 
before degenerating into physical violence. Thus there have been misconceptions of what 
constitutes violence, especially where there is the absence of physical violence. Cramer 
(2003:402-3) identified the ‘fragility of the conceptualization of violence and conflicts in war 
studies’. His finding on inequality shows that Brazil did not experience civil war but a 
‘structurally persistent and pervasive daily violence. Guinea-Bissau on the other hand, 
experienced violent conflict in late 1990s. Thus, inequality may lead to violence and conflict but 
not necessary a civil war. 
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However with broader conceptualization of what constitutes violence today, its overall meaning 
and understanding brought a better and clearer link to conflict processes. In all, it is worth noting 
that violence is ‘a holistic, crosscutting and endemic phenomenon’ (Moser and Rodgers, 2005: 
4).  The oil fuelled conflict under examination in the study did not start as a physical conflict; 
rather the commercial exploitation of oil brought about some forms of non-violent situations.  It 
consisted of structural, psychological, cultural and environmental violence in the oil villages, 
which after years degenerated into armed or physical violence. Galtung (1969:168) defined 
violence as “the cause of the difference between the actual, between what could have been and 
what is.  [...]In other words, when the potential is higher than the actual, the difference is by 
definition avoidable, and when it is avoidable, violence is present”. This definition by Gultung 
gives credit to the broader meaning and representation of violence. It shows that violence is more 
than what is expected, known and seen. Similarly, Jacobs and Reychler (2004:5) argue that a 
conflict situation could be considered as violent: 
when two conditions are met:(a) when the quantitative and qualitative life 
expectancies of a certain group within a population is significantly lower 
than, for instance, of the dominant group;(b) when that difference can be 
attributed to one or more means of violence: physical, structural, 
psychological, cultural violence and violence caused by bad governance. 
 
Violent conflict on the other hand is equally known as ‘deadly conflict’, and similarity with 
‘armed conflict’. Violent conflict contains ‘direct, physical violence’ which is directly different 
from other forms of violence including structural violence which is more indirect. (Miall, et al, 
1999). Jeong (2000: 20) states that “mass violence such as war and revolution brings about 
social change and a power imbalance”. This as such has one salient meaning, that most conflict 
situations are first and foremost non-violent, and are most times policy issues, which remained 
unresolved for a long time. The non-resolution of the conflict, which is mainly in the form of 
structural violence gradually turns into situations leading to direct violence, and a consequent 
an armed conflict.  
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The conditions mentioned above by Jacobs and Reychler (2004), Miall, et al(1999) and Jeong 
(2000), were more than present, judging from the living conditions  and the environmentally 
related problems  the oil communities in the Niger Delta suffer, vis-à-vis the rents and benefits 
from oil revenues. Considering this submission in line with the situation in The Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria, violence could be said be have shown all its characteristics and nature. 
Physical violence became the most present and pronounced, especially in the later part of the 
conflict; communities are invaded by the Nigerian State using the state apparatus of coercion to 
suppress the people’s protestation and rebellion (Ibeanu, 2000). Therefore, there is clear 
indication that the Nigerian state has constructed structural violence through developing a set of 
institutions that support oil related activities in oil village communities whilst maintaining a 
repressive structure in the communities.   
 
Thus, this non-physical violence seems present at the beginning of the exploration of oil 
business in Nigeria.  Reporting on violence in the Niger Delta, Human Rights Watch (1999 :10) 
reports about occasional large oil spills in the region, which destroys agricultural crops and 
causes water pollution, ‘with serious effects for the communities and families affected’. This is 
further compounded by inadequate compensation for such damage. Acknowledging the 
existence of violence in the region, a Nigerian former Head of State, General Abdulsalam 
Abubakar in a national broadcast stated that: 
                Genuine as these grievances may be, we cannot allow the 
continued reckless expression of such feelings. Disruptions of the 
activities of oil companies, government and private enterprises by 
rampaging youth, seizure of oil wells, rigs and platforms as well as 
hostage taking and vehicular-hijacking are totally unacceptable to 
this administration. We will not accept brazen challenge to the 
state authority under threat of violence as happened recently in the 
Niger-Delta region. (National Concord, January1st, 1999, p. 1-2) 
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The implication of this view is that the non-physical violence which is meted on the oil 
communities were not seen as urgent issues initially, but the disruption of oil activities and 
other physical violent activities by the communities draws immediate attention of the Nigerian 
state. Conflicts in the oil region of Nigeria started with non-physical violence, which 
metamorphosed into the people expressing their grievances through physical violent means. 
This situation depicts what Azer(1991:93) refers to as ‘ Protracted social conflict’, where ‘it 
represented the prolonged and often violent struggle by the communal groups for such basic 
needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political and economic 
participation’. One thing that stands unarguable in all the definitions, meanings and 
explanations given to conflict is that ‘it is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values 
and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited 
constraints’(Miall et al, 1999:5). This interest makes “violence as a possible (but not inevitable) 
response to specific conflict situation”. Just like in the case of oil resource conflict in the Niger 
Delta, violence is “deeply structured into the system of the relationship” that exist between and 
within the oil communities, the Nigerian state and the oil MNC who explore the oil.  The 
‘socio-economic and political arrangements’ is not devoid of this violence, thus making the 
situation a ‘systemic violence’ with oil resources as the perceived root cause of the conflict 
(Azar, 1991, and Miall et al, 1999).To structural violence exist ‘a behavioural response’ in 
reaction to the deep rooted violence going on in the Niger Delta, which the outcome is the 
present day violent conflicts (Responding To Conflict, 2000). Therefore, the structural 
conditions which grew out of oil activities developed as part of the structural violence in the oil 
village communities and were mainly to serve the oil production interest. 
 
 Examining  the term resource conflict thus suggests ‘that there is something special about the 
general relationship between natural resources and conflict, and stirring a suspicion that this 
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relationship has an impact on conflict recurrence too’(Rustad and Binningsbø, 
2012:533).Therefore, oil resources as exemplified while explaining violent and conflicts 
situations, have roles of increasing the risk of outbreak of violent conflicts as well as 
prolonging such situation (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, 2005; 
Lujala, 2010; Ross, 2004 and 2006). As Kaldor (2007:92) explained in her “new wars” 
classification to which oil resource conflicts are examples, these conflicts are “characterized by 
a multiplicity of types of fighting units in both public and private, state and non-state, or some 
kind of mixture”. Other argument is that there are changes in the contemporary violent 
conflicts. Many inter-state wars are replaced by intra-state wars, with ethnic wars, self-
determination and identity-struggles taking over the front burner on conflict issues. These 
changes brought about specialised fields such as conflict resolution to tackle the new global 
problem of Post-Cold War era development (Miall et al, 1999).  
 
 The violent conflict in Nigeria’s Delta region is a situation that seems to be necessitated by 
opposing interests in the oil resources region. The discovery of oil in this region changed the 
entire social relations within most of the oil village communities, amongst the oil village 
communities, and between the oil village communities and the Nigerian state .For instance, the 
Nigeria state granted ‘oil multinationals the latitude to feign ignorance and deflect allegations 
of negative social, economic, environmental, cultural and political impact of their operations on 
host communities’ (Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria, 2006). Furthermore, the oil resources 
production may have increased the environmental pressure and resource scarcity thereby 
escalating violence among the communities (Homer-Dixon, 1999). The resultant oil economy 
brought with it a change in interest, values and beliefs of the oil communities and the state, 
especially with regards to governance, leadership, power and access to oil resource 
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opportunities. This goes to confirm another classical idea that conflict arises from imbalances 
in relations, such as power relations, economic relations and social relations (Jeong, 2000).  
 
These imbalances in relations are mostly experienced with regards to growth, changes and 
development, which are demonstrated in relations to issues such as unequal social status, 
unequal wealth and access to resources, and unequal power, leading to problems such as 
discrimination, unemployment, poverty, oppression among other forms of social exclusions 
(Responding To Conflict, 2000). These factors listed here are not different from definitions 
provided in the classical definitions of conflicts. In all, it is a demonstration of unequal stake in 
a relationship among or between parties, leading to incompatibility of goals. Therefore, every 
conflict such as conflicts on oil resources as experienced in the Niger Delta should first and 
foremost be seen from a traditional definition of conflict and violence. In this case study, it 
comprises of incompatibility of interests and values among parties who are directly or 
indirectly linked to the oil resources. Therefore, for the oil village communities, this 
‘perception of incompatibility shapes their attitudes and behaviour towards’ themselves, fellow 
oil village communities, the Nigerian state and the Multinational oil companies (Barnes, 
2005:11). Furthermore, conflict is equally an outward expression of imbalance relationship or 
relations of economic, political and socio-cultural which has cumulated into violent responses. 
Thus, conflicts take place within a structured framework of a relationship of dominance, 
resulting in an asymmetrical relationship, as one party is stronger and dominates the other. A 
struggle by the disadvantaged party in such a relationship for a change in its continuous 
dominance could result into a violent conflict. Schmid (1968:226) defines conflict as consisting 
of a social structure ‘that one class loses what the other class wins’. The situation in the oil 
village communities in Nigeria does not actually involve classical economic classes as defined 
in Marxian teaching, but class as an organised or unorganised groups seeking better welfare 
19 
 
and treatment from the abundant oil resource opportunities in Nigeria.  Therefore, as interests 
and disputes over access to such oil benefits persist among the groups, between time and space, 
such conflicts acquire some characteristics of a ‘new war’ (as defined by Kaldor, 2007).  The 
conflicts develop ‘predatory social conditions’ involving grievance, greed, militancy, oil theft 
and illegal bunkering.  
 
 
2.2 Understanding the Paradoxes of Oil Resources 
 
The paradoxical nature of oil resources have continued to multiply as more discoveries and 
explorations are carried out around the globe. As oil resources production increase, it faces the 
challenges of dealing with various socio-political, economic and cultural conditions arising as a 
result of oil resources production activities or other factors around the management of oil 
resources activities, rents and benefits. As stated by Le Billon (2004:2) ‘resources have specific 
historic, geographic, and social qualities participating in shaping the patterns of conflicts and 
violence’.  Consequently, there is a diverse and growing literature on oil resources paradoxes. 
These are literature on the political economy of resource curses and oil abundance (Karl, 1997; 
Ross, 1999; De Soysa, 2000; Watts, 2004; Di John, 2007). Others are political economy and 
geopolitics of resource wars (Klare, 2001; Le Billion, 2004; Richards, 2005). There are also 
literature on economics of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffer, 2004; Fearon, 2006; Cramer, 2006; 
Ross, 2006) and the arguments on oil abundance, resource management and political violence 
(Ibeanu, 2002; Omeje, 2006; Di John, 2007). Specifically, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) in their 
findings, demonstrate that oil amongst all other natural resources, is found to have the highest 
risk of civil conflicts because of the large rent it generates and the shocks to which the 
government and the national economy are subjected. 
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However, in analysing these paradoxes of oil resources, variables identifiable in various studies 
and findings intertwine among themselves, thereby demonstrating the deep nature and 
influence of oil resources on the socio-economics, culture and politics of states which produce 
such resources. In many instances, oil resources and their surrounding variables/factors become 
noticeable for fuelling violent conflicts. Just as argued by Soares de Oliveria while examining 
the impact of oil resources in the Gulf of Guinea, he stated that “Whether or not one accepts the 
notion of a resource curse, dependence on oil revenue has contributed dramatically to the 
unpredictability of economic and political life in the Gulf of Guinea” (2007:56). Similarly, Le 
Billion (2005) also argues that resource dependence, in addition to negatively affecting 
economic performance, also affects politics and the quality of governance. Therefore “given the 
opportunity, ruling groups and communities routinely manipulate economic sectors for political 
and financial gain” (Le Billion, 2005:20).  While referring to oil as devil’s excrement, Ibeanu 
(2008:16) simplifies the argument by submitting that: 
                [Oil resources] has been a source of wealth and poverty, security and 
                insecurity, and development and underdevelopment in equal measures.  
                Ironically, those from whose land it is taken are always on the negative  
                side of its inherent paradoxes-they are poor, insecure and underdeveloped.   
Ironically, the position taken by le Billion (2005) brought out the salient point that communities 
or groups who may not have any connection to the state could play vital roles in the nature of 
the conflict or continuous violence. Therefore, the asymmetrical relationship which exist in oil 
resources conflicts, which states and Oil MNCs are the strong parties and the oil village 
communities is the weak party, could also mean that within the oil village communities, there is 
the existence of asymmetric relationship.  The relationships here are between and among 
members of the oil communities, as they fight over access to power, governance and oil 
opportunities. While some become more secured through their new economic benefits, others 
feel less secured. Again, others due to positions linking them to oil resources become wealthy, 
others face more poverty owing to the activities of oil resources within the same communities.  
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The various dimensional paradoxes of oil presented above have further expanded the meaning 
and explanation of the structures of oil resources. Nonetheless, there is still the existence of 
“the centralizing effect of oil and the state in relation to the oil based nation-building 
enterprises that are unleashed in the context of a politics that predates oil” as a common 
explanation (Watts, 2004:53). However, this common explanation is limited in application, as it 
falls short of including oil-fuelled activities taking place in local communities where the actual 
oil mining and production activities occur. Similarly, Michael Ross’ (2001:4) findings for 
Oxfam America indicate that: 
i. Overall living standards in oil and mineral dependent states are exceptionally low -
lower than they should be given their per capita incomes; 
ii. Higher levels of mineral dependence are strongly correlated with higher poverty rates; 
iii. Oil and mineral dependent states tend to suffer from exceptionally high rates of child 
mortality and low life expectancy; 
iv. Oil dependence (though not mineral dependence) is also associated with high child 
malnutrition, low spending levels on health care, low enrolment rate in primary and 
secondary schools, and low rates of adult literacy; 
v. Mineral dependence is strongly correlated with income inequality; 
vi. Both oil and mineral dependent states are exceptionally vulnerable to economic shocks.  
 
There are further arguments that oil and mineral dependent states tend to suffer from unusual 
high rates of corruption, authoritarian government, government ineffectiveness, military 
spending, and civil war (Ross, 2006). While considerable evidences are presented by Ross in 
support of the above findings, they suffer from the problem of over-generalisation. The 
research approach of examining all the regions of oil producing state or country with the same 
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indices or as a unit, limits its ability to differentiate the extent to which oil resources 
individually affect each region of such state, especially the oil village regions or communities 
where the bulk of the oil producing activities take place. Unlike the focus of this study, most 
existing literature and findings paid more attentions on the extent and effects of oil resources on 
the state. However, among few researches which gave consideration to oil communities, 
findings show that the consequences of violent conflicts in oil village communities are linked 
mainly as an act of the state, with little or no contributions from host communities. Ukiwo 
(2011:26) observes that: 
They include decaying community governance structures, 
violent and violated environments that can no longer sustain 
livelihoods, declining social capital and pervasive distrust of 
public institutions and officer-holders, and the internalization 
of the culture of militarism.  
 
 
The above observation has clearly shown that oil resources affect oil village communities, but 
with little contribution on roles of the communities. Therefore assessing the effects or impacts 
of oil on a state as a unit, would not guarantee an in-depth finding and analysis of oil effects. In 
another example, a review of a research  conducted by the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria 
(2006) on the effects of oil in Nigeria, further highlighted four major consequences or ‘mixed-
blessings’ of oil resources. Firstly, the dominance of oil in the economy has made the state an 
insatiable rent-seeking entity, which seeks to maximise gains from oil resources at all cost. 
There is an intensive zero-sum game at the centre between and among factions and fractions of 
the ruling class, military and civilians.  
 
However, the situations raised above are also commonly experienced in the local oil village 
communities, although they are highly under-investigated. A thorough examination of the 
pattern of conflicts in these oil communities indicates that oil resources greatly affect the socio-
economic and political conditions of these communities. Secondly, the revenue made from oil 
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leads to the creation of “an elaborate and largely informal patron-client structure of incentives 
guaranteeing stupendous wealth to those in charge of political power,” and therefore the 
“concentration of power in the hands of a few elites who circulate around the corridors of 
power almost without end nurtures political corruption and excessive abuse of power” 
(Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria, 2006:25). For example in oil village communities in Nigeria, 
there are high stake struggle for governance, leadership or any other form of authority which 
confers influence or gives access to oil resources benefits and opportunities. Therefore, in 
many instances, it has brewed a fierce struggle for power and authority within these oil village 
communities and at the same time guaranteeing personal security for those who are in control 
of such oil resources benefits and opportunities.  
 
Thirdly, in a typical oil rent economy, economic development is dependent upon a steady 
increase of oil revenue, meaning that the government deploys any means available to achieve 
its oil revenue targets. Local communities also develop strategies to ‘extract’6 and to keep 
‘extracting’ oil benefits such as monetary benefits formally and informally from oil MNCs and 
other petrobusiness operating within their domain. These they do in the forms of 
compensations for land acquired for oil exploration, oil spills and other environmental hazards, 
and as well as rents for protection and for not providing employments for the “youths” in the 
communities.  As will be shown further in this research finding, such a situation of struggle for 
opportunity often leads to fierce competition over such oil resources benefits, resulting in 
violent conflicts. Thus, the resultant violent conflicts stall economic developments of not only 
the state but also the oil village communities, especially revenues coming from oil resources 
which sustain the entire national economy. In the same manner, the existing local economy of 
such oil communities are also distorted towards a capitalist oil resources driven economy, 
                                                 
6 Extract is used connotatively to show the association between the acts of gaining legally or illegally oil resource 
benefits from oil extracting companies operating in oil village communities.  
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which fall short of catering for the socio-economic needs of the local inhabitants, especially in 
the provision of employment and other sources of livelihoods. Oil village communities are 
therefore left with a barrage of socio-economic problems such as poverty, underdevelopment, 
violent competition for access, etc. 
 
On the basis of the foregoing arguments on the paradoxes of oil resources, it may be obvious 
that oil resources create similar socio-economic and political conditions at local community 
level, to the ones they create at the national level. The paradoxes of oil resources as explained 
in this section have shown that oil resources create opportunities for rent-seeking behaviours 
which lead to struggles for power, authority and leadership.  Again, it may further be argued 
that such conditions as unemployment, environmental scarcity and social exclusion created by 
oil resources fuel violent conflicts in oil village communities. For instance, greed and grievance 
cultures7 develop over oil resources activities, oil resources management and access to oil 
benefits and opportunities. 
 
On this note, the previous explanations of the effects of oil resources on the host state seem to 
be asking questions that define and conceptualise the paradox of oil only from a holistic point 
of view. This thereby forgoes an examination of the fact that every constituent of a state 
(especially the region producing the resources) is affected differently by the presence of oil 
resources. Therefore, researching the paradoxes of oil resources at the community level, such 
as the effects of oil resources on violent conflicts, help in understanding the effects of oil 
resources on the political and economic structures of oil village communities. The next section 
aims to explore the manners and means by which oil resources contribute to violent conflicts 
using the various paradoxes it creates. 
                                                 
7  Culture here depicts the acceptance of such activities as a way of life or as part of an existence. To an extent, 
grievance and greed become accepted as a means of addressing oil resource exclusion and oil- fuelled violence.  
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2.3 Demystifying Oil “Resource Curse” and Violent Conflicts 
Arguments 
 
Having broadly situated the paradoxes of oil resources within the context of micro-analysis and 
community based governance in the last section; this section now delineates the link between 
resource curse and violent conflicts. However, even with the vast and varied nature of literature 
on resources and conflicts, ‘the causal links between resources and conflicts are not always 
clear’ (O’lear, 2004:162), thereby leading to various dimensions of what constitutes resource 
conflicts. For instance, resource curse is seen as a major theoretical contribution and finding in 
understanding the effects of oil resources on the political economy of oil producing states. 
These are because, firstly, natural resources abundance according to Karl (1997:44) shows that 
“when minerals are the key source of wealth of a state, these mining revenues alter the 
framework for decision making. They affect not only the actual policy environment of goal 
formation, the type of public institutions adopted, the prospects of building other extractive 
capabilities, and the locus of authority.”  Thus, Sorens(2011:571) summed up resource curse as 
‘a cluster of observed, cross national relationships between natural resources on the one hand 
and poor economic performance, state weakness, political corruption and civil conflict on the 
other’ These are the new assumptions which have consequently overtaken the earlier thinking 
in the 1950s, which saw resource abundance as a blessing. The earliest established knowledge 
on the importance of natural resources could be linked to the early 1950s and 60s conventional 
theories of natural resource abundance as a blessing, with proponents of the theories depicting 
natural resources as being capable of masterminding rapid development in the countries were 
they are located. 
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Proponents of this ‘natural resource as a blessing thinking’ like Rostow (1961) proposed that 
abundant natural resources will enable host developing economies to achieve industrial ‘take-
off’ like Australia, the United States and Britain. However, an identifiable oversight in their 
research findings are that Karl (1997) and Rostow (1961) based their premises only on formal 
state authority, institutions and formal sectors. They gave little consideration to the non-formal 
sector, non-state institutions and non-formal authorities like subsistence farming, traditional 
institutions, and community leadership, which in one way or another are affected by extractive 
activities. Therefore, their premises provided a narrow analytical path for understanding the 
roles of natural resources in the entire political economy of the host state, especially where 
such a state is seen as a single unit. As argued in section 2.2, the narrow nature of some of the 
research or the generalisation approach leaves the political economy of oil resources in the 
local oil communities un-researched.  
 
In assessing the profound nature of resource curse and resource abundance, Di John (2007:961) 
looks at the effects of oil abundance, submitting that: 
                  While oil abundance has long been considered beneficial to economic 
                  and political development, the recent poor economic performance 
                  of oil exporters and the growing incidence of civil wars in mineral 
                 -rich economies have revived the idea that their resources abundance 
                 may be more of a curse than a blessing.  
 
While this explanation can be considered as being more issue-specific, it still failed to include 
socio-economic relations and social development, especially of other non-state actors like the 
oil village communities affected by effects of oil abundance. However, Le Billion (2001:564) 
deepens this argument, submitting that: 
                   Rents generated by narrow and mostly foreign-dominated resource 
                 industries allow ruling groups to dispense with economic diversification 
                 and popular legitimacy, often resulting in rent seeking, poor economic  
                  growth, and little social mobility outside politics and state patronage.  
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As we shall see, rent seeking and patronage are part of the mechanism for the continuous 
extraction of oil resources, as those considered as the ruling or influential groups are very 
adequately compensated by petrobusiness. Arguing in the same perspective, Rosser (2006:267) 
suggests that “the effect that natural resources have on a country’s conflict risk depends on how 
the revenues affect the rest of the economy: if new oil or diamond wealth is productively 
invested and leads to a substantial rise in GDP, the benefits of a higher income can offset the 
detriments of resource extraction.” These negative effects identified by Le Billion and Rosser 
could also exist outside the state, as patronage and informal rent-seeking which exist in 
informal settings in some oil economies are linked to the presence of oil resources. Again, oil 
resources have promoted local economies which exist outside the formal sector (existing in the 
informal sector) which are mostly not captured in the GDPs of most resources-rich developing 
countries like Nigeria, Sudan and Angola. Furthermore, Le Billion and Rosser neglected the 
struggles to control such local economies which in many instances fuel violent conflicts among 
local communities in the area. In exemplifying this argument further, Watts (2004:52) claims 
that “oil is the theatre of conflict within which Nigerian politics is currently being played”, 
based on an assessment of Nigeria’s political and ethnic composition. Watts further identified 
the growing struggle for self-determination, insecurity, intra-community crisis, local control 
over oil resources, and youth militancy, as factors which greatly affect such local communities. 
However, while making his submission, Watts failed to clearly link the violent struggles 
experienced in local governance and leadership tussles in the oil region to the presence and 
activities of oil resources. 
 
However, further examination of some of the literature on oil resources conflicts show that the 
environmental impacts of oil operations on the local people have been comprehensively 
addressed as a major aspect of the effects of oil resources on local communities (Frynas, 2001). 
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As noted by Frynas, various researches have been conducted on anti-oil protests by local 
communities, and the repressive and concessional activities of the Nigeria state aided by 
‘corporate security measures’ provided by oil MNCs(Frynas, 2001:28). While acknowledging 
the negative impact of oil operations on the environment as the visible chief cause of anti-oil 
protest in oil village communities, the literature and other findings have paid no attention to the 
re-structuring of socio-economic conditions of host oil communities by oil resources activities, 
as well as a change in the social relations of people, which could cause anti-oil protests and 
violence among the people. This has imposed various forms of political, economic, social, 
cultural and historical negative changes on oil village communities. Examples of such negative 
effects are found in leadership and access to power, inequalities and access to livelihoods. 
 
Cramer (2003:409) suggests that “economic inequality is hugely important to explaining civil 
conflict, but only insofar as the economic is considered inseparable from the social, political, 
cultural and historical. This allows for greater explanatory depth…; it also allows for the 
significance of varying kinds of inequality to become clearer”. Similarly, in understanding 
resource abundance (oil abundance), resource curse (oil curse) and violent conflicts, various 
aspects of the effects of oil resources should be considered and not just the environment. This 
is because oil-fuelled conflict and violence also have political, social, cultural and economic 
negative effects on affected host communities. Homer-Dixon(1994:52) further clarified issues 
of environmental scarcity and inequality as experienced in oil resources related violent conflict, 
by stating that structural scarcity (a form of environmental scarcity) “is caused by unequal 
distribution that concentrates a resource in the hands of some groups and subjects the rest to 
greater than average scarcity”. This submission by Homer-Dixon was clear in establishing the 
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tendency of resources (natural resources like oil) creating social exclusion8, but fell short of 
linking the aftermath of such social exclusion to fierce competition for access to the new or 
scarce resources and opportunities by the socially excluded. However, the struggle for the 
reversal of the new condition is always met with opposition by those who gain or are gaining 
from such social exclusion, thereby fuelling violent conflicts and revolts.  
 
However, the relationship between oil resources abundance, oil resources curse and violent 
conflicts and the socially excluded members of the oil village communities is that it is “a 
contemporary form of exploitation” (Byrne, 2005:15).According to Byrne, exclusion is not 
domination and has little to do with identity, but has more to do with specific economic 
relations (2005:15).As contentious as this submission seems, findings on oil resources 
activities show that they create an environment of social exclusionism, as one group is 
favoured over others in the society. These violence situations  which are necessitated by oil 
related activities cuts across various ‘dimensions’ of violent conflict, which according to 
Goodhand (2001:18) are the “security dimension of conflict”, the “political dimension of 
conflict”, the “economic dimension of conflict” and the “social dimension of conflict” 
(Goodhand, 2001:21-40). Invariably, oil resources activities impose a form of structure that 
promotes socio-economic discrimination among members of oil village communities. 
 
To further lend support to the understanding of the ‘oil resources curse and abundance 
argument’, Rosser (2006:268) identified the categories used in explaining resource curse and 
the causal mechanisms under seven perspectives.  These are: 
i. Economistic perspectives that emphasise economic mechanisms; 
                                                 
8Madanipour et al. (1998.22) defined social exclusion as “a multi-dimensional process, in which various forms of 
exclusion are combined: participation in decision making and political processes, access to employment and 
material resources, and integration into common cultural processes. When combined, they create acute forms of 
exclusion that find a spatial manifestation in particular neighbourhoods.” 
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ii. Behaviouralist perspectives that emphasise emotional or irrational behaviour  on the 
part of political actors; 
iii. Rational actor perspectives that emphasise self-interested behaviour on the part of the 
political actors; 
iv. State-centred perspectives that emphasise the nature of the state; 
v. Social capital perspectives that emphasise the degree of social cohesion in countries; 
vi. Structural perspectives that emphasise the role of social groups or socio-economic 
structure;  
vii.   Radical perspectives that emphasise the role of foreign actors and structures of power 
at the global level. 
Rosser’s opinion on the understanding of oil resources curse and oil abundance presents wide-
ranging views considering the various dimensions of the perspectives but it lacks a strong 
contextual and analytical explanation in linking the various perspectives to oil-fuelled conflicts.   
 
Writing on the impact of oil wealth on economies of resource-rich countries, Humphreys, 
Sachs and Stieglitz (2007:4) explain that “the detachment of the oil sector from domestic, 
political and economic processes and the non-renewable nature of natural resources give rise to 
a large array of political and economic processes that produce adverse effects on an economy.” 
This explanation is similar to the views of Ross (1999:298) who submits that states’ failure to 
adopt measures that would change “resource abundance from a liability to an asset has become 
the most puzzling part of the resource curse”, and could therefore create enabling environment 
for other forms violent conflicts. As further explained by Torvik (2002), natural resource 
increase may decrease productivity and income due to rent seeking. This implies that rent 
seeking arising out of abundance of natural resources could become a curse to national growth 
and productivity of the host state and host oil village communities as well. As explained in 
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various literatures, such situation gives rise to ‘Dutch disease’9, which crowd out all other 
investment and economic endeavours for petrobusiness.  
 Again, Rosser (2006:07) rather stresses the role of social forces or external political and 
economic environments in shaping development outcomes in resource abundant states. This 
demonstrates the distorting role of natural resources to the political, economic and social 
environment of its host state.  The above explanations provide a state-centred perspective of 
what constitutes resource curse and resource abundance and as such neglect an interpretation of 
how the local environment, and the activities of local actors  influence development outcomes, 
or how oil resources affect the activities of local actors in oil village communities. This study 
adopts its research findings from the resource curse and resource abundance arguments but 
argues from the local community perspective instead of the state-centred perspective. 
 
 It is also imperative to mention that contemporary literature on resources and conflict is vast 
and varied, but “yet the causal links between resources and conflict are not always clear.” 
(O’lear, 2004:162); for instance, there is the failure to establish the causal mechanisms that 
connect mineral wealth to war (Ross, 2006), notwithstanding that research on the ‘phenomenon 
of resource wars’ and the relationship between resource scarcity and violent conflicts have long 
been acknowledged (Peters, 2004:188).  
 
Pointing in a similar direction, Watts (2004:53) acknowledges the deep problematic nature of 
most of resource politics literature, especially as “it elides the purported effects of oil with 
incumbent politics.” Watts, in contributing to oil resources-politics scholarship, examines the 
                                                 
9 Dutch disease refers to the poor performance of other sectors of the economy or a decline of pre-existing 
domestic sectors with the export of resources in commercial quantity.  There is a rise in value of exported natural 
resources leading to appreciation of real exchange rate, and therefore the diversion of labour and materials to 
natural resource sector(Humphreys, Sachs and Stieglitz,2007:5). 
32 
 
relationship between oil and violence, and how forms of governable space10 are shaped and 
recreated out of authoritarian governmentality in the Niger Delta. Watts’s position further 
demonstrates that violent contestations that take place in an existing governable space such as 
chieftainship, or a violent creation of a new space such as civil vigilantism or “youth” authority 
in the Niger Delta are due to the illegal rents which such space helps in extracting from 
petrobusiness, or the access which it provides to oil benefits. This assumption drawn from 
Watts’s submission meant that local oil village communities and other forms of local 
governance could be re-shaped and recreated by oil- related activities. 
 
Furthermore, in the midst of these academic contributions, one clear and very observable point 
is that natural resources wealth could be extracted independent of the political and economic 
processes in the state. Meaning that not only established government could extract and lay 
claim to such resources, but other forms of informal authorities, especially local informal 
authorities within where the oil activities take place, could also lay claim to it legally or 
illegally (Humphreys, Sachs and Stieglitz, 2007). Subsequently, complementary violence 
develops out of the act of laying these claims, and possessing and processing such natural 
resources, as government fights groups or groups fight each other in the attempt to lay claims, 
control and gain access to such resources. Humphreys, Sachs and Stieglitz in their 2007 book 
Escaping the resource curse further argue that: 
The production of natural resources is liable to give rise to 
various types of political frustrations within a country and 
especially in the producing region. The extraction process itself 
may result in forced out-migration, and new in-migration, with 
attendant population pressure and environmental pollution or 
degradation. Even if such changes to local conditions are 
minimal, resource-rich regions may feel that they have a 
particular claim on resource wealth and may be aggravated if 
                                                 
10Governable space is defined as the topography of overlapping, entangled governable orders with different logics 
imposed by violent and powerful actors. They create interplay of rules and orders within which actors in civil war 
navigate (Korf et al., 2008). 
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they see the wealth leaving their region and benefiting others 
(2007:13). 
 
While the argument presented in the above explanation is relatively straightforward, there is 
also the need not to directly link all struggles over resources as the causes of violent conflict. 
As pointed out by Le Billion (2007) this may amount to reducing conflicts over resources to a 
single factor and therefore risking the problem of oversimplification. Therefore in re- 
examining the resource abundance, resource curse and violent conflicts arguments, I apply a 
multidimensional perspective with no specific or direct link between conflicts and oil 
resources, but rather looking at how oil resources generate other conditions that may fuel 
violent conflicts. These conditions could be political, economic or social, and, as further argued 
by Le Billion such “political dimensions of resources include the social practices involved in 
resource exploitation, circulation, transformation and consumption...[and the involvement of] 
potential interplay of resource related social processes, including identity formation and 
territorialities at various scales.” (2007:2). 
 
On the basis of the foregoing arguments, various recent studies have demonstrated the effects 
of natural resources on violent conflicts in many natural resources rich-states. This has 
prompted  the need and urgency to re-examine the effect of natural resources in fuelling such 
violent conflicts, especially in local oil communities. Ngomba-Roth (2007:106) opines that 
“the effects (long term and short) of oil...are many and controversial”; it fuels exploitation11 . 
For example,  for “most Nigerians, especially those living in the Niger Delta, Nigeria’s oil 
wealth is actually ‘oil of poverty’ or a curse, because it has produced only poverty, 
underdevelopment and conflicts since its commercial exploitation began in the late 1950s.” 
(Olarinmoye, 2005:22). Like in the case of Nigeria, benefit from oil resources which accrue to 
                                                 
11 Robert E.Goodin (1987:168) claims that “Exploitation is an act which, if successful, confers certain perceived 
benefits upon the exploiter. (‘Perceived’, because people may of course think they are benefitting, when they are 
not really at all.) To succeed... exploiters must not only successfully seize the advantages but also successfully 
transform them into real advantages.” 
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individuals, groups or communities are based on their positions and influence nationally or 
locally within the oil economy. 
 
The divergent views in literature notwithstanding, what stands as a major point of convergence 
in understanding resources and conflict arguments is that “resources have specific historic, 
geographic, and social qualities participating in shaping the pattern of conflicts and violence” 
(Le Billion, 2004:2). Disappointingly, levels of poverty and destitution are found to be high 
particularly in the areas that harbour such natural resources or where the mining occurs.   
 
 
2.4 Conceptualising Resource Conflicts and Violence in Oil States 
 
In analysing conflicts and violence in oil states, it is pertinent to point out that there is the 
continuous presence of conflicts and violence in most oil rich states, especially in developing 
states. Such conflicts arise out of the conflict handling styles like competing, avoiding etc., and 
as well as the disposition of most of such states to the resources coming from oil. Such 
conflicts and violence have widened and transformed considerably into violent conflicts, and 
stalling economic development for such states (Klare, 2004). However, even with the resultant 
violent conflicts that seems to be rising due to the presence, valuation and activities of oil 
resources, the global demand for oil remains very high. For instance, 2010 consumption 
exceeded production by over 5m barrels per day for the first year ever, as world oil stocks were 
in high demand with China’s consumption rising “by over 4m barrels per day in the past 
decade, accounting for two-fifths of the global rise” (The Economist: June, 2011). Klare 
(2001:15) provides further insight by submitting that the “global demand for many key 
materials is growing at an unsustainable rate. As the human population grows, societies require 
more of everything (food, water, energy, timber, minerals, fibres and so on) to satisfy the basic 
material requirements of their members” Again, as explained by Klare, petroleum stands out 
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among other natural resources as the major resource that drives the global economy. Thus “no 
highly industrialized society can survive at present without substantial supplies of oil, and so 
any significant threat to the continued availability of this resource will prove a cause for crisis 
and, in extreme cases, provoke the use of military force” (Klare,2001:27). This implies how 
much oil resources are valued and the extent to which groups both state and non-state actor 
could go in other to maintain the production, especially because of the benefits which it brings. 
 
These arguments lay the foundation for understanding the importance of oil resources to the 
global economy, both for the producing states and the demanding states, even though it does 
not provide an explanation for other forms of ‘threats’ to oil supply which cannot be dealt with 
militarily. Initial explanations of the use of military force makes oil- fuelled conflict a one-
sided violence12 only prosecuted by the state. However in many situations, organised armed 
groups engage in various non-state violent conflicts over natural resources such as oil.  This is 
contrary to such analyses which look at violent conflicts and violence from a macro level, 
especially where the state is assumed to be the custodian of natural resources in any given 
territory.  However, the growing nature of violent conflicts fuelled by oil resources activities 
involves both ‘armed conflicts’ and ‘non- state conflicts’, meaning that it may involve other 
‘formally organised groups’ or ‘organised group’13 other than the state.  Thus, oil resources, 
like other “natural resources have played a conspicuous role in the history of armed conflicts” 
                                                 
12 According to Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) One- sided Violence is defined as “the use of armed force 
by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths.” 
Or, in simpler terms, it is defined as more or less violence aimed directly at unarmed civilians that during one year 
reaches a certain level of intensity. This shows the extent to which states can go to maintain oil production or 
groups can go to gain from oil resource. 
13Non-state conflict is defined by UCDP as “The use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither 
of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle related deaths in a year.” Formally 
organised group is defined as “Any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group 
and using armed force.” It could be state based, non-state or one-sided. Organised group is defined as“Any group 
who does not have an announced name, but who uses armed force and whose violent activity meets at least one of 
the following organisational requirements: there must be a clear pattern of incidents which are connected, or there 
must be evidence that violence was planned in advance. It is mostly non-state based 
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in various forms, interstate, intrastate, ethnic, local and communal (Le Billion, 2001:562). 
Therefore, the idea of the studying the link between natural resources and conflicts arises from 
the fact that many economies with abundant endowments of such resources have experienced 
violent internal conflicts, such as civil wars, although not in all cases (Tadjoeddin, 2007). 
Incidentally, where such studies are between the state and groups or regions in which such 
resources are extracted, there is also the tendency that non-state conflicts and violence are 
subsumed inside the entire study. 
 
Consequently, the issues of resource conflicts and violence in oil states are commonly 
examined by scholars using either the resource scarcity argument or the resource abundance 
argument or both. According to Homer-Dixon (1999:48), resource scarcities come in the forms 
of supply-induced, demand induced and structural scarcities arising “in three ways: through a 
drop in the supply of a key resource, through an increase in demand, and through a change in 
the relative access of different groups to the resource”. These could be a threat to availability of 
oil resources and a driver for violence and conflicts in oil resource states. Brunnschweiler and 
Bultey while writing on Natural resources and violent conflict submitted that: 
Scarcity is linked to conflict via two mechanisms: it may 
trigger marginalization of powerless groups by elite scrambling 
for resource, and it could have a debilitating effect on processes 
of social and economic innovation (resulting in an ‘ingenuity 
gap’). (2009:654) 
 
This argument provides a contextual view of assessing how oil resources fuel conflicts and 
violence. Using Environmental scarcity14 as the underlying factor causing violent conflicts, 
especially in resource-rich developing economics, Homer-Dixon (1999) further submitted that 
such states depend much on their “environmental goods and services for their economic 
                                                 
14  Thomas Homer-Dixon in his 1999 book Environment, scarcity and violence described Environmental scarcity 
as scarcity of renewable resources, such as cropland, forests, river water and fish stocks. This scarcity can arise 
from… depletion, degradation of the resource, from increased demand on it, and from unequal distribution 
(1999:8). 
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wellbeing, with environmental scarcities as consequence of such activities”. When this 
happens, there is a tendency for any of these five types of violent conflicts to befall such states, 
these are: 
1. Disputes arising directly from local environmental degradation caused, for instance, by 
factory emissions, logging or dam construction 
 
2. Ethnic clashes arising from population migration and deepened social cleavages due to 
environmental scarcity  
 
3. Civil strife(including insurgency, banditry, and coups d’état) caused by environmental 
scarcity that affects economic productivity and, in turn, people’s livelihoods, the 
behaviour of elite groups, and the ability of states to meet these changing demands 
 
4. Scarcity-induced interstate war over, for example, water 
 
5. North-South conflicts(i.e., conflicts between the developed and developing worlds) 
over mitigation of, adaptation to, and compensation for global environmental problems 
like global warning, ozone depletion, threats to biodiversity, and decreases in fish 
stocks. 
 
 
Although these arguments were able to establish the linkage between environmental scarcity 
and violent conflict, they cannot escape the challenge of using environmental scarcity as the 
main pivot of resource scarcity which fuels violent conflicts and violence. Again, the 
consequences listed by Homer-Dixon do not include the politics and economics of resource 
ownership, which are mainly experienced in local resource-bearing communities, as the clashes 
may not be fuelled by ethnic colouration but by economic gains and access to resource 
benefits.  In the same way, Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) argue that the environmental scarcity 
argument fails to include factors such as ‘maldistribution of land’ and income inequality as a 
cause of conflict in its structural scarcity, as it concerns ‘unequal distribution of resources’ 
(especially land), which is a consequence of politics and not economic. But rather, the politics 
of resource distribution has been submerged into the environmental scarcity concept.  Welch 
and Miewald (1983:10) argued that “Scarcity seldom exists as an absolute fact...scarcity as a 
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social or political problem is largely defined by people’s perceptions of the lack of resource in 
terms of their image of the good life.” 
 
Watts (2004a) in providing an explanation for resource conflicts and violence in oil states 
adopted the ‘oil complex’15‘Petro-violence’16 and ‘Petrol state’17 perspectives. The ‘oil 
complex’ means that the current political economy of the oil industry breeds violence and 
human rights violation through the ‘petro-structure’18 it has imposed on the oil-rich developing 
countries. Citing an example of such ‘oil complex Petro-violence’, Watts explained that:   
The complex relations between oil and violence mean that 
many extractive industries operate in conditions of deep enmity 
and conflict, and occasionally civil war and insurgency [...] The 
human rights concerns stem from the fact that continued oil 
operations can become the basis for continued or expanded 
military action – and companies’ profits may in part reflect the 
benefits conferred by state violence (displacement, scorched 
earth policies, suppression of dissent). The Indonesian state 
imposed martial law and terrorized Aceh in the 1990s, and 
gave the military a large role in both the planning and 
execution of the gas and oil installations. The role of a number 
of oil companies in Afghanistan in relation to the rise of 
Taliban rule and the civil war has been exposed as deeply 
unethical (2004a:15). 
 
Watts’ submission was clear in establishing the nature and manner of petro-violence which a 
petro-state is ready to inflict on citizens in order to carry on with oil production. Furthermore 
Klare, in his 2001 work Resource wars, argued boldly that, “conflict over valuable resources – 
and the power and wealth they confer- has become an increasingly prominent feature of global 
                                                 
15Watts (2004a:7) describes The oil complex as “a sort of corporate enclave economy and in this sense harkens 
back to dependency theory and the enclave character of ‘modernization’ – but its character and dynamics are quite 
specific to the oil sector and the historical moment in which oil is a strategic assets...It is a configuration of 
community, Oil Company, and the state and local government institutions generative of conflict.” 
16 Petro-violence is conceptualised in the study to depict the joint security carried out by the Nigerian military and 
the oil MNCs as part of policing oil installations, and curbing the communities of social unrest surrounding 
petroleum extraction(Peluso,N and M. Watts ,2001) 
17 Petro-state means a rentier state with oil resource revenue accounting for a significant proportion of its GDP, 
and over 80% of both Government and export revenues. Examples of such states are Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela(Watts,2004a:10) 
18 Watts (2004a:5) this is the configuration of social, political and economic forces around the oil complex in most 
developing states with abundance oil resource like Venezuela or Gabon, Nigeria. 
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landscape. Often intermixed with ethnic, religious, tribal antagonisms, such conflict has posed 
a significant and growing threat to peace and stability in many areas of the world” (2001:1). 
However, Richards (2001:66) disagrees with the notion of resource wars, citing Western Africa 
as an example of having a distinctive feature, with the resources in question(oil, diamonds, 
uranium) not being of immediate local utility to them but rather being of ‘strategic 
significance’ to the industrial countries.  As precise as Richard’s submission is in identifying 
the non-utility value of these natural resources to local societies or communities where they are 
mined, his assessment of the values of the resources purely from the direct utility of the 
resources falls short of recognising other forms of values such as socio-economic and political 
values, and access to benefits due to the office one occupys,which the mining of such natural 
resources could confer on a few people from such a local community.  
 
Again, resource abundance, just like resource scarcity, has been linked to the prevalence of 
violence in oil producing states.  In some cases, the nature and extent of violence instituted by 
oil abundance may differ in various part of the state. Especially among the oil –village 
communities, it may not just be ‘armed or physical violence’ but ‘psychological violence’, 
‘structural violence’ and/or ‘cultural violence. To that effect, a resource such as oil with its 
high-rent nature sustains corrosion of the political economy and entrenching a predatory 
political state, thereby eliciting “military challenge from disenchanted groups” (Auty, 
2004:46). This predatory nature created by oil abundance does not only involve the formal 
authorities, like the state, who benefit from the high rent, but also other informal authorities or 
other forms of governance who are linked in one way or another to such oil resources. 
 
Arguing in this context, oil resources in whichever way they are perceived (either as a case of 
abundance or scarcity) have a social relation which is built around the political economy of its 
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management, or rightly put, in the ways and manners of the distribution of the oil resources 
benefits. Considering Obi’s submission that: 
There should be no inevitability in the relationship between oil, 
corruption, and violent conflict. The reality is that oil alone 
does not lead to violence or corruption. Conflict occurs only as 
a result of the politicisation of the oil factor, in ways that make 
the exclusive control of oil and its distribution, the exclusive 
preserve of ‘a few’ to the exclusion of others. (2007:9) 
 
The above submission took cognisance of the mixed nature of the conflicts and causes of 
violence necessitated not just by oil resources alone but activities surrounding whom and how 
such oil resources and benefits are distributed. Obi’s argument like the previous ones fell short 
of acknowledging that these politicised oil factors could also be in the form of ‘local politics’ 
or local influences in oil village communities. This is because, as local leadership positions 
such as traditional authorities become part of the politicised factor of oil production, the 
struggle for such positions becomes fierce, owing to the access to oil resources opportunities 
and benefits which they provide.  
 
It is therefore evident that the understanding and conceptualisation of oil resources-related 
violent conflicts in the oil states are drawn from all the available theses: the ‘oil resource 
curse’, the oil resource abundance and oil scarcity theses. It further means that to have a clear 
understanding of the contribution of these theses in line with the nature of conflict and violence 
which exist in oil states, the conceptualisation should capture every level of governance, 
authority and social relations (whether formal or informal, state or non-state) associated with 
oil resources distribution and management. Especially as it affects the local oil village 
communities, unlike previous researches which dwell on a macro analysis of ‘resource curse’, 
‘resource abundance’ and ‘resource scarcity’, and forgoes the importance of the micro-level 
analysis represented by local activities (struggle for power, access to control of handouts from 
oil resources). Incidentally, many violent conflicts in the oil village communities are non-state 
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conflicts and violence with evidence showing effects of ‘oil curse’, ‘environmental scarcity’ 
and ‘oil abundance’ at the local level. Therefore, it is evident that oil resources, like other 
natural resources, have “played a conspicuous role in the history of armed conflicts” (Le 
Billion, 2001:562), but more obviously, they have continued to fuel violent conflicts (mostly 
non-state conflicts) in the communities or areas of their production activities.   
 
 
2.4.1 Examining Oil rent, Rent-seeking and Oil Resources Conflicts 
 
The explanation below by Watts (2007) depicts a picture of a typical petro- state, accordingly: 
The heart of the petro-state state is unearned income, and its 
central dynamic is the fiscal sociology of the distribution of and 
access to oil rents. The oil revenue distribution question – 
whether in a federal system like Nigeria or in an autocratic 
monarchy like Saudi Arabia – is an indispensable part of 
understanding the combustible politics of imperial oil. (Watts, 
2007:642) 
 
As noted in Section 2.2, oil resources, like other natural resources, are considered by some 
scholars and leaders of resource-rich countries as new avenues which could provide the 
resources necessary for oil producing states to achieve a level of development like the countries 
classified as developed. However, the inability of many natural resource-rich countries, 
especially those with abundant oil resources, with high external earnings from oil to transform 
their countries into appreciably, visibly and sustainably developed economies, has remained a 
puzzle. There have been questions as to why these states are experiencing violent conflicts and 
wars in the midst of such oil wealth. 
 
Just as it is described as “the devil’s excrement”19, oil is today often linked to the economic and 
political failures of these petro-states (Karl, 1997). Such reliance on oil revenue, which is 
                                                 
19 Karl’s (1997:4) nickname for Petroleum to show its double sided nature, especially its negative aspect.  
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referred to as ‘oil rent’20, has today broadened out the issue of ‘rentierism’21 .  Ross (1999:312) 
opines that “theories of rentier state centered on the fact that when governments gain most of 
their revenue from external sources such as resource rents ... they are freed from need to levy 
domestic taxes and become less accountable to the societies they govern.” This explanation 
lends support to one of the famous theses on The paradox of oil resources, Petro-state and oil 
rent by Terry L.Karl. Here, Karl (1997) putting in perspective the nature of oil revenue argued 
that: 
Dependence on petroleum revenue produces a distinctive type 
of institutional setting, the petrol-state, which encourages the 
distribution of rents. Such a state is characterized by fiscal 
reliance on petro-dollars, which expands state jurisdiction and 
weakens authority as other extractive capabilities. As a result, 
when faced with competing pressures, state officials become 
habituated by relying on the statecraft, thereby further 
weakening state capability. (Karl, 1999:16) 
 
Much of the researches by Karl and Ross were able to identify the inhibiting nature of oil rent 
on an oil producing state, especially on the institutions, authority, capacity and capability of the 
producing state. Again, beside the interpretation and the linkage between oil rent and oil 
resources abundance and resource curse which have been acknowledged and accepted, there is 
the negligence of other non-state actors, whose activities may in one way or another have been 
affected by the oil rent and oil rent seeking behaviour. Omeje (2005:322), in giving further 
explanation on what constitutes a rentier state, posits that: 
A rentier state is a state reliant not on the surplus production of the 
domestic economy or population but externally generated revenues or 
rents, usually derived from the extractive industry such as oil. A rentier 
state generally lacks a productive outlook in the sense that revenues 
from natural resources rents contribute a significant proportion of the 
                                                 
20Beblawi(1990:85) explained that rents are “exports earned or income derived from a gift of nature,” thus      
Omeje (2005:1) sees oil rent as oil mining rents, taxes, returns from equity stakes on joint oil investments and 
royalties paid by transnational oil-producing companies(TNOCs) on which such a country largely depends. 
21 Okruhlik (1999:295) sees rentierism as the intellectual debates that have been generated on the relationship 
between oil and politics, of which a number of propositions concern the nature of the developmental process 
necessitated by the oil rent. 
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gross domestic product and dominate national income distribution, 
usually at the expense of the real productive sectors of the economy. 
 
The above definition is able to demonstrate the nature of oil rent in becoming a dominant 
feature in the economy of a rentier state. However, just like other classical state-centred 
perspectives, it gives major consideration to the national economy, thus terms such as “the 
productive sector of the economy” and the gross domestic product are considered as the major 
conditions in determining the impact of oil rent in such economy.  There is less or no 
consideration of the impact of oil rent on local economy that exists in some local communities 
where such oil activities take place. Even with explanations that “oil revenues increase to the 
point at which they dominate a government’s revenue sources,” and the government evolving 
from an extractive state into a distributive one (Smith, 2004:233), there is no emphasis on oil-
related revenues dominating the income of agents other than the government of the state. 
Following this nature of analysis, scholars characteristically fail to link oil rent or rent seeking 
to the non-state or intra-communal conflicts that often take place in oil village communities.  
 
In furtherance of the notion of ‘rent-seeking’, Di John (2007:964) notes that; 
                Rent seeking can be conceptualized as influencing activities, which 
                range from bribing, political lobbying and advertising to taking up  
                arms. The greed based theories of war make two implicit assumptions:  
                the first is that the existence of oil rents will induce greater rent-seeking 
                generally, the second that the violent forms of rent-seeking are more 
                likely to occur when oil rents exist. 
 
  
Di John’s insertion of informal patron-client networks and illegal forms of rent-seeking or 
corruption as mechanisms of influencing rent seeking in a state is very inclusive. Thus, in line 
with his argument, it could be suggested that illegal rent-seeking may become accepted as a 
“legal and formal mechanism” in local oil village communities, which are marginalised from 
oil rent by the state. Consequently, such a situation may breed stiff competition and violent 
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conflicts among parties in the communities interested in or participating in such forms of 
illegal rent-seeking. Therefore, just as rent-seeking weakens state institutions (Omeje, 2005), it 
also weakens existing non-state institutions like traditional authorities, by creating new 
governable spaces (see section 2.3) 
 
2.4.2 Oil Resources and the Cultures of Greed and Grievance 
 
In the literature, various perspectives have been raised regarding the causes and natures of 
natural resources- fuelled violent conflicts. Berdal and Malone (2000:2) were driven by the 
circumstances of these war economies and violent conflicts into questioning “the complex web 
of motives and interactions...of the political economy of civil wars.” Consequently, the major 
divide is between “the conventional wisdom that civil wars and insurgencies originate in 
perceptions of relative deprivation and social justice... and that people rebel not because of the 
opportunities available for them to do well out of war.” (Ukiwo, 2007:589).  In many instances, 
it becomes very difficult to differentiate, especially where one party is using violence meted on 
them as basis for their reaction which is seen as opportunistic.  
 
 This has raised various questions among scholars about why and what constitutes the motives 
behind oil resources driven violent conflicts, and whether such conflicts are singularly 
motivated by economic opportunity. The situation commonly referred to in literature as ‘greed 
and grievance’ is today considered to have led to many oil- related civil wars, civil conflicts, 
non-state conflicts and insurgency. While grievance is regarded as part and parcel of traditional 
conflict, greed is seen as a new introduction to conflict issues, and mostly associated with 
economic resources. However, if conflicts are intrinsically linked to human existence and 
relations in all societies (Isard, 1992:1), this therefore means that grievances could arise out of 
such social relations and, in combination with other factors, could result in conflict. Therefore, 
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issues such as income inequality and social exclusion are major causes of economic grievances 
in many societies and have in most cases fuelled violence spearheaded by a disadvantaged 
group (Gurr, 1970; Alesina and Perotti, 1996).  
 
Similarly, in providing an explanation for grievance fuelled conflicts over resources, Cramer 
(2006:124) argued that: 
                        The two contrasting arguments about resource and conflict, one about 
scarcity and the other about abundance, capture two basic ideas of the 
                        material dimensions of what drives political violence and conflict. One 
                        stresses desperation and inequality, the other calculation and opportunity. 
                         
Therefore “grievance...is rooted in a behavioral paradigm, and emphasizes relative deprivation, 
social exclusion and inequality” (Brunnschweiler and Bultey, 2009:3).This could be 
exacerbated by factors such as democracy, ethnic or religious fractionalisation and ethnic 
dominance (Ward, Greenhill and Bakke, 2010) and, in the case of resource-rich societies, by 
factors such as environmental degradation, poverty, land and unemployment (Rosser, 2006). 
 
However, proponents of ‘greed’ assumption and theory like Paul Collier consider economic 
opportunity as the driving force behind violent conflicts such as civil wars. Collier and Hoeffler 
argued that oil abundance can increase the incidence of civil conflicts and war. To Collier and 
Hoeffler, primary commodities such as oil provide opportunities for extortion “making 
rebellion feasible and perhaps even attractive” (2004). Again, Collier (2000:110) had 
previously argued that “the objective factors that might contribute to grievance, such as 
income, asset inequality, ethnic and religious divisions, and political repression, do not seem to 
increase the risks of conflict”. Rather that economic factors are the main drivers of conflict, 
with small identifiable groups doing well out of the conflict. In continuance of the greed 
theory, Collier further pointed out that, “grievance rebellions are not suppressed by effective 
government: they are crowded out by other types of rebellion...A rebellion started by idealists 
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in the context of valuable resources becomes swamped by opportunists as it expands” 
(2005:626). Subsequently, to the rebels involved in such a war, it is not just about “a 
breakdown in a particular system, rather...the emergence of an alternative system of profit, 
power, and even protection,” which creates a war economy situation and a favourable 
environment for looting and plundering existing natural resources(Keen,2000:22). 
Interestingly, greed in many occasions develop into warlordism, with the main actor or actors 
challenging the state in the arena of monopoly of violence, control of resource wealth, and thus 
becoming ‘competitor for economic resources and local, or indeed regional, political influence’ 
(Beswick, 2009:338). 
 
Although these arguments setting greed and opportunity as the main motivation for war, 
insurgency and other forms of violent conflict cannot be totally refuted, they have been 
criticised for being “less assertive of the causal link between economic incentives and the 
outbreak of insurgency and civil war” (Ukiwo, 2007:589).  Again, the economics of violence 
thesis neglects the context–specific nature of conflicts, using a ‘one cap fits all’ theory in 
examining all cases. It focuses most of its analysis around the state and around armed conflicts, 
with little consideration for non-state conflicts that occur over resource ownership.   
 
Again, with the specific case study of oil village communities, the war economy thesis does not 
consider issues of inequality, social exclusion, economic and political marginalisation as 
important in fuelling violent conflicts, especially where one group is favoured by the state over 
and above other groups in gaining benefits from such resources. Oluwaniyi (2011:150) 
submitted that: 
                  Women in the Niger Delta struggle simultaneously against the state- 
                  partnership as well as oppressive gender relations. This party finds 
                  expression in the collaboration between the local male elites, the 
                  state and oil MNCs, which conspire to exclude women from the 
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                  distribution of the benefits of the oil industry, resulting in  their 
                  their impoverishment and disempowerment’. 
 
 As Anugwom (2007:62) explained, woman from such oil communities ‘suffer a double 
jeopardy of relative deprivation’. First, they are excluded from internal or domestic politics, 
decision making and external bargaining or negotiation with oil firms by the male dominated 
leadership and secondly, they suffer more socio-economic deprivation than average women 
from other part of the country due to the destruction of their environment through oil extraction 
activities. Looking at women’s social and economic exclusion from benefits of oil in Niger 
Delta, it is worth noting that although there was an existing oppressive gender relation; 
petrobusiness helped to further worsened the situation by excluding women in the distribution 
of the new benefit, while degrading their environment, thereby fuelling violent protests and 
struggle from women.  
 
 Ross (2008) observed that new minerals increase inequality leading to an inequality trap and a 
resultant violent conflict. In situations where an existing socio-economic condition has been 
adversely affected by the activities of a new mineral resource, in this case oil resources, the 
tendency arises that, after a prolonged period of grievance, with no considerable improvement, 
a situation of ‘self-help’ could emerge and may not be over-ruled. Jackson (2007:275) further 
explained that “in African wars, politics and economics are frequently difficult to separate. 
There are a number of different reasons for this, not least that there is confusion over whether 
or not the desire to better one’s self is tantamount to greed. Whilst there are a number of 
different drivers behind conflicts across the continent, economics do play some part in almost 
all African insurgencies.” This submission tries to solidify the interwoven nature of violent 
conflicts, in which it may seem difficult to distinguish one factor as the cause of the conflict, 
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especially where it has a lot to do with inequality and livelihood, and in which a critical trace 
analysis does not rule out the role of politics and influence of governance on the situation. 
 
Therefore, the greed or grievance situation in the oil village communities is about “the context 
over resources and the resultant conflict between groups” which is depicted by the [in] ability or 
otherwise of the state to meet the minimum expectations of the citizens (Anugwom, 2005).  
Ikelegbe (2005:214), putting into perspective a period of grievance in the oil village communities, 
noted that “the minorities of the Niger Delta region have been agitating since the 1950s. First it 
was against marginalisation, neglect and the politics of exclusion by the ethnic majority based 
ruling political parties and governments of the then Eastern and Western regions.” And by the 
1990s, it has degenerated into large pockets of oil resources fuelled violent conflicts within and 
among the various oil village communities that make up the Niger Delta. The dichotomy between 
greed and grievance seems blurred; demonstrating that the transformation from grievance to greed 
cannot always be equated in economic terms or is examined using quantitative values. In case 
studies involving local oil village communities, activities seen as greedy, such as illegal oil 
bunkering, could be a survival strategy for people long denied of their source of livelihoods, 
therefore, “this is a classic survival strategy for someone living in poverty in an insecure 
environment.” (Jackson, 2007:276). 
 
Despite this explanation, there is wide disagreement about what really constitutes greed or 
grievance, but one main undisputable fact is that they exist within the same continuum. In many 
cases, the socio-economic dispositions of a group at a period of time determine their reactions and 
relations to an existing or newly discovered natural resources within their domain. As explained 
by Ikelegbe, a proponent of the economy of war thesis: 
Economic opportunism may therefore be incidental to and a 
perversion of resistance. The nexus between economics and 
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conflict environment is therefore much more than the issues of 
causality. It may relate to the actual dynamics of conflict and 
resistance; the funding of both the state and rebel movements, 
the exploitation of opportunities that emerge from disorder and 
violence, the multiplication of violence and violence 
institutions, the proliferation of arms and the intervention of 
metropolitan centres bent on maintaining supplies of critical 
minerals, and how all these underpin the prolongation of 
conflicts in resource rich regions. (2005:213) 
 
However, given the nature of the conflict under study and considering the application of the 
greed or grievance arguments within the context of the case study, the economy of war thesis 
focuses so much more on full scale wars than on other types of small-scale violence or revolts 
that occur in these societies. In most cases, armed conflict cases are state centric in nature; 
such parameters leave out some other issues that could be found at the micro level or as part of 
non-state violence among non-state actors.  
 
2.4.3 Oil Resources, Environmental Degradation and Scarcity 
 
With the continual rise in the nature and volume of oil resources’ activities, the environment is 
considered to be the worst hit by the effects of oil processes and production. However, 
environmental concerns, which in most current literature are discussed as environmental 
security, face a ‘tug of war of concepts’, with groups either wishing to “elevate- or prevent the 
elevation of- environmental concerns to the same status as military ones” (Diehl, 1998:275). 
Even with “these numerous pronouncements on the relationship between conflict and the 
environment, there is no consensus on the causal mechanism” (Gleditsch, 1998:383). Reuveny 
and Maxwell (2001:721) explain that, “due to its tendency to describe specific episodes of 
conflict, the extant literature on conflict over renewable resources in political science has 
generally neglected the complex dynamic interplay between population, natural resources, and 
conflict”. Again, even where such literature has taken an economic approach in examining 
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resultant conflicts and linking them to political violence or conflict, there is this adoption of a 
‘single approach’ linkage and one-level macro-level analysis with little or no consideration for 
the complexity of such an environment as is under examination. 
 
Therefore in trying to give a clear picture of what constitutes ‘environment fuelled violence’, 
Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts, in their edited book Violent environment, wrote that 
“violent environments accounts for ways that specific resources (tropical forest or oil reserves) 
and environmental processes (deforestation, conservation, or resource amelioration) are 
constituted by, and in part constitute, the political economy of access to and control over 
resources” (2001:5). A major point which is obvious from the submission by Peluso and Watts 
is the existing of cultural, social, economic and power relations, which could be further 
classified as the existence of a ‘political economy of environmental concerns’, within which 
issues such as power relations, access, conflicts, control and livelihoods exist. 
 
Homer-Dixon (1994) makes a distinction on conflicts caused by natural resources. Natural 
resources, according to the author, create a condition of ‘simple scarcity’, ‘group identity’ and 
‘deprivation’. This description covers the underlining factors behind most conflicts which are 
experienced in oil-rich developing states or natural resource–rich developing states in general. 
This, to a large extent also implies that, first and foremost, oil resources conflicts contain 
characteristics and nature of every known conflict. Providing further insight into the nature of 
various conflicts we encounter in oil resources-rich developing states, Libiszewski (1992:5) 
argues that: 
The extraction of oil for example, does not mean by itself an 
environmental degradation. Even the total depletion of oil 
stocks would not cause any destabilization of the ecosystem; 
but would, of course, represent a serious economic problem. 
Therefore, conflicts over the possession of or the access to oil 
can be regarded as environmental conflicts. They are originally 
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economic or social conflicts. Only the consequences of the 
combustion of oil derivates, for example the green house 
effects, or damages caused by its production and transport may 
lead to environmental degradation.  
 
The argument posed by Libiszewski further shows that oil resources have different conflict 
dimensions. As such, there is an interdependence of factors which contribute to oil resources 
conflict. Thus, there are multi-dimensional approaches to understanding environmental or 
natural resources driven conflicts. It further implies the existence of linkages across levels of 
analysis of the subject matter. In this, the relationships that exist between the parties who 
benefit and those who feel excluded from the benefits of such resources also form part of the 
conflict.   
 
Therefore, these could equally be seen in the increasing struggle over oil resources: its control, 
acceptance, availability and production. Subsequently, to a large extent, the effect of oil as a 
natural resource has brought intensive and extensive violent conflicts which greatly affect local 
inhabitants. This incidentally does include the environment, which suffers from the oil 
activities. As summarised by Obi (1997:1), environmental conflicts in the oil–producing areas 
thus becomes a terrain for contesting not just political space and access to resources, but 
resisting authoritarian forms of state rule and accumulation. Lending support to Obi’s 
argument, Ukeje, while explaining ‘Oil and environment fuelled political violence’ in oil 
communities in Nigeria, historically explained that: 
Since fossil oil was discovered in large quantities in 1958, oil-
producing communities in the riverine Niger Delta basin have 
persistently expressed exasperation over the unsustainable 
manner in which their fragile aquatic environment is being 
despoiled, while socio-economic opportunities and active 
participation in national political processes are simultaneously 
undermined. (Ukeje, 2001:16). 
 
 
The above explanations show that the effects of oil resources on the environment come with 
not just physical degradation but also socio-economic and political effects.  In situations like 
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this, such effects create a new socio-economic condition, social and power relations. Therefore 
the affected people especially in the oil village communities, struggle not to lose out totally 
from such effects. With such effects creating situations such as scarcity, socio-economic and 
political effects, they could trigger violent conflict, especially when dashed expectations are 
involved. Writing on oil resource in Chad, Massey and May (2005) explained that such an oil 
project engendered negative environmental and social impacts, which were far off the 
imagination and expectation of the ordinary people, and more that what their ‘anticipated 
development goods’ were; this could result in various kinds of frustration and violent conflicts . 
 
However, in the case of Nigeria in 1991, for example, its oil operation exceeded the world 
average for gas flares by 72%, as against an OPEC average of 18%. Pollution and oil spillages 
destroyed marine life and crops, making the water unsuitable for fishing as well as rendering 
many hectares of farmland unusable. Such oil activities consequently changed the socio-
economic situation of the people, especially in institutionalising poverty in the area (Ibeanu, 
2008:18). As further explained by Ibeanu (2008:20), such ecological damage in the Niger Delta 
goes “hand in hand with resource scarcity. Consequently, local communities have come to 
associate the two, sometimes unjustifiably”. Interestingly, Hauge and Ellingsen (1998:313) also 
agreed that the severity of environmental scarcity in igniting incidences of domestic armed 
conflicts might be attributed to other factors. As simplistic and reductionist as some of the 
considered literature may be, especially with environmental security and environmental 
conflicts centering only around environmental degradation and scarcity, there is still no 
denying that some of the evidence and analyses are valid, although having little consideration 
for micro-level analysis, and being mainly factored around armed conflicts and state-linked 
environmental violence.  
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2.5 Oil Resources and Changes in Socio-economic Structures 
 
A major way to explain the effects of violence and conflicts fuelled by oil  resources is to first 
establish the nature of changes oil resources has brought to people’s socio-economic structures, 
social structures and relations, and political structures. Obi (2007:106) explained that: 
 
Oil pollution, extreme poverty, high levels of youth 
unemployment, pollution perceived discriminatory 
employment practices against locals by oil companies  and 
socioeconomic and political marginalisation and neglect by 
successive  administrations constitute the main grievances 
against the oil companies and  the government.  
 
 
 Above description shows the level of changes oil resources can institute in a society. Writing 
on “Nigeria’s Oil Sector and the Poor”, Ross (2001) listed   negative changes by oil resources 
against the poor to include: economic volatility, crowding out agriculture and manufacturing, 
fostering of inequality, undermining democracy, sparking off violent conflicts. Moser and 
Rodgers (2005) argue that, although proponents of natural resource-related conflicts like Paul 
Collier have been able to document such violence in a war context, “these are equally 
applicable in non-conflict situations, and may well be a precondition or underlying causal 
factor in the deterioration into conflict itself”(2007:14 ).In the case of oil resources, their 
manner of operation and utilisation of other natural resources brings about a change in the 
production system of the host community, and could thereby increase the chances of violence. 
As suggested by Moser and Rodger (2005) in their executive summary, such could be 
“associated with increasing inequality in access to natural resources, particularly land. Here, 
violence is often a hidden dimension of poverty itself. For instance, in rural areas where land, 
water and forests are all critical resources for livelihood strategies, unequal power relationships 
relating to land ownership and exclusionary agrarian systems are exacerbated when this 
becomes more exaggerated”.  However, the broad and elaborate classification of the socio-
economic changes by the literature discussed above make it difficult to properly understand 
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and situate the nature of social changes in the oil village communities. For example, an 
aggregate submission of incidences of poverty in Nigeria, as used in Ross’ work, will not 
enable one to understand the changes that have taken place in rural oil village communities 
since the inception of oil resources activities. 
 
Again, these traditional societies (oil village communities) had “subsistence farming and 
fishing as their two main dominant economic activities. With such economic activities, land is 
‘the most important source of economic power and social prestige…” for the local 
communities (Okonta, 2008:32), so also for the oil companies who “are dependent on access to 
land because they derive their wealth primarily and directly from below the earth’s surface” 
(Frynas, 2000:170). Both authors here have been able to establish the linkage between oil 
resources, inequality, livelihoods, and land, social and economic status in oil producing 
societies. This is because, as more land and fishing waters are taken for oil activities, the 
smaller the size of farming land and fishing waters that is available for local dwellers to eke out 
their living. However, what the authors did not establish or demonstrate, is a direct and primary 
role/or effects for oil resources in fuelling non-state violence and conflicts, such as inter-
community and intra-community conflicts, which ensue over the available land and waters.  
Establishing the linkage between oil resources, farming land and fishing water, and the 
subsequent non-state conflict makes it easy to appreciate the change in socio-economic 
conditions and relations imposed on these oil village communities by the change in their means 
and access of livelihood.  
 
Human Rights Watch (2005:6) explained that oil MNCs, as demanded by law, are expected to 
make statutory or customary payments to oil village communities(often referred to as host 
communities or oil-bearing communities by human right activists) whose land or fishing waters 
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the oil exploration or production activities like drilling  are carried out. As lamented by Human 
Right Watch: 
Designation as a host community thus brings significant 
benefits in the form of compensation, community development 
funds and promises of labor and security contracts. The oil 
companies negotiate such agreements and contracts with 
individuals whom they identify as community representatives, 
notably the top traditional leaders or chiefs. These policies have 
fuelled inter-communal conflict by funneling large quantities of 
money to the tribal leaders, many of whom fail to share the 
benefits with their community. (2005:7) 
 
It is therefore pertinent to note that the oil dominance of Nigeria’s political economy invokes a 
‘high stake rentier politics’22 involving not only the state and the hegemonic elites as principal  
architects but also the “grassroots communities(oil and non-oil)...High stake rentier politics 
underlies and complicates the oil conflicts” (Omeje,2006:6).Oil resources reproduce the same 
high stake rentier politics in local oil village communities ( just as in the national economy), as 
well as producing entirely new socio-political relations and conditions which institutionalise 
poverty, inequality, the struggle for access to oil benefits and opportunities, and unemployment 
in the oil village community. Consequently, in the bid to make the oil economy works, there is 
a creation of high stake local politics within traditional and village community authorities. This 
in turn fuels violent conflicts among members of the community, as various parties seek to 
position themselves within the position of “rent seeking”.   
 
 
 
                                                 
22  To Kenneth Omeje (2006) high stake politics converges and interlinks the rentier features of the economy with 
neo-patrimonial traditions of the post-colonial state and society to produce a convoluted political culture, marked 
by clientelistic desperation in both oil-related accumulation and state-society relations. The various stakeholders, 
clients and partisans of the political economy  are disposed to pursue, fast track, protect and defend oil-related 
accumulation by desperate measures, including the use of violence or threat of it, as well as placatory trade-offs 
and rewards 
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2.6 Oil Resources, Power Struggle and Violent Conflict  
 
The discourses around politics and the struggle for power as a cause of oil fuelled violence and 
violent conflicts in the oil village communities have recently been categorised into many 
perspectives. Using Nigeria as a case study, Gore and Pratten (2003:212) submitted that: 
 
Nigeria’s ‘political economy of predation’ is manifest in an 
apparent institutional monopoly of violence and rampant 
prebendalism which reflects the extractive nature of the state 
and the accumulative base of ethno-regional commercial and 
bureaucratic classes. (Gore and Pratten, 2003:212) 
 
The discourses around politics and the struggle for power as a cause of oil fuelled violence and 
violent conflicts in the oil village communities have recently been categorised into many 
perspectives. Of note in these discourses are “prebendal, neopatrimonial and high stake rentier 
discourses,” in which decisive politics in Nigeria are rooted (Omeje, 2006:6). These discourses 
hinge upon the ‘understanding’ that “routine relationships between state and society in Nigeria 
are currently dominated by…the illegitimacy of instrumentalised distribution and disorder. It is 
this very illegitimacy which shapes individual and collective local responses. On the one axis, 
the politics of distribution, people are organising themselves within familiar frameworks to 
‘capture’ the state” (Gore and Pratten, 2003:212).  Therefore, ‘‘the heart of the Nigerian petro-
state state is unearned income, and its central dynamic is the fiscal sociology of the 
distribution of and access to oil rents, ’’ which is what projects these acts of capturing the 
state through politics (Watts,2007b:642). Interestingly, as at the centre,“the local system is 
liable to be high jacked by local strongmen seeking political influence or may neglect 
vulnerable groups and minorities,” (Baker and Scheye, 2007:508), with the sole aim of 
monopolising oil rents and opportunities, thereby fuelling fierce violence.  
 
These discourses have been able to throw some light onto the nature of politics in Nigeria. 
However, understanding politics alone will not provide enough insight and knowledge about 
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other forms of power struggles or forms of authority in many oil village communities or at the 
local community level. Distribution and access to oil rent can also be routed outside the formal 
authorities and power, or outside the state. 
 
Again, it is worth noting that neo-patrimonial or patrimonial cultures re-enforce informal 
structures, making them serve as legitimate access to power and in-turn access to to oil rents 
and benefits. According to Ohlson and Soderberg, in “a patrimonial system rulers base their 
claim to power, their authority and legitimacy on powerful, but informal structures of vertical 
patron-client  relationships, with rewards going top-down and support going bottom-up in the 
system,” (2002: 9). Hence where the environment is ripe for informal governance and is 
supported by illegal rent seeking and oil resources benefits and opportunities, it creates room 
for violent struggle for such informal power and authority. 
 
For instance, Human Rights Watch in their article “Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in 
Nigeria’s Rivers State” wrote that: 
As traditional leadership positions became more lucrative and 
the tribal elders more powerful, the competition to occupy them 
intensified. Beginning in the mid-1990s, prominent local 
leaders competing to assume top chieftaincy positions in an 
area recruited youth leaders and provided them with money and 
weapons to assist in their often violent struggles to control 
villages.  Such violent clashes occurred in several villages. 
(2005:7) 
 
 
Therefore if occupying any traditional or informal forms of leadership guarantees access to oil 
benefits and opportunities, it subsequently could often fuel violent struggles for such positions, 
as they know that “patronage is a selective activity benefiting specific groups,[therefore] those 
excluded are pushed to use violence to demand for and access their own share of the rents” 
(Olarinmoye,2005:30). In the case of oil village communities, as selective patronages become 
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the basis for determining who benefits from opportunities from oil resources, the outcome are 
the negative impacts they bestow on the existing socio-economic conditions, social relations, 
governance, power and leadership roles. Thus leading to fierce struggle(s) for the control and 
occupation of such positions, as such positions is synonymous to getting patronage from oil 
resource. Based on this assumption, the result is the use of violence to reach the position that 
gives access to such patronage.  In this case study, it is mainly between groups within the same 
oil village community or between oil village communities, and not necessarily between the 
state and the oil village communities or between oil communities and oil MNCs. 
2.7 Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviewed the state of knowledge regarding oil resources fuelled conflicts. Based 
on the introduction to the concepts of violent conflicts and paradoxes of oil resources which 
form the logic of oil resources conflicts, this chapter reviews two sets of literature which 
examine respectively whether oil resources conflicts take place in oil village communities and 
exploring the underlying reasons for the occurrence of the conflict. While the review agrees 
with the various assumptions posited by the literature reviewed, it criticises the holistic nature 
of the various contributions, as oil village communities were under- researched due to the use 
of state centric approach by the previous research. Arguing from micro-level analysis 
perspective, the review sees oil resources paradoxes as having different effects on the various 
parts of an oil producing state. Thus, in this case, oil village communities are affected 
differently by the presence of oil resources than the other parts of the Nigerian states. 
 
Reviewing oil resources curse and abundance, and environmental scarcity and degradation 
literature, it argues that oil resources have specific effects on informal sectors like subsistent 
farming; on-state institutions and non-formal authorities like traditional institutions and 
community leadership. Oil resource curse and abundance create a new socio-economic 
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relations and social relations such as denial of sources of livelihoods, social exclusion and 
power struggles in oil village communities, thereby fuelling violent conflicts as groups and 
actors struggle for local control due to the new conditions. Based on this, it challenges the 
existing knowledge which focuses on oil resource-fuelled conflicts and violence linked only to 
the state and oil MNCs. It agreed with the submissions on environmental scarcity and violent 
conflicts, but criticizes the one-sided violence and conflict analysis approach applied, by 
arguing that individuals, groups, local and informal authorities operating outside the state are 
not investigated and their activities and contributions like rent-seeking, greed, grievance and 
other economic opportunities linked to oil resources conflicts are not researched. This chapter 
also points out the limitation of the existing literature in linking the analysis of oil resources 
activities to the nature of changes on socio-economic and power structures in oil village 
communities. This set of literature has the limitation that its argument covers only state 
sponsored violence and no linkage with non-state violence as covered in this study. 
 
   What conclusions and gaps? 
This review of the contributions and limitations of the existing literature provides a basis for 
developing the main proposition of the thesis. The review agrees with the argument on the 
interface between oil resources and violent conflicts arising out of paradoxes of oil resources, 
which fuels oil resource conflict. However, it points out the limitation of not understudying the 
influence of oil resources on local oil village communities. In the case of Nigeria’s oil village 
communities, the research is mainly concerned with structural violence. Structural violence in 
Nigeria is not just about the state but the constellation of different governance mechanisms 
beyond the central state who are allied to the central state. 
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More limited are studies that sought to bridge the structural conflict theory and natural resource 
conflicts theory streams of literature like environmental scarcity, Greed vs. Grievance. 
Research with an integrating framework of Structural conflicts and Natural resources theories 
to study oil resources conflicts, in oil village communities are generally absent.  
Oil produces a particularly centralising tendency internationally due to the levels of investment, 
the need for access to international markets and the large size of the contracts. This means that 
a relatively small elite benefit from oil, but they benefit hugely. At the same time, there is not 
much for the local communities unless the central elite decide to give the wealth away. In 
reality, the state and the oil MNCs tend to ally themselves with those who can maintain the 
security of the oil installations, so at a local level some chiefs and some influential members of 
communities might benefit while then majority will not benefit. The real dilemma is therefore 
about inclusion versus exclusion and where the boundaries of that are. At a local level they are 
between and within specific communities. The case study is in oil village communities which 
aim to contribute to the analysis in oil resource conflicts in Nigeria. The propositions and the 
analytical framework for carrying out the analysis and achieving these aims are set up in 
chapter three.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
                      THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
3 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical frameworks of analysis used in the study. The research 
involves the study of multiple and inter-linked factors in oil resource fuelled conflicts. The 
complex nature of the study warranted an integration of environmental scarcity theory and 
greed versus grievance theory into structural conflict theory (structural violence) to form a 
framework for analysing the research. This therefore helps structural conflict theory in 
providing a strong explanation for the research. This is because, ‘conflicts have multiple causes 
that interact in highly specific ways according to the context’ (Ginty and Williams, 
2009:26).Hence in this study, apart from the explanation for power relations and socio-
economic structures or conditions, structural conflict theory may not adequately provide strong 
explanation  for other variables such as environmental violence and criminality.  As explained 
by Kaldor, Karl and Said (2007:3), there is ‘the prevalence of several competing explanations 
of the exact causal linkages between oil and war, or involving oil and violent conflict’.  It 
therefore means that Structural conflict theory may not sufficiently provide every explanation. 
Therefore, the “integrated” structural conflict theory was adopted because it goes beyond 
providing a strong anchor for this study, but helps in the analysis and interpretation of data 
collected in this research. Jeong (2000:32) opines that “structural conditions for the emergence 
of serious social conflict are related to unequal access to political power” and by extension 
economic power and social relations. Not surprisingly, conflict is said to be “a generic 
phenomenon” (Jabri, 1996:11). Structural conflict theory therefore offers sufficient 
explanations for explaining violent conflicts in relation unequal access to socio-economic 
conditions and power relations. This would be explained in the other sections. 
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 3.1        Structural Conflict Theory 
 
The study adopts Structural conflict theory (which is also known as Structural violence) as the 
theoretical approach for situating the research questions and propositions in the research. This is 
because of the dominant nature of power relations, social economic conditions and inequality 
among groups involve in the conflict in oil village communities in Nigeria. This means that all 
variables and explanations employed for the study of the research are anchored in structural 
conflict theory. Therefore in this research, structural conflict theory and structural violence are 
used as one theoretical approach and the names are used interchangeably; I also use structural 
violence to represent the whole conditions of structural violence and structural conflict as 
defined by the approach. 
 
This theory emphasises that behaviours of people are affected or influenced by the unequal 
distribution of advantages in their society. The theory's basic orientation originated first from 
the radical structural theory developed by the Marxist dialectical school which had the likes of 
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels as its major exponents. The second orientation is from liberal 
structuralism with Ross Marc and Johan Gultung as the main exponents (Faleti, 2006). Gultung 
in his 1969 classic work “violence, peace and peace research” first used the term structural 
violence to explain the indirect nature of the violence, as it “is built into the structure and 
shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances”(1969:171). The theory 
therefore demonstrates that “serious conflict is embedded in an inequitable social and 
economic system, reflecting prolonged exploitation supported by coercion”, which inherently 
creates a situation of disadvantaged and advantaged, as such re-defining a new relation which 
breeds a conflict situation (Jeong:2000:31). According to Saith (2011:71) ‘inequality has come 
to carry an intensifying salience in socio-political terms; there is a rising tide of informed 
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opinion that inequality has powerful, often cataclysmic implications within countries’.  
Therefore when people experience unequal access to public goods within their societies, the 
tendency to revolt against the existing inequalities in their societies becomes imminent.  
 
Faleti (2006:41) submits that “the main argument of the structural conflict theory is that 
conflict is built into the particular ways societies are structured and organised.” This is a clear 
interpretation of Karl Marx’s structuralist’s position, to which he contends ‘that structures, 
particularly economic structures, determine the action of agents’ (Marsh, 2002:155). In the 
same perspective, Galtung (1969) used the “conflict triangle” to show that conflict is a dynamic 
process involving structures, attitude and behaviour which constantly change and influence one 
another. As the existing structures change, one group gains an advantage while another group 
is disadvantaged; the new structure could be oppressive in nature with each party's interests 
remaining paramount. This will in turn lead to conflictual behaviour which subsequently grows 
and becomes violent. 
 
Thus, structural conflict theory demonstrates the effects of inequality in societies, and how 
changes in existing structures could lead to conflict. In the oil village communities in Nigeria, 
oil resources changed the structures of these oil village communities. It empowered some 
people economically and disempowered others at the same time. As argued by Cramer 
(2006:112), ‘inequality between categorical pairings is sustained by social mechanisms: 
exploitation is at its core; where there is exploitation there is typically opportunity hoarding by 
one group (of access to jobs, of control of certain markets, of political positions etc.)’. In the 
case under study, oil resources influence the change in the economic structures of relatively 
peaceful rural communities in favour of a particular group. This brought about changes in 
perceptions of human relations, thereby leading to suspicion, conflictual behaviour and then 
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violent conflict. The oil resources define the new structure and relationships which exist in 
these oil village communities (Watts, 2004).  
 
Secondly, the discovery and subsequent production of oil created a three structure relationship 
which has oil resource at the centre of the relationship. A typical relationship structure consists 
of the oil village community, which acts as the host community for the oil; the Nigerian state, 
which by virtue of the Land Use decree of 1976(later changed to Land Use ACT of 1979) owns 
the land and the natural resources; and the multi-national oil companies operating in the oil 
village community in the petrobusiness (Ibeanu, 2000). 
 
Although previous research have studied  the structure of the relationship between oil village 
communities, the Nigerian state and oil MNCs, especially with regard to environmental 
degradation, social and economic neglect on the part of the Nigerian state, and the failure of oil 
MNCs to engage in CSR(Zalik,2004;Watts,2004; Ibeanu,2008).There are no direct discussions 
of the re-structuring of the socio-economic relations of the oil village communities by the 
presence of the oil resources activities. Oil resources introduce a structural material divide 
within oil village communities, leading to structural conflicts or violence as the oil resource has 
favoured and enriched some members of the community leaving the others out.  As noted by 
Obi (2009:111), “where there is a sense of inequality in access to power and resources, the 
disadvantage group are likely to be mobilized to challenge an unsatisfactory status quo”, in 
order to also gain access to such power and resources.  In the case of oil village communities, 
those who benefit from the oil resources windfall are either those who perpetuated violence 
against the oil MNCs, or the educated or influential group which negotiates on behalf of its 
various communities (Okonta, 2008; Okonta and Douglas, 2003). In many situations, these 
groups within the oil village communities easily benefit from the oil resources especially from 
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oil MNCs contracts, thereby creating a new structure in these communities which is a direct 
result of the production of oil resource in the community (Ukiwo, 2011).   
 
However, Structural conflict theory has been criticised for focusing more on the material 
interests of the parties in conflict, because the conflict may well have been instituted by other 
non-material factors (faleti, 2006:44).  Again, it is pertinent to point out that the gap between 
the period in which the socio-economic re-structure occurs and the period when the actual 
violent conflict sets in could be long, depending upon the point at which the disadvantaged or 
unfavoured groups perceive their position. As long as the disadvantaged group remains 
ignorant of their socio-economic exploitation or gains being made by their fellow oil village 
community dwellers, negative peace will continue to exist within the particular oil village 
community and among the people, as they continue to still see the Nigerian state and the Oil 
MNCs as their only common enemies. However, this theoretical perspective is adopted in this 
study because of its strong explanation of unevenly distribution of resources, as well as 
unevenly distribution of the power to influence such distribution (Gultung, 1969) as shown in 
the analysis chapters. Thus, the theory demonstrates how ‘the competing interests of group tie 
conflict directly into the social, economic, and political organisation of society as well as 
nature and strength of social networks within and between community groups(Faleti,2006:42). 
 
3.1.1 The Environmental Scarcity Theory  
 
This theory is built on complex causes which could move ‘from the most local to the most 
global’ types of causes. Thomas Homer-Dixon is one of the proponents of this theory, which 
proposes that environmental scarcity could produce violent conflicts. Such conflicts range from 
local environmental degradation, to ethnic clashes, to civil strife (insurgencies), scarcity 
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induced wars out of a loss of sources of livelihoods and the negligent behaviour of the state and 
elite class (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Lending support to the environment and conflict argument, 
Brunborg and Urdal (2005:371) specified that “demographic factors may, however, also be 
potential causes of conflict”, with factors likes “high population pressure” making negative 
impact on scarce resources such as arable land and fresh waters which could lead to violent 
conflicts. Although, Gultung (1990) uses the term ‘ecological balance’ to depict environmental 
violence, which I  subsumed as part of structural violence, but environmental scarcity approach 
provides a stronger  and wider explanation for conditions such as oil spills, struggle for land 
and fishing waters in oil village communities.  This will be explained in section 3. 4. 
 
Environmental scarcity has “a variety of critical social effects, including declining food 
production, general economic stagnation or decline, displacement of population, and the 
disruption of institutions and traditional social relations among people and groups” (Homer-
Dixon,1998:346). In his own contribution, Benjaminsen (2008:819) argues that ”scarcity is 
believed to be rapidly increasing in many marginal environments, in particular, owing to on-
going processes of environmental degradation primarily by escalating population growth’. 
Arguing differently but within the environmental scarcity debate, Gleditsch’s critique of the 
literature on armed conflict and the environment claims that “all conflicts of interest derive 
from scarcity. However, not all resource conflicts lead to overt conflict behaviour, and even 
fewer to the use of force. Environmental degradation may exacerbate resource conflicts 
because it reduces the quantity or quality or the resource in question” (1998:387). Implicitly, 
environmental degradation and resultant conflict may not at onset take physical violent 
approach, but rather a structural violent approach such as environmental violence, before 
becoming an armed and violent conflict. 
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 Accordingly, the environmental scarcity theory has three main dimensions: Supply-induced 
scarcity, demand-induced scarcity, and structural scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Supply–
induced scarcity emerges when resources are reduced and degraded faster than they are 
replenished.  Demand–induced scarcity arises out of population growth as against its source of 
livelihood, while structural scarcity exists because of inequitable distribution of resources due 
to their concentration in the hands of a few, while the rest of the population suffers from 
resource inadequacy(Homer-Dixon,1999). Supporting the Environmental scarcity theory, 
Midlarsky noted that: 
            Theoretically, an important intervening variable between environmental 
             scarcity and civil conflict is inequality. The greater the scarcity, the greater  
              the likelihood that some people will possess more of the scarce resource 
              than others. Such inequality at least would exacerbate civil conflict,  
              if not constitute a necessary condition for its existence (1998:341) 
 
Hauge and Ellingsen agreed that “increased environmental scarcity caused by one or more of 
these factors is assumed to have several consequences, which in turn may lead to domestic 
armed conflict,” with intervening variables such as decreased agricultural production, 
decreased economic activity, migration and a weakened state helping to build up the 
environmental scarcity and violent conflict (1998:301). As people’s quality of life diminishes 
due to decrease in environmental resources such as fertile land, there is the tendency that 
competition may ensue over the scare resources, such competition if unchecked could turned 
fierce, may result into violent conflict.  
 
This theory is adopted by this research to provide support to structural conflict theory because 
of diverse meanings and explanations it brings to environmentally linked- resource conflicts 
which ‘ecological balance’ in Gultung’s structural violence could not sufficiently do. Unlike 
ecological balance which is linked directly to ecological degradation, resulting to human 
degradation as structural violence. Environmental scarcity in the case of oil village 
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communities shows how oil resources fuel scarcity of critical environmental resources 
especially land and fishing waters. Such environmental scarcity generates ‘severe social 
stresses within countries, helping to stimulate subnational insurgencies, ethnic clashes and 
urban unrest’ (Homer-Dixon, 1999:12). This assumption helps the research to demonstrate how 
and why oil village communities who depend mainly  on these environmental resources such as 
fishing water and farming land fight to control the left-over waters and farming land. It also 
provides explanation on the structural violent nature of environmental scarcity, as the social 
crises it causes consequently fuels non-state conflict among affected oil communities. 
 
However, this theory was criticised for ignoring the more direct linkage between economic and 
political factors and domestic armed conflict, thereby reducing the understanding of the causal 
pathway to domestic armed conflict.  For instance, ‘Structural scarcity, which concerns unequal 
distribution of resources (especially land), is mainly a consequence of politics’ (Hauge and 
Ellingsen, 1998:302). Again, notwithstanding the initial acceptance given to the theory and its 
findings, but like other environmental security literature, its ‘environmental and resource-
related issues are connected to conflict in a state-centric sense’ (O’lear, 
2003:129).Furthermore, Salehyan argues that ‘while environmental degradation is certainly not 
a necessary condition for armed conflicts, neither is it a sufficient one, since states play a key 
role in containing or aggravating violence’ (2008:317). This flaw in the theory has been noted 
and is complemented by structural conflict theory, in order to build a direct linkage between 
economic and political factors, and domestic armed conflict. This is one of the reasons why this 
theory is not adopted as a single theory but as a component of the structural conflict theory. 
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3.1.2 The Greed versus Grievances Theory 
 
Collier and Hoffler (2001) advanced this theory using statistical representation to establish 
some linkage of causes for internally generated wars in some states.  In one of his initial 
studies, Collier (2000a) opined that some people (referred to in conflict literature as ‘conflict 
entrepreneurs’) actually benefit from violent conflict; while the overwhelming majority of the 
populace are affected negatively by the conflicts, the leaders of those armed groups that 
perpetuate the violence  more often than not profit from the situation. For the insurgent group, 
the incentive gained from the rebellion constitutes the major reason for their action.  Collier 
(2001:146-162) further argues that motivation for conflict is less important, as lust for power 
and perceived grievance are common issues. The main issue lies in how a rebel group can 
maintain itself, as war involves a great deal of financial resources. Based on this, rebellion to 
Collier (2001) is a form of organised crime, with rebels engaging in it as a business through 
which their activities maintain the group. He further submits that the likelihood of armed 
conflict is higher in a country with high dependency on primary commodities, as rebellion 
finds its activities profitable in such an environment.  
 
However, this theory has been seriously contested, for what some theorists believe to be its 
misapplication.  Ballentine (2003) refutes Collier’s arguments that armed conflict is basically a 
function of rebels’ predatory activities. Ballentine argues that socio-economic and political 
grievances, inter-group disputes, and security dilemmas are the primary factors which could 
lead to violent conflict. She acknowledges the existence of economic predation and 
opportunities for greed in fuelling a violent conflict, but she claims that they are not the 
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primary cause or causes of war. She further explains  that only a few wars can be explained as 
‘resource wars’ or be linked to a ‘loot seeking’ assumption as presented in Collier’s research.  
Ballentine's submission brings out salient points that must be recognised before branding a 
violent conflict as being fuelled by greed or grievance. However, I feel that she missed an 
important point, which is that structural violence in natural resource conflicts does not 
deteriorate into armed conflict on the same day such structural violence is initiated. In essence, 
violent conflicts go through various stages, and like Collier, Ballentine did not give prominence 
to these stages. My further submission is that the causes highlighted by Ballentine occur during 
the protracted non-violent era. If after the period of non-violence, and the socio-economic 
position does not match their perception, a disaffected party may develop a means for solving 
their problem or to change their position which in most cases may involve greed.  
This study draws support from this theory to demonstrate that greed and economic opportunism 
occurs in oil resources conflict. However, the study does not conform to Collier’s group’s 
submission that “the incidence of rebellion is not explained by motive, but by the atypical 
circumstances that generate profitable opportunities” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004:564).Rather, 
the study sees grievance as “justice-seeking motives grounded in political, ethnic, or social 
grievance” (Ballantine, 2004:3),thus, grievance is a reaction against structural conditions such 
as inequality and marginalization .  
In this study, as the oil village communities suffer from various forms of environmental 
degradation and scarcity, they initially resulted to complaints and protests to demonstrate their 
grievances. Consequently, as opportunity structures of the structural conflict changes without 
an improvement in the socio-economic conditions of these oil communities, some members of 
the communities opted for economic and criminal opportunities which exist within the new oil 
resources economy. This shows the importance of time scale in conflicts which is omitted by 
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proponents of ‘resource war’ arguments. Oil activities affecting oil communities’ environment, 
livelihoods and social relations are considered primarily as structural violence, even though 
they could be classified differently as environmental conflict, environmental scarcity and 
relative deprivation, which produce other effects in oil communities. Thus, many years of 
neglects, inequalities, changes in socio-economic conditions and social relations, developed 
into struggle for power and leadership as means for control of oil opportunities. The result of 
such change is direct conflicts within and among oil village communities for oil resources 
benefits. In some cases, greed overtake genuine grievance as visible seen in some instances, 
like kidnapping for ransom which were widespread in Nigeria's oil region at the period of this 
field research and the plundering of oil resources by militant groups for personal gains (Reno, 
2000; Collier, 2003).   
Again, within the context of this argument, this study contends that the 'criminal ventures' in oil 
village communities started as grievances. There is a mixture of grievance and greed in most 
cases, with grievance often the starting point. Ikelegbe (2006) argues that in the case of the 
Niger Delta regions in Nigeria, where the oil village communities are situated, most militant 
activities were not motivated by economic opportunities but primarily by grievance, but  the 
opportunities to plunder the oil resources that exist within their environment was too tempting 
to be resisted. This situation has created a grievance-greed mixture that has exacerbated the 
violent conflicts in the oil village communities in Nigeria, and continues to create opportunities 
and incentives for conflict perpetuation. This thereby means that that the study internalises the 
existence and applicability of grievance and ‘opportunities'’ variables in this research. 
Therefore both grievance and greed as a mixture are important for analysing natural resource 
conflicts. 
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3.2 Explanation and Application of the Framework 
 
The main propositions submitted by this framework are the following: 
Firstly in this research, oil resources conflicts in Nigeria’s oil village communities were 
considered primarily as structural violence. Like every structural conflict, structural violence 
creates ‘structural conditions for the emergence of serious social conflicts’ and fuels conditions 
such as environmental scarcity, struggle for leadership, grievance, greed and criminality in oil 
village communities (Jeong, 2000:32).Based on the nature of the conflict as well as the study, 
the research developed an integrated structural violence framework, which involves the 
integration of environmental scarcity theory and greed vs. grievance theory into the structural 
violence theory in order to provide a strong and sufficient explanation for analysis of findings.  
 
 As an integrated structural violence framework, it demonstrates that oil resources produce a 
particular form of structural violence which influences power and economic relations within oil 
village communities. As discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5, with explanatory viewpoints in 
sections 3.1 to 3.1.2. Oil resources impose structural conditions or indirect violence which 
gradually led to armed violent conflict. As discussed in section 2.2, oil resources fuel both 
negative and positive changes in oil village communities, such changes includes changes in 
socio-economic conditions.  The framework adopted environmental scarcity theory as part of 
the integrated analytical framework to demonstrate how oil resources fuel environmental 
scarcity over time resulting in violent struggles and violent conflicts over scarce natural 
resources like farming land and fishing waters. Again, the adoption of greed vs. grievance 
theory as part of the integrated analytical frame provides explanation on how structural 
violence fuelled by oil resources could over time lead to rebellion, economic opportunism or 
criminality. Therefore as an integrated framework, any part of the theories which make up the 
framework could be used to provide an explanation.  
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Secondly, the framework demonstrates that the new socio-economic condition created by oil 
resources and activities form part of the structural violence, as well as fierce struggle for power 
and leadership.  New wealthy, influential and dominant groups are created by oil resources, as 
gaining access to power and leadership positions means gaining access to the oil resources 
opportunities. Therefore, having access to oil resources opportunities create a new fierce 
struggle for power, leadership and authority in oil village communities (Francis et al, 2011). 
 
 As documented in the literature, the Structural conflict theory framework assumes that oil 
resources build structural violence into the system in the form of environmental scarcity 
(structural induced scarcity [discrimination and alienation],demand induced scarcity [poverty] 
and supply induced scarcity [environmental degradation], and arise out of oil resources 
activities). As will be discussed in the analysis chapters, the framework demonstrates how 
factors such as poverty and loss of livelihoods arising out of oil activities could fuel grievance 
or greed (as exemplify in the framework), thus fuelling violent conflicts.  As Obi (2011:7) 
explained, “in the Niger Delta, with its high population density, it has meant a loss of power 
over ‘scarce’ (oil-rich) land for local people, and loss of compensation for the full value of 
appropriated land, save for compensation for trees/crops or property on the surface of such 
land”. The study as supported by the structural violence framework assumes that such changes 
produce structural violence leading to violent conflict over a period. The changes produced by 
oil resources presence and activities consequently re-define access to socio-economic 
conditions. 
 
The framework also assumes that power and leadership struggles are fallouts of changes in 
socio-economic conditions and relations arising out of oil activities, especially in the 
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distribution of benefits. For instance, HRW (2005:7) wrote that “as traditional leadership 
positions became more lucrative and the tribal elders more powerful, the competition to occupy 
them intensified”. As discussed in Section 2.5, the struggle for power or leadership/ authority 
may be due to the benefits and opportunities oil resources provide. This argument within the 
structural violence framework establishes the link between oil resources and the struggle for 
power in oil village communities. It provides the basis for understanding the second research 
question. The framework has a radical cluster23 shape but denotes a relationship which oil 
resources at the top of the cluster fuels structural conflicts. However, it is pertinent to note that 
oil resources activities, benefits and opportunities are the centre-piece of the conflict (HRW, 
1999 and 2005). Structural conflicts in turn produce elements of environmental scarcity, greed 
or grievance. Again, within the framework, environment scarcity can reinforce greed or 
grievance and verse versa, as well as environmental scarcity and greed or grievance rein-
enforcing structural violence.   
 
The application of this framework is conducted under the premise that structural conflict theory 
provided the best analysis for this research, while drawing support from environmental scarcity 
theory and greed vs. grievance approach, thus the integration of the other theories into it. It is 
argued in this study that oil resources to a large extent change the socio-economic conditions of 
the oil village communities thereby institutionalising discrimination and alienation from the 
new economy, poverty and environmental degradation, leading to either a struggle for power to 
aid resource appropriation or violent conflict out of grievance or greed (see the explanation of 
the theory in section 3.1.). Oil resources also changed the nature of power and/or traditional 
authority structures and the local economy, thereby linking such structures directly to oil 
                                                 
23  The radical cluster as adopted in this framework shows that the three theories relates to a central idea or theme 
of the research. However, the research adapted the framework to show more direct relationship between the 
central idea represented by oil resources and structural conflict theory, with environmental conflict and greed vs. 
grievance theories as other clusters supporting structural conflict theory.    
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resources opportunities. In examining the role played by struggle for power and leadership in 
fuelling oil resources conflict in oil village communities, it is important to state how 
‘rationalization’ of corruption, mismanagement of community wealth and conflicts within these 
oil village communities fuel the fierce competitions for positions which give access to oil 
resources opportunities. Gaining power and leadership position is then pursued at all cost, as 
described by Chabal and Daloz (1999; 2006). These factors of disorder such as conflict, 
corruption and misrule are ‘instrumentalized’ as part of the societal culture in order to promote 
patrimonial and personal gains of those in power or in leadership positions. Therefore, a further 
insight From HRW (1999) sees oil resource opportunities as “spoils” to the communities and 
more especially to those whose positions in the communities’ enables them to either negotiate 
or represent the oil communities. In the words of Theobald (1982:550) “these spoils are 
apportioned to the leaders of various groups or factions who then transit to their followers such 
resources as a necessity to retain their support”. In the oil village communities, the positions of 
transmitting oil spoils are heavily contested by elders, “youth” association and women group 
because of the probabilities of personalising such spoils without been seen as corrupt. 
 
As stated in chapter two, oil resources conflict is first and foremost to be understood from the 
broader perspective of violent conflict, which like every other conflict could occur. Like every 
conflict, is about competing interests, while the State uses the Land Use Act of 1978/9 to 
acquire land in the communities for petrobusiness, the oil communities are asking for the 
repeal of the legislation as well as the Petroleum Act of 1969, which dispossess them of their 
land (ICG, 2006). However the peculiarity of oil resources conflict is that it distorts and 
influences a cycle of structural violence that may eventual result to physical violence through 
factors such as environmental degradation, relative deprivation and Dutch diseases. Other 
aspects of conflict shows that conflict is also further exacerbated by the activities of the 
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Nigerian state and oil MNCs in distributing oil rent to various oil communities. This is 
because, instead of the “triangular relationship” which existed in the oil industry in Nigeria, 
between the MNCs, the local Nigerian businessmen also referred to as middlemen or 
comprador and the Nigerian state (Turner, 1982:64); oil village communities have emerged as 
partners in seeking oil rent, thereby making oil resources and oil resources benefits and 
opportunities as shown in the framework the centre-piece of the conflict, but sitting at the top 
of the cluster.HRW(1999:96) argued that just as at the federal level, corruption “feeds down 
into each community in the delta, where oil money flows into the hands of local elites in the 
same way as it does to national elites(1999.96). 
 
 
 In the framework, Structural conflict theory drawing support from environmental scarcity 
theory made major contribution by defining and explaining the socio-economic changes. A 
relatively peaceful 'poor' fishing community with the discovery and production of oil resources 
in its domain suddenly has its socio-economic structures distorted, with some members of the 
community becoming rich, leaving the others further down the poverty web, because their 
collective source of livelihood is been degraded by petrobusiness.  Describing the oil resources 
and the production scenario, Ibeanu (2008:16) writes that: 
           The Devil's Excrement [referring to oil resources] has been a source 
           of wealth and poverty,     security and insecurity, and development and 
           underdevelopment  in equal measures. Ironically, those from whose land 
           it is taken are always on the negative side of its inherent paradoxes-they 
           are poor, insecure and underdeveloped. 
 
 Although Ibeanu was referring to the relationship between the oil village communities and the 
rest of the Nigerian state, the study believes that the same situation exists within each oil 
village community, as some groups within each community benefit from the resources, while 
the rest suffer in poverty. Thus the framework acknowledges that this situation brings about a 
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change in the way the communities are structured and organised. Oil resources instantly 
introduce socio-economic exclusion and political supremacy in these oil village communities. 
As most structuralists agree, the change in the economic structures and social institutions leads 
to conflict because new factors of class domination, exclusionalism, and exploitation have been 
introduced. In addition, those who benefit from oil resources benefits do so because ‘there is a 
persistent structural inequality that is reflected in access to money, knowledge and power; and 
these are the key resources used in the struggle for political influence’ (Marsh, 2002:170).Oil 
resources have brought class divisions in most oil village communities, enriching some and 
further deprived the majority. Oil resources have created class inequality, economic and 
political discrimination and weakened the kinship ties in the communities (Ross, 1993:4). As 
Faleti (2006:43) says, “when social, political, economic and cultural processes are monopolised 
by a group, it creates the conditions that make people to adopt adversarial approaches to 
conflict.” This situation gives room for violent conflict, especially when the position of the 
deprived group becomes very obvious to them. 
 
The framework drawing from greed vs. grievance approach in support of structural violence 
shows that grievance driven-conflict could become greed or economic opportunity-driven. 
Ramsbotham (2005:115) opines that, unlike interests, needs are 'ontological' and non-
negotiable, so that, if conflict comes, it is likely to be intense, vicious, and, from a traditional 
Clausewitzean perspective, ‘irrational’. Once the needs of these oil village communities have 
gone unfulfilled over a long period of time, they are more likely to turn to violent conflict to 
gain attention. Furthermore, Using Luc Reychler's phases of conflict transformation, it is 
important to note that at the inception of oil production, ‘incipient conflict’ was introduced, 
meaning that the oil village communities were “not aware of the existing structural, 
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psychological or cultural violence,” (Reychler, 1999:17), at this stage, the structural conflict 
has altered their existing socio-economic relations.  
 
 Finally, knowing which conflict theory to apply has always been a major issue that confronts 
most researchers in peace and conflict studies, and this becomes more difficult when it involves 
natural resources. According to Klare (2001:190),“conflicts of this sort are interwoven with 
long–standing ethnic, political, and regional antagonisms. In most cases, a sought after 
resource is concentrated in an area that is occupied by – or coveted by- an ethnic or religious 
group that seeks to increase its political power or to break away from the existing state”. The 
vast and dynamic nature of the conflict in the oil village communities make it imperative that I 
take a firm stand on which area of the conflict to focus on, thereby eliminating any chance of 
clashes of knowledge claims24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Knowledge claim, according to Creswell (2003:7), could be seen as assumptions researchers adopt on starting a 
project, about how they will learn and what they will learn during the inquiry, otherwise called paradigms. 
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Fig.3.1The theoretical framework: The “Integrated” Structural conflict 
theory or structural violence (Explaining oil resources conflicts using 
Structural conflict theory, drawing support from Environmental scarcity 
and Greed vs. Grievance theories) 
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3.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the theoretical framework considered appropriate for examining and 
analysing the extent to which and how oil resources contributes to violent conflicts in the oil 
village communities in Nigeria. As earlier explained, the nature of the conflict warrants the 
need for a multi-faceted theoretical framework that explains structural violence. The 
“integrated” Structural violence analytical framework was chosen for this study to 
accommodate various forms of structural violence, environmental scarcity, economic 
opportunism and rebellion arising out of oil resources activities. Based on the need to provide a 
strong explanation to why oil resources conflicts occur in oil village communities, the conflict 
theories that were adopted to form the analytical framework are the structural conflict 
theory/structural violence, environmental scarcity theory and greed vs. grievance theory. 
 
Structural conflict theory or structural violence as part of the framework provides explanation 
on how oil resources create structural conditions that fuels conflicts. These forms of structural 
violence created by oil resources include socio-economic conditions such as poverty, inequality 
and social exclusion. Environmental scarcity theory as part of the integrated analytical 
framework provides explanation on how oil resources fuel environmental scarcity over time 
resulting in fierce competition over scarce natural resources like farming land and fishing 
waters. The adoption of greed vs. grievance theory as part of the integrated analytical frame 
gives explanation on how structural violence fuelled by oil resources could over time lead to 
rebellion, economic opportunism or criminality as experience in many natural resources 
conflicts like oil resources conflicts in Nigeria. 
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This study therefore considers the “integrated” structural conflict theory or structural violence 
as providing a robust and sufficient explanation for oil resource conflicts. The theories that 
formed the framework provide support for the entire framework and are generally interwoven. 
This is because it is difficult to have a single factor that could be solely responsible for the 
emergence, escalation, and protraction of violence or violent conflict. Therefore, the 
importance of this framework is in showing that oil resources are not important in isolation, but 
rather through the changes it brings to the socio-economic and political structures of local oil 
village communities. 
 
Drawing on the discussion above, it is suggested that oil resource conflicts have not been given 
adequate attention in oil resources literature. Based on the research questions which were built 
under the proposition, the analysis of the study of Nigeria’s oil village communities using the 
“integrated” structural conflict theory/structural violence will add to the debate and the existing 
knowledge in this area of oil resources research. To do this, the methods used in data collection 
are discussed in the next chapter. 
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                               CHAPTER FOUR 
                      RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4   Introduction   
 
 This chapter explains the philosophical positions of the research, the methodology of the study 
and the methods employed in the collection and analysis of data for the study.    
4.1 Philosophical Assumptions 
Before the discussion of the research methods used in this research, it is useful to set out the 
philosophical worldviews, in other words, the epistemological and ontological bases of the 
research. According to Blaikie (1993), assumptions and choices are made in response to 
research questions which, overtly or covertly, have significant consequences for conducting 
social enquiry, as well as the research results. In this study, the philosophical assumptions that 
guided my approach to this study are interpretivism and critical theory (Blaikie, 1993:1). These 
philosophical positions helped me to forms the critical element in the design of my research, 
especially the specification of the questions which I answered (Blaikie, 1993).Consequently, 
the research’s paradigms25 are driven by three fundamental questions; (a) the ontological 
question (b) the epistemological question and (c) the methodological question. These three 
questions are interconnected in such a manner that any answer given to any one question 
influences the answers we obtain from the other questions. Based on the interrelatedness of the 
basic belief systems on whose assumptions paradigms are established, as well as my conviction 
that there is no way to establish ultimate truthfulness for the basic beliefs that informs any 
paradigm, the study employs these two philosophical positions as the dominant paradigm for 
                                                 
25Guba and Lincoln (2004), define paradigms as sets of basic beliefs, which reflect the worldview of the holders, 
the range of possible relationships which are not open to proof in any conventional sense. Therefore, paradigms 
are also human constructions. Holloway (1997:114) defines a paradigm as “a philosophical model or framework 
originating in a world view and belief system based on a particular ontology and shared by a scientific 
community.” 
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the research.   However, this research notes that qualitative research is an inclusive method 
with its approaches not always wholly separate but possibly overlapping (Holloway, 1997).  
 
I adopted interpretivism26 because it enabled me to understand social phenomena and the 
existing ‘constructed’ social world and its interpretation by people in oil village communities in 
Nigeria (Holloway, 1997; Blaikie, 1993). Even though I acknowledge the existences of 
multiple ‘understandings’ as people in the oil village communities differently construct and 
interpret their relationship to the oil resources, there is relative consensus in the knowledge that 
exist within them(Guba and Linclon,2004). The construction, interpretation and understanding 
of their world changes as situation in their oil communities changes. 
 
I interpreted these social realities from their stances and constructions. This I did by giving 
primary data such as interviews, focus group discussion (FGD) and observations from the field, 
meanings and explanations by seeking for clarification and probing for confirmation to ensure 
a better understanding of oil resource conflicts in the communities visited. I acknowledge the 
difficulty of achieving complete objectivity and neutrality in social science research, as “social 
reality is a product of its inhabitants” (Blaikie, 1993:48). However, the use of triangulation in 
the research as would be explained in section 4.6 helped me in achieving reliability and 
validity.  
 
I also adopted Critical theory as the second and complementary philosophical assumption 
based “on the idea that reason is the highest potentiality of human beings. As well, through it 
usage, it is possible to criticise and challenge the nature of existing societies” (Blaikie, 
1993:52). Through Critical theory, I was able to critique the social, political, cultural, economic 
                                                 
26Interpretivism situates cultural and historical interpretations of the social life-world. By this, it thereby asserts 
the existing differences between various social realities (Gray, 2004:20) 
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and gender structures in oil village communities (Guba and Lincoln, 2004). In essence, the two 
philosophical approaches adopted in this research were considered as appropriate as 
interpretivism helped me to understand the world constructed by participants or the 
documentary evidence I gathered while the critical theory helped me to question subjective 
reality constructed and interpreted by my respondents or contained in documentary evidence.  
4.2 The Case study Design. 
  
The section justifies my choice of the case study design for this study.  To Yin (2003), case 
study has two critical definitions. First, the technical definition begins with the scope of a case 
study: A case study is an empirical inquiry that: Investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident. The second definition looks at the case study inquiry, which copes with 
the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than 
data points, and as one result. It relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result. It also benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2003). 
 
Accordingly, this research adopts a case study approach out of the “desire to understand the 
complex social phenomena” presented by the study, i.e. greed, grievance, environmental 
degradation, environmental scarcity, power struggles, oil benefits, etc. Furthermore, owing to 
the complexity of the independent, dependent and antecedent variables involved, the study thus 
retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events for achieving good data 
collection and analysis of violent conflicts that exist within Nigerian oil producing village 
communities (Yin, 2003:2; Burns, 2000:460). With a layout of a case study approach, an 
attempt is made to relate the findings to theoretical framework derived generally from 
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structural conflict theory. The deployment of theories is essential both during pre-data 
collection as well as providing a framework for interpreting the case study findings. The 
theoretical ideas that were developed tend to influence the research questions, the propositions, 
units of analysis and provide the logic for linking the data to the research propositions: “the 
complete research design embodies a “theory” of what is being studied (Yin, 2003:29).   
 
The study’s approach in that this study focused on village communities, which were 
investigated as a unit because of their shared socio-political, economic and cultural features.  
Yin (2003:13-14) argues that a case study ‘relies on multiple sources of evidence’ and a ‘prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.’      
 
Delta State’s oil village communities are selected from many other oil producing village 
communities in Nigeria, such as those in Rivers, Edo, Ondo, Abia, Imo, Akwa Ibo, Cross River 
and Bayelsa States. Delta state was purposely selected for this research based on the volume of 
crude oil produced in the state, which was the highest among the oil-producing states in 
Nigeria during the period of the research. The state has a high number of intra-and inter-
community oil-related violent conflicts in Nigeria (Imobighe et al, 2002).  At the period of the 
research, it had the highest number of kidnapping of oil workers, militant activities and 
pipeline vandalism in the region. 
 
However, data from these selected communities as explained in the sampling section were 
analysed together without using a comparative case method27.  The study employs a single 
narrative as the basic unit of the collective study, thereby allowing data collected from 
participants selected from various oil village communities to be analysed as a single study 
                                                 
27 The comparative case method is a distinctive form of multiple–case study mainly used in the field of political 
science and public administration (Yin, 2003:14). 
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(Shkedi, 2005:21). I opted for this because of these reasons: Considering that most Delta state’s 
oil village communities are small hamlets with few population sharing similarities of single 
economic activities like fishing or farming and with an overlapping neighbourhood. Therefore 
adopting a collective case study/single narrative allows for a “thick holistic description,” 
thereby leading to an “achievement of a level of understanding and interpretation” (Shkedi, 
2005:21). Further, the collective case or single narrative provided me with the opportunity to 
capture conditions with the same similarity in the oil village communities such as struggle for 
oil benefits among communities and struggle for leadership. Therefore, I adopted 
collective/single case study design because collective or single case study provided me the 
opportunity of studying social phenomenon such as oil resources fuelled violent conflicts 
‘through a thorough analysis of an individual case. The case may be a person, group, episode, 
process, community, society or any other unit of social life…[and] opportunity for intensive 
analysis of many specific details often overlooked by other methods(Kumar,2005:113). 
4.3 Qualitative Approach as a Research Method for the Study 
 
 I adopted qualitative research because of its phenomenological position, unlike Quantitative 
research which is based on positivism (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994).This phenomenological 
position allowed me to gain insight into reality of oil resource conflicts in oil village 
communities such as their social relations (Flick, 2002). As a general theme, Brockington and 
Sullivan (2003:57) maintain that qualitative research first tries to “understand the world 
through interacting with, empathizing with and interpreting the actions and perceptions of its 
actors.” Berg (1995:7), while contributing to the explanation and understanding of the 
qualitative method, writes that “qualitative research properly seek answers to questions by 
examining various social settings and the individuals who inhabit these settings”. Another 
reason for employing a qualitative data collection method is because of complexity that 
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underlines oil resources-linked violent conflicts. Thus, the qualitative method was considered 
as it helped in order to obtain in-depth knowledge and gather relevant information to the study 
 
Black (2002) argues that the researcher’s question determines the research approach. My 
research tools were chosen based on the research questions and the aim of my research. The 
nature of the research equally warranted me to make some changes while in the field. My 
understanding that “qualitative research is emergent rather than tightly prefigured” informed 
these changes as other aspects of the research evolved (Creswell, 2003:181). I had previously 
set out with the view of conducting my fieldwork based on the existence of environmental 
degradation and poverty in the oil village communities. However the consideration of these 
variables alone would not have provided a solid explanation for the cause of violent conflicts in 
oil village communities in Nigeria. As factors such as struggle for power, leadership and social 
exclusion may also have major roles in fuelling the violent conflicts. In addition, during my 
first week in the field, I discovered that my pre-fieldwork scope of study, which was the Warri 
metropolitan area in Delta State, the hub of violent conflicts in Delta State, is not really an oil 
village community but a metropolitan area. It mainly houses administrative and operation 
offices of the petrobusiness in Delta State, while the real oil activities take place outside the 
geographical area called Warri. This led to the expansion of the research’s scope to include the 
entire Delta State, which means selecting one out of the nine oil producing states (where the oil 
village communities are based) in Nigeria.  
 
It is important to note that this study is embedded in logico-deductive research28.Therefore, 
from the beginning of the research there were clear ideas of the research questions and theories 
                                                 
28Logico-deductive research is a traditional research design that is theory–driven from extant theories. The 
research design requires the researcher pre-structuring each phase of the research process to verify or refute these 
extant theories. It works on preconceived steps that guide the processes (Charmez, 2001). It is equally referred to 
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to test. This to a large extent helped in determining the appropriateness of the chosen research 
methodology, as the method that will help answering the questions. Invariably, it impacted on 
the conceptualisation of the research design, the fieldwork, selection of case studies, and the 
data collection.   
4.4  Data Gathering Process 
 
 This section discusses the forms of data collection instruments, the challenges, opportunities 
and decisions made while on the field in Nigeria between November 2007 and March, 2008.  
Data collection for this research started at the early period of my decision to study for a PhD, 
with collection of secondary data. The primary data collection (by means of interview, focus 
group discussion and observation) which came at later date as stated above, were used to 
empirically to explore the research questions.  During this period of field research, interviews 
and focus group discussions were held with people who have in-depth knowledge and 
understanding of oil resources conflict in oil village communities in Nigeria (sampling 
discussion below).  
 
Within the same period of time, documents such as reports, government white papers, 
publications (books, policy papers and journals) and other relevant documents relating to the 
research topic were sought from universities, research centres, government offices and oil 
companies’ offices in Nigeria. These documents aided a critical exploration and analysis of the 
discourse(s) on power struggle, socio-economic changes that shape the nature of the violent 
conflicts in the oil village communities and the Niger delta region.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
as “hypothetico-deductive or the falsification approach, or the method of conjecture and refutation” (Blaikie, 
1993:143-144). 
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4.4.1 Sample and Sampling Strategies 
 
The major target groups for the study are people from the oil village communities, especially 
those who live in these communities. Others are participants from governmental development 
agencies, Non-Governmental bodies and oil companies whose activities in these oil 
communities impact on the conflicts. In doing this, I adopted a purposeful sampling strategy 
which should allow me to carefully select individuals who have direct bearing on the topic of 
my research. As suggested by  Kumar (2005:179), ‘this  type of  sampling is extremely useful 
when you want to construct a historical reality, describe a phenomenon or develop something 
about which only a little is known’. However, I could not fully utilized this sampling strategy, 
as I find it difficult to interview up to 20 community chiefs/elders as I had intended. Rather I 
met more willing “youths” and women who participated both in the interviews and FGDs, 
providing me with enough information. It is worth noting that the decline of some Chiefs and 
elders to participate in the interviews or FGDs meant that the sample population had more 
“youths”29 than chiefs and elders.  This made my sampling a bit opportunistic as I cashed in on 
their willingness to explore and conducted my field research. With “the youths” being the 
larger percent of the participants (both the interviews and FGDs), their contributions 
demonstrated prevalence of social inequalities which are championed by chiefs and elders and 
those in power and the gains of resultant violent conflicts. The opportunistic nature of this 
sampling approach rather became a positive contribution to my data gathering and the entire 
                                                 
29 The definition of youth is a historically contested term, as societies define who a youth is taking into 
consideration their political, socio-economic, cultural, religious variables. Durham (2000:16) explains that the 
definition of  youth surpass biological or chronological age as social and cultural variables such as gender, 
religion, class, economy, responsibilities and ethnicity play important role in defining who is a youth or who is 
not. Oluwaniyi (2010:311) explains that “Youth is a social construction arising out of the political, socio-cultural, 
institutional and economic dynamics of a society that needs to be fully interrogated in order to understand the 
milieu within which it operates” Therefore in this research, “Youths” are not just adolescents between ages 17-24 
as defined by The UN, but men and women who for either political, traditional or socio-economic reasons are not 
considered as part of the elders in the communities. This is an observed trend in many African societies. These 
youths could have their ranging up to 45 years. 
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research, as their information helped to establish the changing socio-economic and political 
nature of oil village communities. 
 
 Furthermore, as Ritchie et al. (2003) argue that the criteria for choosing samples are dependent 
upon the research questions or the topics to be explored. Therefore, the choice of samples from 
the ten oil village communities were influenced by the experience of the participants their 
knowledge of the theme, and the position of such participants in their various communities. 
Also, government officials whose official responsibilities connect them with the oil village 
communities and MNCs whose oil exploration activities take place in these communities were 
included in the interviews. Consistent with this, Miller and Crabtree (2004:191) argue that 
“respondents should be selected so as to maximize the richness of information obtained 
pertinent to the research question using in depth interviews.”   
 
Considering that there is no list of oil village communities in Delta State, or rather no 
government agency agreed to be in possession of one, purposive and opportunistic sampling 
best served the situation. Again, considering the nature of oil village communities and conflict 
situations, gathering information proved somewhat difficult, especially where the participants 
offered to set up meeting between myself and some other people who could provide me with 
relevant information. This is described as snowballing technique (Kumar, 2005). For example, 
through snowballing I was able to meet and interviewed some community leaders and leaders 
of community development associations. Their views were very important in providing inside 
information on the host communities’ relationships (the popular name for oil village 
communities) with oil companies. Their views were considered very vital in issues such oil 
spills and compensation, development projects and other corporate social responsibilities of oil 
companies. 
91 
 
 
The individuals who were interviewed were located through participants already known to me, 
while some who have featured prominently in the Niger Delta conflicts either as mediators, 
peace builders or development agencies. E-mails were sent asking for interviews. In selecting 
these respondents from oil village communities, I tried to balance the ethnic representation of 
the participants by selecting two oil village communities from one ethnic group. The inclusion 
of ethnic representation for selecting participants is to avoid the research been biased by views 
of people from the same ethnic group as Delta state is a multi-ethnic state. Beyond the socio-
economic conditions and power struggle issues, the researcher while gathering the data in the 
field discovered that gender has an important role in the entire conflict. As Oluwaniyi 
(2011:150) observed, ‘women in the Niger Delta struggle simultaneously against the state-oil 
partnership as well as oppressive gender relations’. However, in this research gender issues is 
recognised as important in the conflict but it is not possible to explore every aspect of the 
gender related conflicts. However, some gender issues were considered in the analysis of the 
main and sub-questions. Thus, within these oil communities, roles and gender were considered 
in the selection. However, women who participated were mainly women leaders and some 
younger women who participated in focus group discussion. This is due to the limited roles 
given to women in these communities. 
 
In total, the research had a sample size of 75 participants across all the 10 communities visited, 
NGOs, interventionist agencies and oil MNCs. This comprised of 51 participants who 
participated in semi structured interviews and 24 participants (twelve in each forum) who took 
part in two separately organised focus group discussions (FGDs).The research selected the 
participants from across 10 village communities visited and was more interested in in-depth 
nature of the interview. This is because these communities share similar structural violence, in 
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areas such as oil resources and traditional institution system, youth unemployment and 
restiveness, sources and forms of livelihoods, environmental issues caused by oil, poverty and 
social exclusion.  Table 4.1 contains the names of oil village communities visited as part of my 
field work. 
 
 
TABLE 4.1 List of   oil village communities visited between November 
 2007 and February 2008  
 
COMMUNITIES LGAs ETHNIC GROUPS  OIL MNCs Date Visited 
Ugbokodo  Okpe Urhobo    SHELL 16/01/2008 
Sapele    Sapele Urhobo SHELL 17/01/2008 
Okerenkoko Warri-South Itsekiri    SHELL 14/11/2007-
15/11/2007 
Batan  Warri-South Itsekiri SHELL 16/11/2007 
Uzere  Isoko-South Isoko SHELL/CHEVRON 24/01/2008 
Olomoro Isoko-South Isoko SHELL/CHEVRON 24/01/2008 
Odimodi Warri-South West Ijaw SHELL 05/12/2007-
06/12/2007 
Gbaramatu  Warri-South West Ijaw SHELL 11/12/2007-
13/12/2007 
Okpai  Ndokwa West Ndokwa AGIP 01/02/2008 
Utagbo-Uno        Ndokwa- West Ndokwa AGIP 01/02/2008 
 
Source: Researcher’s Field notes 
 
4.4.2   Research Interviews 
Interviewing is a common data gathering method in qualitative research.  Kumar (2005:123) 
defines an interview as “[a]ny person-to-person interaction between two or more individuals 
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with specific purpose in mind.” This invariably shows that interview method in qualitative 
research seeks to uncover the perceptions, positions and experiences of participants. Thus, a 
semi-structured type of interview was adopted in this study to tap into participants’ views and 
knowledge of oil resources related violent conflicts. 
 
I used an interview guide which contained my pre-determined questions, but had ample 
freedom to modified, re-word, explain, or omit questions when the situation seemed 
appropriate while conversing with participants (Robson, 2002). The technique also allowed me 
to rearrange the order of my questions from the original script.  
 
Having made these initial interviews and contacts in Warri, and having used all the goodwill 
provided by both the location of oil-related development intervention government agencies and 
the location of oil companies’ operations offices in Warri, the interviews moved to oil village 
communities. In the oil village communities I relied on some of the contacts made in Warri and 
applied the snowball technique to access more key informants. It proved extremely difficult to 
get some of people in the oil village communities to talk, especially the chiefs and elders. They 
were cautious of the developments in some other oil village communities, with the Nigerian 
government trying some charity workers for espionage. However, it was not the same with 
“youths”, who showed more aggression over the state of infrastructural development and 
unemployment situations in their various communities. However with patience, persistence and 
follow–ups, as well as constant explanations of the importance of the interviews and research 
to me (as the research is not being done for profit or on behalf of any foreign organisation but 
purely academic), some key informants provided me with critical and balanced understanding 
and interpretation of the role played by oil resources benefits, power struggle and other factors 
in fuelling the violent conflicts in Nigeria’s oil village communities.   
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However, few people refused to grant me interviews, citing the sensitive nature of the topic and 
my association with a foreign university. Their refusal and views for not granting interview on 
the topic helped the researcher to further exploring the link between the second and third 
objectives. Specifically, in exploring how oil resources opportunities and benefits influence the 
disposition of those who benefit from it and the subsequent violent conflict. These refusals 
occurred more among few serving government officials who directly supervise oil 
development/interventionist agencies and among traditional rulers, elders and community 
development committee officials. However, the “youth” were much more ready to grant me 
interviews, except two “youth” leaders who denied my approach for interview; this helped me 
in forming my decision to use more “youths” in the FGDs. The hurdles encountered while 
visiting the ten oil village communities are mainly linked to the tense nature of the 
environment, especially the nature of existing conflicts and insecurity. Some gatekeepers at the 
government offices, who caused unnecessary delays, did not see the importance of my research 
to their personal gains. They rather gave access first to a contractor, a businessman or an 
influential “youth” leaders who wants to see their senior officials than allow the researcher 
access, as they may not get any financial gain from me. For instance, each time I visited 
DESOPADEC’s office, I meet thousands of “youths” from various oil village communities 
who were demonstrating, or contractors struggling to get access to government officials for 
contract jobs. For example: On the 7th of December, 2007, while visiting DESOPADEC's 
office (Delta State Oil Producing Development Commission), “youths” from the Ndokwa area 
of the state besieged the commission and sacked the entire workforce leading to the shutting 
down of the office, as they protest over non-inclusion of their communities in DESOPADEC’s 
development programmes. Again, on the 12th of February, 2008, I was at DESOPADEC's 
office while the governor of the state, Dr.Emmanuel Udeughan was visiting the office and 
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there were hundreds of angry “youths” who stormed the office demonstrating and protesting 
over lack of jobs, accusing their community leaders and DESOPADEC of favouring only their 
family members, friends and relations in giving employment (Field Notes, Warri: 2007). 
 
The situation I met on the ground was critical in some decisions made in order to meet the 
target set out for the field research. With a tense environment, the fear of being accused of 
espionage and the attitude of some gatekeepers in the government offices, I relied on the 
assistance of some “youths” in order to be able to conduct the interviews in the oil village 
communities. Furthermore, to get to government officials and some community leaders, the 
researcher employed a lot of snowballing techniques, where necessary, using an already 
interviewed community leader to get to the next community leader whose contributions might 
be informative. In some instances, I personally appealed to a senior official to introduce me to 
any official I had on my list. In sum, 51 respondents granted face to face semi structured 
interviews to the researcher. Table 4.2 shows the categories of participants in the interviews.  
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Table 4.2: Semi-structured interviews by category conducted Between 
November 2007 and March 2008 
 
Category       Number interviewed 
Traditional Heads of/elders of communities   7 
Chairmen/ Members of Community development Committee 8 
Community Youth Leaders 9 
Development interventionist Agencies: 
                                                             NDDC  
                                                             DESOPADEC 
6                                               
(3) 
(3) 
Non-Governmental Organisations(local) 2 
Oil MNCs 
                                               Director 
                                               Senior Managers 
                                               Community relation officer 
5 
(1) 
(2) 
(2) 
 
Human rights activists 
                                Environmental right activists 
                                Constitutional Rights Activists 
2 
(1) 
(1) 
Women Leaders/ Committee members of women 
Association  
10 
Development Consultant/Researcher 1 
Diaspora oil village community  Member 1 
Total 51 
Source: Researcher’s field notes 
 
Table 4.2 summaries the semi structured interviews conducted in the oil village communities 
between November 2007 and February 2008. In Total 51 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted as earlier explained. As can be seen in the table, out of the 51 participants, 35 are 
linked to oil village communities as either, Village head, Community Development Committee 
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members or “youth” or women leader. The remaining people are linked to Oil MNCs, NGOs, 
development/interventionist agencies, rights group and development consultancy. 
 
In sum while visiting the oil village communities, some communities were very willing and 
with that, I had more respondents (as shown in the table 4.1). I visited some oil village 
communities more than once, while my visit to some communities lasted only a day as I had 
very few people willing to be interviewed. However, since this is a single/collective study and 
considering the security situation, the similarities in socio-economic, traditional and political 
structures, and the oil fuelled structural violence in the visited communities, in-depth 
information given by participants provided across the board evidence. 
 
4.4.3  Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
 
Another aspect of the fieldwork data gathering exercise was conducted through focus group 
discussions (FGDs). The aim of conducting FGDs was to gain insight into the extent to which 
oil resources contribute to violent conflicts in oil village communities. Thus, two focus group 
discussions (FGDs) were held in Warri to provide additional primary data for the study.  The 
first FGD was held on 5th December, 2007 with 12 discussants participating while the second 
final FGD was held on 26th February, 2008 with another set of 12 discussants. Efforts were 
made to make sure that no person participated in both of the focus group discussion, in order to 
ensure balanced and new data. 
  4.4.4 Documentary Review 
In this study, documents are another important source of evidence, and were used in the 
analysis chapters 6-8. The documents reviewed were to help in gaining a sense of the situation 
within oil village communities. During the course of the fieldwork and interview sessions, 
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requests were made for copies of relevant documents. These types of documents include 
bulletins, memoranda of understanding (MOU), newspapers, magazines, written reports, etc. In 
collecting these documents, I solicited for some of them through written application, especially 
where the custodians of such documents saw them as 'confidential'. Due to the non-passage of 
the Freedom of Information Bill by Nigeria's National Assembly, obtaining any document from 
government establishments was not easy at the period of my field work. Government 
establishments and agencies are not obligated to release information and details of their 
activities to the public; more often than not it is left to the willingness of the officials in charge, 
or his or her personal considerations. 
 
In Shell Nigeria, the researcher obtained the full copy of GMOU (Global memorandum of 
understanding) between Shell and oil village communities and the report which records the 
whole process of the agreement. These documents provided really important evidence 
regarding the reasons for struggles for positions within oil village communities. In one 
interventionist agency, I was refused a list of oil village communities they consider as host 
communities, but was rather given their internal news bulletin showing different intervention 
projects embarked by them in some oil villages. 
 
Yin (2003) writes that documentary information is relevant to every case topic and it is the 
object of explicit data collection plans. For the case, the newspaper clippings and the articles 
appearing in the mass media were also important sources of evidence, particularly for the 
conflict involving communities or groups which have drawn strong attention from the media 
during the whole project process. Therefore, documentary evidence enables any good case 
study to make use of as many sources as possible. The discovery of oil resources and the 
emergent violence and conflicts in the oil Village communities have generated a large volume 
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of documentary sources. Furthermore, in the course of collecting data for this study, I visited 
research centres, bookshops, educational institutions and their libraries where I solicited for 
documents relevant to the subject of this study. I also attended seminars and workshops on the 
wider issues of conflicts and development in the Niger Delta, as this is a burning issue in the 
Nigerian polity. Research materials and knowledge acquired in the course of such visits and 
participating in such seminars were all invaluable to this research, as some of the information 
acquired during such occasions were considered as ‘technical and specialized contribution’ on 
the subject been investigated. For example, Environmental rights action (ERA) Field Report 
50; January 12, 2000, contains information on the use of “divide and rule tactics” by oil 
companies. 
4.4.5 Non-Participant Observation 
 
The research also employed non-participation observation in addition to the three major data 
gathering instruments used for primary data collection. Non-participant observation as 
described by Flick (2002:135) “refrains from intervention in the field.”  In the course of the 
interviews, I visited ten oil village communities and made several visits to DESOPADEC’s 
office in Warri.  On many occasions, while arranging interview dates at the DESOPADEC’s 
office, I witnessed youths from various oil village communities storming the agency, making 
demands and threatening to unleash havoc if their demands were not met. Other observations 
included contractors and job seekers from the oil village communities bringing letters from 
prominent citizens and politicians to be 'favoured'. Accordingly, I noted my observations in my 
field diary whenever such incident occurred. This critically helped in deepening my 
understanding of views and perceptions on some issues relating to their oil village 
communities, oil resources and violent conflicts. To achieve construct validity, I used some of 
the information gathered from this source which I wrote down in field note for triangulation in 
the thesis, which can be seen in the presentation of the data in the analysis sections. 
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4.4.6 Field Research Notes 
Every researcher before embarking on any field research trip makes research plans and time-
tables. However, more often than not, situations met on the field alter these previously made 
plans. This leaves the researcher with the alternative of making amendments to the original 
research plan. These changes could be in the period to be spent in the field, places to visit, or 
sampling, or even in the data gathering process. When these types of changes and unplanned 
situations confront me, I put them down in writing, as it will aid me in justifying impromptu 
decisions taken while in the field. These notes made in the field provide good explanations 
with other documents when undertaking analysis. De Laine (2000:146) describes field note as 
bits of information, data “which must be organized into categories to have significance in the 
text.” De Laine stresses that “field notes are developed and created by the fieldworker, who is 
in the unique position of bringing personal meaning to the created account” (2000:148). The 
researcher makes his or her personal submission while writing a field note, meaning that field 
notes are semi-processed data which includes the interpretation of the researcher.   
4.5 Data Analysis Strategy 
 
 The process of the data analysis means that the researcher creates meaning from the raw data 
gathered. Data analysis involves a number of stages namely; data management; generation; 
interpretation and presentation (Creswell, 2009; Yin, 2009). In this study, data analysis 
involves inspecting data for emerging themes, coding the data, developing categories and 
interpretation of data. 
 
The process of the data analysis started with data management, as the researcher creates 
meaning from the raw data gathered in the field. Data management facilitates inspection of the 
data for representative and coherence, as well as to commence giving the data perspective, 
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interpretation and meaning. The transcription of the data generated over 250 pages of single 
spaced A4 paper. The audio tapes and field notes were from time to time used for further 
reference during the period of writing up and subsequently stored if further need arises. On 
completion of the transcription, I carried out a detailed review of the data by reading the 
transcribed material thoroughly and carefully. The reason behind undertaking a detailed review 
of the results was to identify recurring issues and themes. With this process, I was able to 
identify key words and statements on oil resources related conflicts.  
 
The next stage involved generating categories and themes, which involved a thorough coding 
of the data. To achieve a well coded data, I further read through the data on a line by line and 
word-by-word basis. Through this process,  I was able to label the data according to the three 
research questions under the main research question posed in chapter1.1.The analytical 
framework developed in section 3.2 and illustrated in figure 3.1 guided the analysis. Through 
reading and re-reading of the transcripts, field notes and continuous reference to the analytical 
framework, analysis was kept close to the research questions. This was to avoid drifting from 
the main thrust of the research and develop grounded conceptual categories.  
 
The researched coded and labelled the data using an open coding system. The data was 
disaggregated and analysed for similarities and differences. The use of disaggregation of data 
helped the initial research findings to be explored in greater detail to further generate themes 
and categories. The researcher labelled and sorted the raw data into themes and categories thus 
producing an indexed document. The indexed document was categorised by general themes 
that had a page link corresponding to the raw data from which the themes were developed and 
derived. The process of indexation resulted in a document with about 55 pages of single spaced 
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A4 paper and linked to the initial 250 pages for retrieval and reference purposes during the 
presentation of result. 
 
The next stage in the data processing is the interpretation of data. The interpretation stage is an 
integral and important stage of data analysis about the design and influence of oil resources on 
oil village conflicts. The data was indexed, was grouped according to codes developed by the 
investigator. This led to the emergences of themes (Creswell, 2009). Six themes that emerged 
initially from the indexed data on oil village resource conflicts were merged into three 
categories of themes namely; Socio-economic condition, Power struggle and management of 
oil conflicts. The three categories of themes were developed after a thorough examination of 
the transcribed data, and were used to draft the research discussion and analysis. To understand 
the data, I compared the categories and themes developed out of the data on oil resource 
conflicts in village communities and the initial data gathered in the field to ensure that the 
categories and themes developed in the interpretive stage were suited to answer the three 
research questions posed in chapter 1.1.The process of data analysis in its entity made it 
possible to develop consistent explanations based on the research questions and analytical 
framework. Further meaning of data comes from understanding, interpretation, and 
representation (Creswell, 2007). Overall, three chapters (six, seven and eight) of analysis were 
developed. 
4.6 Reliability and Validity 
 
Denscombe (2002) sees reliability and validity as the two major questions that confront any 
social researcher when it comes to issues of accuracy. This means that, for any social research 
to stand up to critical examination, it must show reliability and validity.  
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Reliability of qualitative study relates to whether the same result can be achieved if another 
study is conducted using the same methods of research. To achieve reliability in qualitative 
research, there is a detailed description of the methods employed in the research during the 
preparation for field work exercise, data collection process, transcribing and coding and 
analysis and presentation of research findings (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). It is argued that this 
helps to solve the problem of reliability and validity, thus improve the quality of case studies 
when applied. This research on the political economy of oil resources conflicts in oil village 
communities in Nigeria, attempts as much as possible to present the research method in a 
transparent and honest manner. Some of the actions I took to enhance the reliability of this 
study include checking whether the questions were clear to the participants who took part in the 
interviews and FGDs 
 
Validity in research is related to deepening the understanding of the qualitative data. This phase 
in qualitative research seeks to confirm whether the findings of the study can be relevant 
beyond the case study and the context of the research (Yin, 2009).The question of validity 
centres around three issues: (a) accuracy in terms of asking the right questions; (b) accuracy in 
terms of the precision and details of the data; and (c) accuracy in terms of the truthfulness of 
the information gathered (Denscombe, 2002).In this case study, to ensure validity, the 
questions asked were drawn out of the gap that exists in literature which the study is proposing 
to fill. This allowed me to establish a chain of evidence and maintain clear linkages between 
the various stages of the study, thus allowing the conclusion to be traced to the research 
questions, the data collection tools employed and the evidence.  Furthermore, I had earlier 
followed correct research operational procedures for studying laid down areas of investigation 
in relation to the study’s objectives. These research procedures were established in order to 
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construct validity for the research. This according to Yin (2003) is a tactics to increase the 
quality of construct validity during the data collection phase.  
 
Although this study as a qualitative research is not designed to be statistically representative for 
generalisation of research findings, the research generalised its findings to structural conflict 
theory based on the theoretical sampling. This is contrary to the view that generalisation means 
application of data to a wider population, form of representational generalisation use by 
positivists (Yin 2009; Creswell, 2003). In this thesis, findings on the socio-economic 
conditions and power struggle in oil village communities in Nigeria has been extensively 
presented to allow for transferability of the findings to other similar settings or context. 
Secondly, the validity of the process cumulated in the quality of the data generated through the 
fieldwork. This is backed up by the explanations given for the steps taken while in the field to 
ensure accuracy. To enhance the validity of this study, the study drew on the documentary 
review, in-depth semi-structured interviews and focus group discussion, and non-participation 
observation as sources of evidence to increasing the understanding. These sources of evidence 
allowed the development of converging lines of enquiry, a triangulation process that improved 
the reliability of evidence and produces a holistic understanding. The availability of different 
documents from different sources with similar information provided a means of cross checking 
for accuracy.  
 4.6.1   My position in the research 
 
 My field work was conducted between November 2007 and February, 2008. This was my first 
major field work in the research. I anticipated some challenges in the Niger Delta region, 
especially in oil village communities, due to the activities of militants and the state security 
services. My first two weeks saw me conducting my activities with fear, based on two things: 
firstly, coming from the United Kingdom meant that I might be perceived as having a lot of 
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money, thus making me a good target for kidnap. Again, from the on-set of the fieldwork, I 
took an ‘outsider researcher’ stand considering the nature of suspicion among communities in 
the Niger Delta and not to be associated with any community, thereby risking my safety, and 
the probability that  many people may see my name and ask me about my state of origin. 
Again, though two of the ten oil village communities visited for interviews are Igbo speaking, 
they do not comfortably identify themselves as such. Therefore, I never had the advantage of 
being an insider, and this hugely helped me with regard to the officials of the two 
interventionist agencies, the oil companies and the other non-Igbo oil village communities who 
saw me as neutral coming from another state and from a Western University. 
 
Secondly, being an Igbo, one of the three major ethnic groups considered to be dominating 
Nigeria’s politics and economy, I had fears of not being given audience. Luckily, my being 
Igbo did not in any way affect responses I got or became a problem for me based on these 
reasons. This is because there are severally Igbo ethnic/speaking oil village communities in 
Imo state, Abia State, Rivers State and Delta State, so they suffer the same fate as other oil 
village communities from other ethnic groups. More so, most of the participants in the study 
understood the direction of the questions and answered accordingly.  They explained how oil 
resources have re-conditioned their own local social relations, economic relations and power 
distribution, without referring to “power” at Abuja. Even where they did, they saw it as a plan 
against oil producing areas to which some Igbo village communities are among. The 
researcher’s Igbo identity and position as a researcher in an area other than his Igbo ethnic 
environment was an advantage as it guided against the researcher overtly introducing biases 
based on common knowledge during the period of data collection and reporting process. 
Unlike positivists, researchers who adopt interpretivism know that they “cannot be divorced 
from the phenomenon under study” or be free from the interests and values of the socially 
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constructed world (Holloway, 1997:2). However, this did not completely remove such feelings, 
biases and prejudices but as a researcher I remained objective as I asked the right questions and 
used member checking/ feedbacks mechanisms for re-affirmation. Even when in some oil 
villages I was shown farms claimed to have been destroyed by oil resources, I still asked 
questions to be sure it was not an act of criminality on the part of such community to get 
compensation. 
 
 Again, the interviews and focus group discussions were all conducted in English Language 
which is the official language of Nigeria, and where the participants were not fluent in English 
Language, they were encouraged to use pidgin/broken English, which is a diluted form of 
English widely spoken in the Niger Delta due to the multiplicity of languages in that region of 
Nigeria. As a Nigerian, I am fluent in both speaking and writing of pidgin/broken English. 
Therefore I did not need the assistance of any interpreter during the interviews. My ability to 
speak broken/Pidgin English helped in disguising my identity as a returnee or non-local, as I 
easily use the pidgin/broken English when communicating with local people. I employed 
feedback mechanism to prevent personal bias and affirmed such ideas from the respondents. I 
also shared some of my observation with participants before writing it in my field notes. 
4.7 Ethical Consideration 
 
 This research was guided by the 2004 Revised Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research by 
British Educational Research Association (BERA). The adoption of this external ethical 
guideline was due to the non-existence of ethical guidelines and consent forms for such 
research in the university at the period of the fieldwork in November, 2007.  As opined by 
Osaghae and Robinson (2005:3) ‘the nature of recent conflicts and interventions to manage or 
resolve them has made ethical considerations a key methodological issue’. My adoption of 
British Educational Research Association’s ethical guidelines was to help me in observing ‘the 
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rules of confidentiality, especially with regards to disclosures, in order to maintain objectivity 
and accountability’ (Osaghae and Robinson, 2003:3). The University of Birmingham’s ethical 
guidelines and consent forms for research was later introduced in October 2008. 
 
Conducting fieldwork requires a lot of tact and commitment, thus every researcher while in the 
field tries to stick to laid down research rules while at the same time tries to use his or her 
personal judgment where it is required or where the rules cannot be applied. The researcher had 
experience of youths who participated in the FGDs, asking the researcher for money, which 
they referred to as ‘settlement’. The researcher had to explain to them that he is a poor Nigerian 
student with no form of sponsorship or scholarship, and could not afford to pay them. 
However, I provided drinks after each focus group discussion.  According to De Laine, “ethical 
and moral dilemmas are occupational work hazards of fieldwork that the researcher cannot plan 
for, but nonetheless must be addressed on the spot, by drawing on values, ideals, ethical codes, 
moral and professional standards, intuition and emotions” (2000:16).  
 
Embarking on a fieldwork “remains one of the most challenging of all social science 
endeavors” (Yin, 2003:1). However, in most situations, “it contributes to our knowledge of 
individual, group, organisational, social, political and related phenomena” (Yin, 2003:1). 
Generally, some of my respondents doubted my person, but a presentation of my introduction 
letter assisted me (See Appendix I), but as such discussions progresses, they let down their 
guards and discuss very openly. With their consent, all my interviewees allowed me to use an 
audio tape recorder but insisted that I would not use any video recording, citing the case of the 
CNN African reporter who faked militant activities for broadcast. The interview sessions were 
managed tactfully; even when an informant tended to digress, I generally allowed this as the 
digression was answering a further probe question I was planning to ask.  Therefore, in 
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contemporary research, ethical issues such as confidentiality, risk and safety are given high 
priority before any sensitive research topic30 is undertaken in the field. Looking at the sensitive 
nature of the topic that I was doing, there was recognition ‘that danger is probably inherent in 
anthropological fieldwork’, especially since some aspect of the conflict like militancy and 
kidnapping were still ongoing in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria (Sluka, 1995:276).   
4.7.1   Confidentiality  
 
Researching in an area recently affected by violence or still going through violent conflicts, I 
considered the ethics of my actions and took actions to ameliorate the impact my presence will 
have on the people I have studied. The researched topic is a very sensitive one because of its 
potential to pose problems to both the researched and the researcher, “as personal security is 
jeopardized” (Lee and Renzetti, 1993:5). As stated earlier, the selected communities which 
were visited were ones with no on-going violent conflicts; this is not to jeopardize my safety 
and that of the researched. The ethics in the research involves avoiding doing long-term, 
systematic harm to those individuals, communities and environments that we as social 
scientists seek to study in order to bring about social change. Social scientists should assure 
trust, ensure research integrity, and satisfy organisational and professional demands (Israel and 
Hay, 2006:2). Thus, ethical considerations are essential in undertaking any research. The 
nature, timing and location of my research made it very imperative that ethics and rules of 
research were met and observed. I was confronted with respondents’ views and preferences, 
gaining access and gatekeepers.  
 
 Furthermore, considerations around right to privacy, and deception, as well as protecting both 
the researcher and participants from harm were observed (Guillemin and Gillin, 2004).This 
                                                 
30 Sensitive Research – According to Sieber and Stanley (1988) quoted in Renzetti and Lee(ed) 
(1993:3) as “studies in which there are potential consequences or implications, either directly 
for the participants in the research or for the class of individuals represented by the  research”  
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research considered confidentiality as ultra-important, owing to the ‘risky and sensitive’ nature 
of the answers given by many respondents. Berg (2001) argues that deception arises when 
research participants’ understanding of the purpose of a study is different from the purpose the 
researcher wants to achieve. To maintain confidentiality, it is important that those who decided 
to cooperate in the research do not suffer any negative effects resulting from the research. This 
research like political violence research had many ‘skeletons to handle, too many closets to 
inspect’ (Robben, 1995:94). I encountered a lot of character assassinations, deliberate lies or 
half –truths and self-exclusion and glorification. One of my respondents was busy accusing 
leadership of one of the development interventionist agency that featured in this research of 
missing managing funds meant for oil community development. He confided in the researcher 
that certain amount money has been promised to him if he will drop his case against the 
management. Interestingly, during my second FGD, some youth while discussing youth’s 
involvement in illegal oil bunkering mentioned his name as a kingpin, that at 32 years he is 
fabulously rich. This quickly drew my attention to the fleet of cars and palatial nature of his 
house, which is rear for someone of his age in Nigeria. 
 
Thus, in guaranteeing such participants protection, nothing in the study should be traceable to 
specific individuals or groups. An introductory letter conveying the purpose of the research and 
assuring respondents of the maintenance of confidentiality was shown to those who 
participated either in interviews or focus group discussions. However, confidentiality was still 
an issue; few public servants declined to grant interviews in their capacity as public servants, 
expressing concern over their jobs. Youths who participated in the interviews and FGDs were 
not much concerned about issue of confidentiality, but the information they were divulging 
were considered risky and very sensitive by me, if their identities were ever to be disclosed. 
Based on this, care has to be taken not to associate statements and quotations with the real 
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names of respondents, rather initials such E.O, E.E was used in place of original names. The 
positions and names of oil village communities were abbreviated to CL, or YL, and SAComm 
or UZComm respectively. As argued by Adetoun(2005:49) ‘ it is vital for researchers to protect 
the identity of their respondents in order not to expose them to any kind of recrimination from 
opposing groups- the researcher must not precipitate further crisis’. A list of true names of 
respondents was added for examination purposes, and was removed during the final submission 
to protect the identity of my respondents as promised to them during my data collection 
process. 
 
The research has adequately ensured that no suppression, falsification or inventing of evidence 
occurs at the point of transcription and analysis. This is done through processes such as re-
affirmation of unclear issues from respondents or retrieving and re-examining of raw data and 
indexed documents.  Newman (2000) argues that engaging in such fraudulent practices is not 
acceptable in professional research communities as they constitute scientific misconduct. 
However, as a compromise to avoid putting the respondents in any danger, the categories of 
respondents in the interviews are listed without their names in table 4.2.  
 
4.7.2 Access and Fieldwork Timing 
 
Conducting fieldwork in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is a task filled with great 
expectations. This ranges from the wonderful aquatic environs to the distorted nature which 
petrobusiness has created in the area. My first major problem was getting a list of oil village 
communities or oil producing communities (host communities, as they are called). I looked for 
this list in the state capital but met a brick wall, and in DESOPADEC’s office, they claimed 
that every community in Delta is regarded as a host community; even if a community does not 
have oil deposits, it harbours fleets of oil pipelines which transport oil way or experiences 
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discomfort through other oil activities. My search for this list took me to The Department for 
Petroleum Resources (DPR), but was still not able to get one; this thereby solidified my desired 
to use purposive sampling in selecting oil village communities where I conducted some of my 
interviews. I selected the ‘relatively peaceful’ oil village communities with past history or 
experience of intra or inter –communal violent clashes or conflicts. This I found out while I 
was doing my fieldwork arrangements. 
 
In course of the field work for this research in Nigeria between November 2007 and March 
2008, my personal observation, especially in relation to public offices and the oil industry 
reveals the secrecy with which any information regarding petrobusiness is held. Shell, which 
was one of the MNCs interviewed, was not prepared to grant any interview to me without an 
approval from Nigeria’s DPR (Department for Petroleum Resources),(see Appendices J  and K 
for an e-mail from Shell asking for approval from DPR and a letter from DPR introducing me 
to Shell ). 
4.7.3 Risk, Health and Safety 
 
Risk, health and safety were thoroughly considered and assessed before I undertook the 
fieldwork. I made contacts with family and friends who live in Warri and other towns in Delta 
State, and was greatly assured that the situation was not as it was been blown in the media, as 
people still go about their daily duties and businesses. Again, like any other Nigerian who 
could speak and understand Pidgin English, I know I could communicate with any local 
resident with ease. However, like every new researcher on his or her first fieldwork experience, 
I was short of “knowledge of what can go wrong” during the fieldwork (Gokar, 2006:64). The 
risk, health and safety factors were things I could not envisage very well. Risk, according to 
Treweek and Linkogle (2000:18) is not something new in conducting research; it is the 
possibility of suffering harm, getting into danger or any hazards. Every research has its own 
112 
 
risk, health and safety issues; the nature, location and timing of such research could affect 
them, thus, Linkogle (2000:132) advised about researchers reflecting deeply on the challenges 
and dilemmas of conducting research in unfamiliar environments.  
 
The nature of violence and insecurity in the Niger Delta were considered to constitute a risk, 
health and safety issue for non-residents, oil workers and foreigners. Mostly at the period of my 
fieldwork, with militants targeting oil facilities, kidnappings of oil workers, and in retaliation, a 
follow-up armed violence against such oil village communities by The Joint Task Force (JTF 
Operation Restore Hope). Through the help of my guide and staff of DESPODEC, I selected 
the ‘relatively peaceful’ oil village communities who had no militant camps or were not in any 
on-going violent conflict.  As part of precaution, each time I visited any oil village community, 
I set out from Warri accompanied by a guide or two (youths from such community) who were 
introduced to me by the official from DESPODEC, and returned to Warri after such interview. 
Most of these “youth” either participated in the face-to-face interview or Focus group 
discussion depending on their position in their communities. 
 
 In some of the oil village communities, the researcher was met by angry “youths”, who after 
verbal pacification agree to grant interviews, especially on seeing me with a “youth” from their 
community or their “youth” leader. The researcher faced issue of rumour, as there are tense 
animosities within and between these communities. In many instances, I was challenged by 
respondents about visiting a particular community before theirs or why I went to see a 
particular respondent before him. Some would even want to know if the other respondent said 
anything about them. In such situation, I out-rightly explain that I am a researcher and that 
nothing has been said about anyone as my questions are not on anyone. Knowing that such 
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rumour will affect my field research, I tried to control by diffusing the situation (Reychler, 
2001). 
 
The tense nature and suspicion among oil village communities, and between oil communities 
and the state security outfit (Joint Task Force-Operation Restore Hope) were clearly visible, 
thereby making my choice of ‘outsider researcher’ the right decision’ as I could not  be 
associated with any community or the government. Another factor was the case of espionage 
brought against two foreign journalists and local NGOs workers by Nigeria’s State Security 
Service (SSS) a month before I arrived for my fieldwork, as part of which Dr Mrs Judith Asuni, 
a Nigerian-American Peace worker in the region and two German Journalists were charged for 
espionage alongside another Nigerian Peace worker. Having earlier contacted Dr Asuni for an 
interview, and coming from a foreign university, I was careful not to get into any direct contact 
with the security officials. Some of the interviews contain sensitive and security related 
information, which for health and safety reasons I may not disclose in my research, at least for 
now, and where I have used some, the confidentiality clause is applied properly.  
4.8 Conclusion  
 
This chapter looks holistically at the methodology of the research. It started with the 
exploration of the philosophical strands adopted in this study being the interpretivist and 
critical theorist strands. The chapter also explained the case study research as a scientific 
inquiry and its appropriateness for studying oil resource conflicts in village communities in this 
study. It explained the tools used for data collection such as interviews, focus group 
discussions, field notes and non-participant observation. The chapter further explained the 
concepts of reliability and validity as they affects the data collected in this study. Lastly, the 
ethical factors considered in the course of collection and analyses of the data for the study were 
explained.    
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The next chapter deals with the background to the political economy of oil resources in 
Nigeria. Focusing on oil village communities, it discusses the context in which oil resources 
promote rent-seeking behaviours, power and leadership struggles, economic opportunism and 
securitisation. The chapter contributes to the understanding of factors arising out of oil 
resources activities which fuels violent conflicts in host oil village communities. 
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                                      CHAPTER FIVE 
                    POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OIL IN NIGERIA 
 
5. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides background information on the political economy of oil resources in 
Nigeria.  The chapter particularly focuses on the oil economy, fiscal federalism, struggles for 
power and oil village communities of Niger Delta as well as the rentier nature of Nigeria.  This 
chapter reviews the historical development of the oil economy and business in Nigeria. The 
chapter explains that right from the inception of oil resources production in Nigeria, ‘oil 
activities’ instituted various forms of violence on oil village communities, which only escalated 
into violent conflicts in the late 1990s. The chapter explains that oil has huge effects especially 
on oil village communities’ socio economic conditions, struggles for power and leadership, 
local governance, access to oil benefits and economic opportunities. These effects are likely to 
fuel violent conflicts in local oil communities. Therefore, in discussing the background analysis 
of the research, it is vital that the study’s phenomena and context are treated intertwiningly 
(Yin, 2004). This is to enable the study present a balanced analysis. 
5.1 The Background and Context of Oil Resources in Nigeria  
 
Nigeria lies on the Atlantic coast of West Africa, with a population estimated to be close to 
167,912.561 million and with more than 250 different ethnic nationalities, with the 
Hausa/Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbos as the dominant ethnic groups and languages (Thisday, 
October 30th 2011; UNDP, 2011; NBS, 2012). It is divided into 36 states, with Abuja as its 
federal capital. The 1914 amalgamation of two British Protectorates (the Protectorates of 
Northern and Sothern Nigeria) and the colony of Lagos by Sir Fredrick Lugard, led to the 
creation of the geographical entity known today as Nigeria. After becoming a federation in 
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1954, on October 1st 1960, Nigeria obtained its independence from Great Britain. Since its 
independence, Nigeria has suffered one socio-political crisis or the other, including a civil war 
that lasted for about four years between 1966 and 1970. Omeje (2006:26) attributed this to a 
“very little effort at political, administrative, social, economic and cultural integration during 
colonial history. Primordial ethnic structures and cleavages have largely been the basis of 
national politics before and after independence.”  Thus, it may not be out of place to question if 
the period of the discovery of the oil played any role in the entire set of socio-political and 
economic crises. 
 
The trajectories of the development of Nigeria as a petrostate are linked to the 1907 
exploration of petroleum by a German company, the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation. In order 
to ward off competition from other non-British interests, the colonial state introduced the 
1914 Colonial Mineral Ordinance,  which formalised state control of oil exploration. This 
ordinance therefore allowed the colonial state to grant exclusive concessions to British and 
British-allied companies. Thus, the Anglo-Dutch group Shell D’Archy (which later became 
Shell-BP), under this exclusive arrangement obtained an oil exploration Concession covering 
the entire 367,000 square miles of Nigeria in 1938 (Frynas, 2000). This set the tune for 
Shell’s dominance of oil economy in Nigeria, with the company controlling about 50% of 
Nigeria’s total oil production and about 53% of its total hydrocarbon reserve base (Ibeanu, 
2006). Also, there was a major policy change which saw the amendment of the Colonial 
Mineral Ordinance of 1914 with the Petroleum Decree No. 15 of 1969. This change in policy 
strengthened Nigeria’s autonomy on the oil industry, and exclusively empowered it to grant Oil 
Mining Leases, oil exploration and oil prospecting licences. Petroleum Decree No. 15 also 
gave the Nigerian state total control and ownership of all petroleum discovered in any part of 
the country, including its territorial waters and continental shelves. This development broke the 
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autonomy of Shell BP, which had the rights of marketing commercially oil found before 
Nigeria’s Independence in 1960 (Frynas, 2000). Consequently, the policy change gave room 
for other major transnational oil companies (TNOCs) or oil MNC to join petrobusiness in 
Nigeria. These TNOCs included Mobil, Texaco, Agip, Elf, Gulf, and Esso West Africa among 
others (Onoh, 1983). Even with the state control of oil resources found in Nigeria’s land, 
territorial waters and continental shelves, its lack of ownership of indigenous technology in the 
sector limits its ability to effectively control the activities of MNCs operating in the sector. For 
example, Nigeria is among the countries with the highest amount of flared natural gas. 
According to the satellite data of World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership 
(GGFR), Nigeria flared around 16.8 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2007, second only to 
Russia (Newsblog, 2009). This is despite various ultimatums given by the Nigeria state for an 
end to gas flaring. One of such ultimatums was a deadline of 31st December, 2010 for 
compliance on non-gas flaring by oil MNCs given by Nigerian Senate (Thisday, May 15th, 
2009). However, gas is still been flared, with the Nigerian state not able to enforce such 
compliance.   
 
Oil resources were discovered in large commercial quantities at Oloribiri Community in 
Bayelsa State in 1956, while exportation started in 1958.  This seemed to have set the tone for 
the oil fuelled curses that befell the country. As the present, socio-economic and political crises 
which the country experiences have been mainly attributed to the impact of oil resources. 
Therefore, to many Nigerians, the discovery of oil resources remains a turning point in 
Nigeria’s socio-political and economic history. Not only did this singular discovery change the 
nature of Nigeria’s economic development and growth, it re-defined its political development, 
socio-political cultures and the political dynamics in the country (Omeje, 2006).  For instance, 
oil resources supported a ‘legacy of three decades of military (mis) rule’ (Obi, 2004:3), and as 
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pointed out by Ross (1999), it rather hindered democracy in the country. The struggle for 
political power has been majorly linked to access it provides to oil resource opportunities. The 
contributions of oil resources to various military coups, political and civil violent conflicts in 
the country such as the 1966-1970 Nigerian civil war left bad experience to the country’s 
development. These political and economic crises were subsequently followed by various 
violent conflicts in the oil village communities in the country. This is because the Nigerian 
state controls the oil, and ‘has functioned as the instrument of economic accumulation and a 
key player in its distribution’ (Okonta, 2008:4).Subsequently, this led to a culture of protest and 
revolt against the state and oil MNCs by oil village communities as well as the struggle for 
power by Nigerians in general for state patronage. Therefore getting into the state would give 
one access to benefitting from such oil resources opportunities. Omeje (2006:5) posits that: 
A major feature of the oil dominance of Nigeria’s political 
economy is the pervasiveness of high stake rentier politics. 
High stake rentier politics converges and interlinks the rentier 
features of the economy with the neo-patrimonial traditions of 
the post-colonial state and society to produce a convoluted 
political culture marked by clientelistic desperation in both oil-
related accumulation and state-society relations. 
 
 
Obi (2007:8) supported the above observation with the claim that:  
                     Oil has since the end of the civil war in 1970, become a central  
                     factor in Nigeria’s political economy, and a rather sensitive issue  
                     in the management of the country’s vast diversities, inequities and  
                     pluralities, particularly as they relate to identities: ethnic, religious  
                     and regional, and competing claims to the control and ownership  
                     of oil. 
With such developments, oil resources have continued to fuel violent struggles and conflicts in 
oil village communities. These violent conflicts range from armed conflicts which involve full 
participation of the state, revolt against oil companies, to non- state armed conflicts involving 
groups in oil village communities. For example, such example of state violence is the killing of 
local oil village people in the Odi, Bayelsa state by the Nigeria State Security in 2000(Ukiwo, 
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2007). Violent revolts against the oil MNCs by various oil village communities, includes for 
instance, the Ogoni uprising against Shell (Okonta, 2008).While the non-state violent conflicts 
among groups and communities in the Niger Delta region, includes the 1997 Warri Crisis 
between the Ijaws, Urhobo and Itsekiri ethnic groups (Imobighe, et al 2002).  
 
In terms of economic impact, oil solely dominated the country’s economy until the late 1990s, 
when sectors like telecommunication started making visible contribution to the economy (Tell 
magazine, February 18, 2008). At one period in the country’s existence, oil resources 
accounted for 93 percent of its exports, 75 percent of foreign exchange earnings, and 45 
percent of its gross national product (Ikein, 1990:19)31. Nigeria’s oil resources production 
makes it the world’s 13th largest producer globally, and the 6th largest oil exporting country 
(OPEC).Oil resources from 1970 to 1999 have also generated $231 billion for Nigeria’s 
domestic economy, which constitutes between 21 and 48% of the Gross Domestic Product 
(ODI, 2009:3). Financially, it accounted for around 79.5% of total government revenues, 
thereby making it the main bedrock responsible for sustaining the Nigerian state (UNDP, 
2006). This development has impacted so much on the country’s economy, resulting in the 
agricultural sector, which was once the country’s pre-independence main source of revenue, 
being relegated to the background. There were fewer attentions paid to the agricultural, 
manufacturing and other sectors of the economy, thereby making the country a ‘monocultural 
economy’, which depended and focused only on the petroleum sector. Concentration on oil 
resources led to the other sectors contributing less than 20% to the national income (Tell 
magazine, February 18, 2008), thus leading to Dutch disease as pointed in chapter two. 
Interestingly, the Nigeria state was not the only party interested in the rent that oil resources 
generate, as the local communities with time also became interested. For the oil village 
                                                 
31 Oil resources’ contribution to the national economy has since changed since 2000, with an increased 
diversification of the economy. 
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communities, judging from their financial contribution of oil resources to the federation 
account, they felt that they have not adequately been compensated for their entire economic 
contribution. Okonta (2008:3) writing on the revolts by Ogoni oil communities against the 
Nigerian state and oil companies on resources activities and benefits, said that: 
              The Ogoni also pointed out that they have not received what they would 
              regard as their fair share of the income derived from oil production in their 
              area, which they estimated at some 30 billion US dollars. 
 
Therefore, it seems that as oil resources continue to make major contribution to Nigeria’s 
economy, every stakeholder feels that they deserve more from the oil economy, even as the 
entire country is wholly dependent on the oil revenue. However, notwithstanding the enormous 
revenue generated from oil, which stands at about $40 billion annually, the country  has  “a 
miserable, undisciplined, decrepit and corrupt form of ‘petro-capitalism’...[of which] Nigerian 
per capita income stands at $290 per year,”. Thus, the living standard of the majority of 
Nigerians shows no difference from what it used to be prior to the production of oil in 1958 
and after Independence in 1960 (Douglas et al., 2003:2). From table 5.1 on relative poverty 
headcount in Nigeria and table 5.5 on oil production in Nigeria, it may be concluded that as 
Nigeria’s oil production increases, the poverty level in the country increases as well. Obi 
(2001:32) considering the oil boom and doom of 1973 and 1977 respectively as factors claimed 
that: 
The oil-dependent, mono-cultural Nigeria economy was in 
trouble as a result of the refraction of the crisis in the global 
capitalist system locally. With foreign reserves barely enough 
to cover a few months of imports, the economy fell into dire 
straits. The shock absorption capacity of the economy had long 
been undermined by its weak import-dependent (light 
manufacturing dominated) base; years of mismanagement, 
waste and corruption, extraction by global capital and western    
commercial and oil interests, and two decades of military 
dictatorship. 
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From the above submission, it seems very obvious that the economic cum political crisis which 
the country is in cannot be disassociated from the presence or role of oil resources in Nigeria’s 
economy, especially the management and control of the oil and oil rents. For instance, oil 
presence and activities have continued to fuel massive corruption in the country, with the 
newest corruption issue being the discovery of payment of over 40 billion Naira from oil 
subsidy fund to 25 oil marketers who did not supply any oil to the country (The Guardian, 
August 23, 2012).The discovery and exploration of this resource, rather than bringing about the 
expected development, unfortunately led to a negative change in the country’s socio-economic 
and political climate. As Nigeria witnesses rapid increase in oil production and resultant 
revenues, its socio-economic and political developments are influenced and directed by 
negative effects of oil resources. Therefore, the negative influence of oil resources on all levels 
of government and governance are greatly felt.  For instance, with the gaining of a ‘rentier 
status’32 in 1971, especially between 1974 and 1993, it derived and based all its revenues and 
expenditures from oil generated income or rent (Sandbakken, 2006).Thus, oil therefore 
“featured prominently in the politics within and between the various tiers of the federal 
government, particularly as it relates to the principles for controlling and sharing the oil wealth 
between the oil producing and non-oil producing parts of the country. This touches upon issues 
of inter-ethnic relations and the distribution of power in a multi-ethnic federation” in Nigeria 
(Obi, 2007:8). 
 
Ross (2001) in his ‘oil-impedes-democracy claim’, posits that rentier, repressive and 
modernization properties and effects of oil resources weaken democracy in oil resource-rich 
countries such as Nigeria. Obi (2002:97) complements this with an example by pointing out 
                                                 
32  Nigeria before 1971 obtained her revenue primarily from agriculture (whose revenue is not considered as rent), 
but from the oil boom period of 1971, oil generated revenue was its peak in the country, making the country turn 
all her energy to petrobusiness and the rents acquired from it.   
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that oil resources are “inextricably linked to the fragile and mono-cultural (oil) economic base, 
and the zero-sum struggles among fractions of the Nigerian ruling class for power.” Thus in 
Nigeria, according to Watts (2004:54) “these political struggles are animated by the desire to 
gain access to: (i) company rents and compensation revenues, and (ii) federal petro-revenues 
by capturing rents (often fraudulently) through the creation of new regional and/or local state 
institutions”. Undoubtedly, oil resources reconfigured and weakened government and 
governance at all levels in the country. It weakened all facets of the country’s economy, turning 
the economy into mono-cultural and oil rent dependent. More importantly, it fuelled socio-
political crises which were driven by access to oil rent, revenue and opportunities. Table 5.1 
shows the relative poverty situation in Nigeria on headcount from 1980-2010. Similarly, World 
Bank 2011 report claims that the poverty ratio at national poverty line (% of the population) 
moved from 43.0% in 1985 to 54.7% in 2004. 
 
Table 5.1 Relative Poverty Headcount from 1980-2010 
 
YEAR POVERTY 
INCIDENCE 
(%) 
ESTIMATED 
POPULATION(MILLION 
POPULATION IN 
POVERTY(MILLION) 
1980 27.2 65 17.1 
1985 46.3 75 34.7 
1992 42.7 91.5 39.2 
1996 65.6 102.3 67.1 
2004 54.4 126.3 68.7 
2010 69.0 163 112.47 
Source: Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 (The National Bureau of Statistics, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
5.2 The Niger Delta region and the Oil Village communities in Nigeria 
 
The Niger Delta is made up of swamps and creeks. It is estimated to cover an area of about 
70,000 square kilometres, and inhabited by about 31.7 million people from the 2006 census 
123 
 
figure (NBS, 2011). It is considered as the largest wetland in Africa and has the third largest 
mangrove forest in the world, covering an area of about 6,000 square kilometres (UNDP, 
2006). The Niger Delta region is peopled predominantly by minority ethnic nationalities, with 
the Izons (Ijaws) representing the largest group (Courson, 2009), and others groups includes 
Urhobo, Isoko, Itsekiri, Ikwere, Ogoni,Edo, Ndokwa, Etche, and Ogba. The region known 
today as Niger Delta is made of nine oil producing states namely; Imo, Abia,Delta, Akwa 
Ibom, Cross -Rivers, Rivers, Bayelsa, Edo and Ondo states(see Appendices b and C). However, 
Abia and Imo states are populated by Igbos, while Ondo state has Yoruba ethnic group as the 
major tribe with Ijaws ethnic group as part of the state. Politically, the other six states of Delta, 
Edo, Cross Rivers, Rivers, Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom are referred to as the South-South 
Geopolitical Zone. Thus, the oil village communities or oil host communities are found within 
this region. 
 
Surrounding these people from the Niger Delta region and their communities are Nigerian oil 
extraction, exploration and production, with offshore and onshore oil operations  which 
produce over 2m barrels of oil a day. It is regarded as a strategic region because it serves as 
home to many oil installations, and acts as an operational base for many oil companies, such as 
Chevron-Texaco (Turshen, 2004). Despite these enormous oil resources which place Nigeria 
amongst the top major oil exporters in the world, the country is still bedevilled by poverty and 
underdevelopment. Nigeria’s Delta region is greatly affected judging by its socio-economic 
and political underdevelopment experiences. UNDP (2006:16) report on the region had it that: 
Social instability, poor local governance, competition for 
economic resources and environmental degradation have taken 
a toll. The delta today is a place of frustrated expectation and 
deep-rooted mistrust [where] [l]ong years of neglect and 
conflict have fostered a siege mentality. 
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 Most communities in the region lack basic infrastructures like good roads, power, hospitals, 
pipe-borne water and other amenities. Analysing the situation of the people vis-à-vis oil 
endowment in the area, Onduku (2001) points out that the Niger Delta is the richest region in 
Nigeria in terms of natural resources deposits, but its potential for sustainable development is 
unfulfilled, as it is increasingly threatened by environmental devastation and worsening 
economic conditions. Coupled with the lack of these basic amenities is the issue of 
environmental degradation. Below are some tables showing the nature of poverty in Nigeria, 
especially in the oil village communities despite the large oil production and oil revenues. 
Table 5.2 points out the level of urban and rural poverty in Nigeria. Oil communities in Nigeria 
are located mainly in rural areas, therefore are considered as experiencing worse poverty 
situation than the urban areas. Table 5.3 contains figures on zonal incidence of poverty in 
Nigeria. Table 5.4 shows the figure on income inequalities based on area of residence and 
geographical zone in Nigeria. Table 5.5 shows the yearly crude oil production and earnings in 
Nigeria from 1960 to 2008. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Urban/Rural Incidence of Poverty by different Poverty Measures 
including Food Poor by Percentage 
 
 
SECTOR FOOD POOR 
% 
ABSOLUTE 
POVERTY% 
RELATIVE 
POVERTY% 
DOLLAR 
PER DAY% 
URBAN 26.7 52.0 61.8 52.4 
RURAL 48.3 66.1 73.2 66.3 
 
Source: Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010(The National Bureau of Statistics, 2012) 
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Table 5.3 Zonal Incidence of Poverty by different poverty measures 
 
ZONE FOOD 
POOR% 
ABSOLUTE 
POOR% 
RELATIVE  
POOR% 
DOLLAR 
PER DAY% 
NORTH -
CENTRAL 
 
38.6 
 
 
59.5 
 
67.5 
 
59.7 
NORTH- 
EAST 
  51.5 69.0 76.3 69.1 
NORTH 
WEST 
51.8 70.0 77.7 70.4 
SOUTH- 
EAST 
41.0 58.7 67.0 59.2 
SOUTH- 
SOUTH 
35.5 55.9 63.8 56.1 
SOUTH -
WEST 
 25.4 49.8 59.1 50.1 
 
Source: Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 (The National Bureau of Statistics, 2012) 
 
 
 
Table 5.4    Income Inequalities by Area of Residence and Geopolitical Zone 
for 2004 and 2010 
 
  2004 2010 %CHANGE 
FROM 2004 TO 
2010 
NATIONAL  0.4296 0.447 4.1 
AREA OF 
RESIDENCE 
 
RURAL 
 
0.4239 
 
0.4334 
 
2.2 
 URBAN 0.4154  4.2 
GEO-
POLITICAL 
ZONE 
    
 1.SOUTH SOUTH 0.3849 0.434 12.8 
 2.SOUTH EAST 0.376 0.4442 18.1 
 3.SOUTH WEST 0.4088 0.4097 0.2 
 4.NORTH 
CENTRAL 
0.4459 0.422 -5.4 
 5.NORTHEAST 0.4114 0.4468 8.6 
 6.NORTH WEST 0.4028 0.4056 0.7 
 
Source: Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 (The National Bureau of Statistics, 201 
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TABLE 5.5 NIGERIA’S YEARLY CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, EXPORT 
AND REVENUE: 1960-2008 
 
 
 
AUTHOR’S COMPILATION SOURCES: CBN ANNUAL STATISTICAL  
BULLETIN, VOL.18 (2007); NNPC 2008 ANNUAL STATISTICAL  
BULLETIN (SUMMARIZED) IST EDITION; TELL MAGAZINE, FEBRUARY  
18, 2008 (SPECIAL EDITION) 
 
 
 
  
 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
YEAR PRODUCTION 
(Million barrels) 
EXPORT REVENUE (Naira 
million) 
1960 6,374.0                                6,244.0 2.4 
1965 99,355.0 96,985.0 29.2 
1970 395,689.0 383,455.0 167 
1975 660,148.0 627,683.0 4,272 
1979 854,463.0 807,685.0 8,881 
1980 760,117.0 656,260.0 12,354 
1985 547,088.0 486,580.0 10,915 
1990 660,559.0 548,249.0 55,216 
1995 715,440.0 616,900.0 324,548 
2000 797,880.0 688,080.0 1,340,000 
2005 919,285.0 846,179.7 4,762,400 
2006 813,950.0 656,090.0 6,109,000 
2007 803,000.0 791,826.5 6,700,000 
2008 768,745.9 724,479.8 NOT AVAILABLE 
127 
 
 
Taking the figures in table 5.2 into consideration, it is obvious from all measurement that the 
incidence of poverty in rural Nigeria is higher than urban Nigeria. Oil village communities of 
Niger Delta being predominately rural and fall into this category despite the enormous wealth 
they contribute to the nation’s wealth. UNDP (2006:1-2) submitted that ‘these [oil village 
communities of Niger Delta] are rural communities, which offer very limited economic 
opportunities. Infrastructure and social services are generally deplorable and vastly inadequate 
for an estimated regional population of nearly 30 million people’. Thus leaving the oil villages 
to compete for these inadequate social services and struggle against exclusion from the 
distribution of the revenue. 
 
Another critical look at table 5.5 shows a continuous rise in volume of oil resources produced 
in these oil village communities in Nigeria leading to rise in revenue generated from it. For 
instance, oil production rose from 6,374 million in 1960 to about 768,745.9 million in 2008. 
Thereby became the economic lifeblood of the country, providing about 40% of the gross 
domestic product and nearly 80% of government earnings in Nigeria (UNDP, 2006). Despite 
enormous revenue made from oil resources, the country kept experiencing rise in poverty, of 
which “by almost any measure of social achievement, the core oil producing states are a 
calamity” (Watts, 2009:18). This is mainly attributed to the difficult topography and the 
alarming deterioration of the environment due to oil activities which affect other economic 
activities in most oil village communities. With such difficult and deteriorating environment 
due oil production activities like oil spill, one could argue that it could be partly why the 
income inequality in the South -South region is high, alongside South East region which two of 
her five states houses oil village communities (see Table 5.4). 
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Following the situation of underdevelopment, poverty, inequality and exclusionism for more 
than four decades, the Niger Delta has degenerated into a conflict zone not just resistant against 
the Nigerian state, multinational oil companies and oil activities, but at war with itself. Ikelegbe 
(2005:234) describes the region as “generally restive with pockets of insurrections and armed 
rebellion.” This is often credited to over forty years of oil production, environmental 
degradation and state neglect, which has created a condition of impoverishment, a marginalised 
and exploited citizenry. For instance, UNDP’s 2006 report on Niger Delta discovered that local 
government areas without oil facilities or oil village communities fare better on poverty index 
than local government areas with oil village communities and oil facilities. Furthermore, local 
government areas with good human development index (HDI) are mostly the urban ones, while 
the poor performing ones are mostly rural local government areas. These disparities in HDI and 
poverty index are “indication of unequal distribution of revenue” (UNDP, 2006:1). Therefore it 
could be argued that even though the South-South region with most of the oil village 
communities is not the region with the highest incident of poverty (as shown in table 5.3), the 
nature of relative inequalities in HDI in the region is the highest. Significantly, local 
government areas without oil facilities appear to have fewer poor people than those with oil 
facilities (UNDP, 2006).  
 
This situation is seen as a regime of state repression and corporate violence, which as part of 
structural violence has resulted in “violent protest, disruption of oil production, seizure of oil 
platforms, installations and equipment, kidnapping of MNOC staff, confrontations with state 
security forces and militarization of the region” (Ikelegbe, 2005:438). As oil village 
communities subsequently took to fierce struggle for either provision of social infrastructures 
or other types of appeasement. This has vehemently raised other questions, such as what are the 
roles of greed or genuineness of grievance over natural resources, and why the resultant violent 
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conflict, the exploitation, neglect and suffering in the name of resources and wealth (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2001).Therefore, it may be difficult to draw a distinction between grievance and 
greed considering their interrelatedness. 
 
However, understanding the changes in the political and economic situations of the entire 
Niger Delta upon the discovery and production of oil helps in understanding the issue of 
grievance or greed in the region. This is because oil resources changed the traditional 
occupations of the people by limiting their access to farming land and fishing waters, thereby 
depriving them of their two main sources of livelihoods. Not forgetting the already natural 
topography difficulty, which encourages people to gather in small communities, and compete 
for the available land (UNDP, 2006). Oil operation activities in the oil village communities 
seem to be given precedence over farming and fishing, using the Land Use Act (LUA) of 1979 
(now updated in the laws of the Federation [LFN] 1990 and LFN CAP L5, 2004).  As any land 
including community owned land, which are recognised under customary Act, were acquired in 
the Public interest for oil exploration. According to Obi and Rustad (2011:7), ‘the Niger Delta, 
with its high population density…meant a loss of power over ‘scare’ (oil rich) land for local 
people, and loss of compensation for full value of appropriated land’. It meant that access to 
livelihood for the local communities was of less priority to the state to acquiring communal and 
individual land in these communities for oil resources activities. Therefore, by the powers 
vested on the governor of any state, local tribal or communal lands could be handed over to the 
oil companies for the “good of the state”.  
 
Furthermore, it could be argued that oil resources may have equally distorted the political 
environment in the Niger Delta, making political positions and other forms of leadership and 
authority increasingly competitive, as being elected, selected or appointed into any form of 
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government (formal and informal) provides better access to the oil revenue.  An example of 
such political transformation is ‘the proliferation and militarization of youth movements amid 
increased opportunities for local political patronage, security contract with oil companies’ 
(Ukiwo, 2011:24). Thus, the various violent conflicts in the Niger Delta region are attributed to 
oil resources, as they are seen as factors that may have polarised the area, making it conflict 
prone. However, the argument on ethnicity playing a major role in the violent conflict is weak; 
judging that violent struggles or conflicts over such oil-related opportunities and benefits 
occurred even within communities of the same ethnic orientation. For example Ogoni crisis 
was mainly between Ogoni ethnic groups, with groups killing each other (Okonta and Douglas, 
2003). 
 
The violent conflict in the Niger Delta comprises all aspects of violent conflict linked to natural 
resources. It demonstrates not only environmental degradation, which leads to scarcity, but also 
political, economic and social conflicts associated with the maximisation and distribution of 
resources, benefits and opportunities from oil. The issues of social exclusion, poverty and 
economic deprivation are common; they in turn gave rise to struggles for limited opportunities 
and the urge to deploy physical violence in achieving such needs.    Ibeanu (2002:163) 
concluded that: 
          Indeed, the Niger Delta seems to be inherently paradoxical. Like Janus, 
          there are always two faces to everything in the Niger Delta. For instance,  
          the region has the potential to be very wealthy, yet it wallows in pervasive  
          poverty. The leaders of communities in the Niger Delta are very rich, and at 
          the same time their people are extremely poor.   
 
Like today in the Niger Delta, militancy and criminality are providing opportunities and 
benefits which leadership has denied a lot of people, especially the “youths”. 
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5.3 Oil and Power Struggles in Nigeria. 
 
Nigeria, with the largest population in Africa, ranks high among the countries in sub–Saharan 
Africa in terms of political instability and highest number of military coups. Since its political 
independence in October 1960, it has struggled to establish stable government. With more than 
200 diverse ethnic groups, with their cultural and linguistic differences, the only unifying factor 
among Nigerians remains the colonial historical experiences. The diversity in culture, ethnicity, 
and to some extent religion, has continued to play an active role in the political development of 
the country, and more importantly dictates the tone of politics in the nation. 
 
Politics in Nigeria, like in every society, has remained the determinant factor ‘in decisions 
about the use, production and distribution of resources’ (Leftwich, 2008:6). In many instances, 
other factors such as ethnic and religious diversities are regarded as playing big roles in 
influencing Nigerian politics. However, a thorough examination of the political situation in 
Nigeria shows that oil resources is another highly important factor in Nigeria’s political 
development and political economy. For example, there is the obvious political culture of 
elected or appointed officials in Nigeria ‘personalising’ whatever revenue is allocated to their 
office. This political culture is understood in Nigerian terms as being supported by revenue 
coming from oil, which is obvious considering that a huge percentage of the revenue of the 
state comes from oil. This situation known as corruption is not peculiar to Nigeria alone but 
varies across the globe. Thus, “the subsequent closing of the gap between ‘political power’ and 
‘oil power’ renders oil a prime target of zero-sum politics, or the prize of political wars over oil 
patrimony” (Obi,2002:97). This is also the reason for the fierce struggle to either be elected or 
appointed into political or state positions. 
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In Nigeria’s local communities, various forms of power struggle occur within local leadership 
or traditional authorities (which are recognised in providing local governance). In the Niger 
Delta, this is majorly linked to most fierce non-state violent conflicts which take place among, 
between and within oil village communities. As oil productions increase, the stakes become 
higher, and local traditional authorities such as chiefs and “youth” leadership become tools and 
pawns in the hands of both the state and oil MNCs, who negotiate with them on behalf of their 
communities in order to continue production. Such negotiations include payment for land 
acquired for oil exploration, cases of oil spills and other corporate social responsibility projects 
which oil MNCs embark upon. Therefore, oil MNCs in many cases identifies the ‘troublesome’ 
‘powerful’ or influential’ people within these communities and empower them by funneling 
money into their pockets, thus buying their loyalty. This makes traditional leadership and local 
governance financially lucrative and attractive, thereby increasing the violent struggle for such 
positions, especially since the 1990s, as groups and persons target such positions as a means to 
gaining access to oil benefits and opportunities (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
 
Again, within these local traditional authorities, is the power struggle between local chiefs and 
“youths”.  This is mainly because these “youths” are the main perpetrators of the struggle 
against the state and oil MNCs; they carry out the violent conflicts and armed struggles and 
therefore should be recognised in the scheme of things. From the 1990s in the Niger Delta, and 
like most other armed conflicts in Africa, the “combatants have become increasingly youthful” 
(Peters and Richards, 1998:183).  Their participation in violent conflict gives them a claim on 
how their communities are governed.  Analysing the situation in the oil village communities, 
Ikelegbe (2005:217) argues that: 
Furthermore, youths, militant youth groups and militia have 
become more active in the communities and community 
leadership. In many communities, the youths have sidelined, 
subdued or even driven into exile erstwhile traditional 
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rulerships and have taken over community leaderships and 
particularly, the liaison with the oil companies. Along with 
more youth and militant group involvement has been the fierce 
and pervasive entry of violence as an instrument of compulsive 
appropriation. 
 
The essence of the struggle for power cannot be far from gaining access to oil resources 
benefits and opportunity.  In the oil village communities, both the formal and informal forms of 
authorities and leaderships are beneficiaries of the enormous wealth derived from oil resources. 
For the informal authorities and leaderships which are represented by the traditional rulerships 
and an emerging strong and violent “youth” system, it is about fierce struggles against other 
groups within their communities. This will elevate them to a position of recognition by oil 
MNCs operating in their communities, who are willing to buy peace at all costs.   
 
5.3.1 The Nigerian State and the Special Development Agencies 
 
The history of special development agencies in the Niger Delta region dates back to the 1958 
Willink Commission33. These special development agencies were established by the Nigerian 
state to tackle “the poor state of infrastructures and the harsh terrain of Nigeria has 
paradoxically underdeveloped the region” (Ibeanu, 2008:34). The first of the special 
development agencies was the Niger Delta Development Board of the 1960s which was 
recommended by the Willink Commission of 1958. The next was the Niger Delta River Basin 
Development Authority, established during the military regimes in the 1970s. This was 
subsequently replaced by a Special Fund created by the 1981 Revenue Act for Oil producing 
Areas and the Special Presidential Task Force for the Oil Producing Areas, which managed the 
special fund which was created in 1989, giving the area about 1.5% from the Federation 
account. Next was the establishment of the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development 
                                                 
33 The Willink Commission was the first attempt in Nigeria, then under colonial administration, to look into the 
problems of the minorities of the Niger Delta. 
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Commission (OMPADEC) by Decree 23 of July 1992, which committed 3% of oil revenue for 
the development of the region. And at present, there is the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC), which officially started in January 2001(ANEEJ, 2004; Ibeanu, 2008). 
 
Historically, the establishment and performance of the special development agencies have 
remained questionable. Although they are designed as special interventionist agencies by the 
state to use allocated special resources in developing the oil producing areas of the country. 
The selection of representatives into such agencies often lead to both state and non-state 
violence, such as a community against the state, or communities against one another. This is 
because they are mainly used as an avenue to settle political associates or to enrich friends.  
During the period OMPADEC existed, it was perceived by the people as a means by which the 
military governments were enriching their families and associates rather than engaging in 
actual development in the region (Ibeanu, 2006).  For example, the NDDC is constantly marred 
by succession disputes, appointments or corruption crises, rather than carrying out actual 
developments required in the region. Ibeanu (2008:32) writes that the general expression by 
civil society organisations is “the feeling that it [NDDC] is another patronage system, an 
avenue for enriching party loyalists.”  This idea could equally be to make sure that oil 
production is continued, especially if those appointed could in one way or another muster 
support for the government and the oil MNCs, thereby making the appointments serve as a 
form of Petro-settlement34, which helps the Nigerian state and the oil MNCs to buy peace 
through appointing those considered as either influential or obstacles to the continuity of oil 
production in the region (Nwokolo, 2010). 
 
                                                 
34 The term Petro-settlement represents policies and programmes conceived and implemented by the Nigerian 
State and the Oil MNCs to financially or economically empower a selected few within oil bearing communities or 
regions of the Niger Delta. Their formulation and deployment are undertaken mostly as reactive conflict measures 
in restoring oil production distorted by violent revolts by oil bearing communities (Nwokolo, 2010). 
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These appointments give less consideration to the choice of representative from the oil village 
communities than to create a pathway for economic opportunity and access to oil benefits for a 
selected few.  For example, between 2009 and 2010, there was an open political challenge 
between Edo state Governor, Adams Oshiomhole (Action Congress) and People’s Democratic 
Party leader (PDP), Chief Anthony Anenih, who hails from Edo state too, over the nomination 
of Mr. Donald Omorodion as the representative of the state on the NDDC Board. While 
Governor Oshiomhole nominated Omorodion, Chief Anenih wanted one of his political sons, 
thus chief Anenih tried to use his party’s majority at the Senate to block the confirmation, but 
this was thwarted by the Presidency (Vanguard, March 10, 2010).   
 
Basically, considerations for appointments into NDDC are given other expedient 
considerations over the development needs of the oil village communities. Also in 2009, there 
were stories and news about a fierce battle for NDDC top jobs between Rivers and Bayelsa 
states over the Chairmanship and between Delta and Akwa Ibom states over the position of 
Executive Director, Finance and Administration (Newswatch, May 25, 2009). Following the 
dissolution of the board, the vacant positions of Chairman, Managing Director, Executive 
Director Finance and Administration were fiercely competed for by the South-South Zone 
states. The first two positions were zoned to Rivers and Bayelsa States respectively while the 
last two were given to Delta and Akwa Ibom States. The rivalry for who takes the jobs 
continued within the states to which the positions have been zoned (Newswatch, May 25, 
2009). In many cases, politicians and leaders or rulers who tend to benefit from such positions 
often provide arms to the “youths”, using them to fight their perceived opponents. 
Communities have also engaged in violent conflict against another, especially where one 
believes that an appointed member of the agency should be a member of a particular 
community and not that of the other community.  
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5.4 Economies of Violence: Economic Opportunism and Oil 
Resources 
 
One of the fundamental characters of oil resources is that “there is so much to fight for in oil 
economy. There are enormous legal and illegal resource opportunities, particularly in terms of 
benefits from oil companies... [this has] fuelled deadly and violent conflicts as each group 
struggles to prove their relevance and capacity to disrupt the oil economy,” (Ikelegbe, 
2005:216). Thus much discussed social grievances may actually be an opportunity to do well 
out of war (Collier, 2000).  However, as contentious as Collier’s arguments are, ‘ownership’ of 
an acquired land for oil exploration and production activities, or providing land for networking 
of oil pipelines and installations constitute a major motivation or drive for economic benefits or 
opportunities for oil village communities. When there are such developments, oil village 
communities expect to see their fortunes change for the better. This could come as a form of 
compensation paid to them for their land or other forms of corporate social responsibility 
activities which encourage good host community and oil MNC relationship.  
 
There are other forms of compensation which could be given to a community based on 
environmental degradation it suffers from oil related activities such as oil spills. However, this 
type of compensation has continually pitched oil village communities against the state and the 
oil MNCs.  There are always accusations and counter accusations anytime there is an oil spill 
For instance “Ekpan Community in Uvwie LGA suffered major fish loss in their ponds from a 
spill traced to Chevron facility that affected the nearby Ekpan River”. The community blamed 
Chevron for the spill (ERA, 2010:17).While the oil communities are concerned about their 
environment, the oil MNCs and the state “claim that the spillage is the result of sabotage by 
local communities for purposes of illegally obtaining petroleum products and monetary 
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compensation”(Ibeanu,2000:23). Such accusation from the oil MNCs and the state has always 
been difficult to establish, judging by the fact that many of the pipelines and valves were laid 
many years ago and are already weak and partially faulty (ERA, 2010). Other forms of oil 
resources backed opportunities and benefits could also include appointments into the various 
special development agencies and committees set up by the Nigerian state and Niger Delta 
states as discussed in section 5.4.1. 
 
However, there are still huge illegal opportunities provided by oil resources in form of oil theft, 
which is known as illegal oil bunkering. There are small and large scale illegal oil bunkerings. 
The small scale involves ‘smuggling syndicates who break into the distribution pipelines of the 
Nigeria National Petroleum Company and particularly those of refined fuel from the Warri and 
Port Harcourt refineries to fuel depots’ (Ikelegbe, 2005:221). The large scale involves “large-
scale theft (‘bunkering’) via barges and flow stations for the international market,” 
(International Crisis Group, 2006), with about 200-250,000 barrels of crude oil stolen per day  
and sold to the international oil mafia who operate along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea. This 
is however made possible by the active involvement of high-ranking military and naval 
personnel, politicians, and oil executives and very recently the entrance into and part capture of 
the business by ethnic militia and warlords (Watts, 2004). In many instances, such illegal oil 
bunkering operations desecrate farm lands and fishing waters, leaving the communities with 
the option of making claims, which in many cases, ‘has resulted into conflicts between and 
within communities over the distribution and control of  payouts and compensations by the 
MNCs for appropriated and polluted land and water’ (Ikelegbe,2005: 220). 
 
Another form of illegal opportunity associated with oil resources is the kidnapping of oil 
workers, especially the kidnapping and hostage taking of foreign oil workers and the demand of 
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ransom payment for their release. There is also organised blockage of oil facilities, with the ring 
leaders being ‘settled’ by the oil firm either through an award of oil contracts or other forms of 
financial payment. The growth of numerous shadow or illicit economy around the oil village 
communities have been attributed to frequent loss of sources of livelihoods, social exclusion or 
out of sheer opportunities presented by the oil activities. Among these three, loss of livelihoods 
remains the most common due to oil spills and gas flaring in these local oil communities. Watts 
(2009:18) argues that  by “conservative oil-industry estimates,  there were almost 7000 oil spills 
between 1970 and 2000, more than one each day (the real figure might be twice or three times 
that number). An equivalent of one gallon of oil has been spilled for every 100 square meters of 
Niger Delta”. In such circumstances, “fisheries and agriculture have been damaged as a result 
of oil spills and waste dumping and other harmful environmental practices”, despite the 
government and oil companies’ recognition of the dependence of majority of the people in the 
local oil villages on fisheries, subsistence agriculture among others for their livelihood 
(Amnesty International, 2009:34). Consequently, as local oil village communities experience 
destruction of their fisheries and farm lands by oil activities, expectedly, they shifted their 
means and sources of livelihoods to oil resources rents and opportunities. 
 
Following these assumptions of deprivation and denial caused by oil activities, acts of violence 
have so much been supported by many people, as either an alternative means to livelihood or a 
way of drawing government attention.  Human rights activist, Barrister Casely Omon-Irabor 
(the coordinator of the Human Rights organization of Nigeria) in an interview granted to a 
newspaper, justified militancy in the region as the way of attracting the sympathy of the 
international community and said that “if there was no riot, fighting and kidnapping, we would 
have been in shambles”(Niger Delta Standard, Oct.26, 2007).   
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The violent situation in the region has therefore created economic opportunities, not just for 
“youths” who have engaged in militancy, hostage taking and kidnapping, but also for top 
politicians, public servants and opinion leaders. As advanced by Dr Chris Ekiyor, the then 
President of Ijaw Youth Council (IYC),every step taken by the federal government has lacked 
commitment and political will, a reason for the unending crises in the region that only produces 
profiteers and government businessmen whose only stock in trade is the Niger Delta 
crisis(Vanguard, February 3,2009). Based on this chaotic situation, militancy and illicit 
businesses around the oil Village communities are seen by some as an act of survival; 
according to Chief Edwin Clark35, “the Ijaw youths are not militants but freedom fighters” (The 
Nation on Sunday, February 8, 2009). In this, militancy and violent conflicts have remained not 
just an issue between the oil village communities, the state and the oil MNCs, but, like most 
illicit business and there are struggles to control the shadow economies. Subsequently, split 
groups often emerge, with violent conflicts ensuing between them, and often leading to what is 
regarded as ethnic crisis (like the Warri Crisis of 1997), which could as well pass as violent 
crisis over oil resource opportunities and benefits such as illegal oil bunkering. 
 
5.5 Securitisation of the Oil Business in Nigeria 
 
A major feature of petrobusiness in the last fifty years of its existence in Nigeria is the   
securitisation of the oil village communities of the Niger Delta. Omeje (2004:431) defined 
securitization in Nigeria’s oil conflicts as: 
                 basically the process by which an issue is factored into the state's 
                security agenda, defined or recognised as a security problem and by 
                so doing the state and its elites (power holders) acquire the legitimate 
                authority and justification to take extraordinary measures (including  
               allocation of social resources) to control or combat the identified issue  
               or threat. 
 
                                                 
35Chief Edwin Clark is a prominent and the highest ranking Ijaw leader, a one-time Minister of Information in the 
first Republic. 
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Through securitisation, every disagreement or civil disobedience is seen as a threat to oil 
exploration and production activities. Among this securitisation is ‘the growing presence of 
private security in the volatile environment of the oil-rich Niger Delta’ (Abrahamsen and 
Williams, 2009: 9), and massive militarization of the region with troops, ‘who stay long 
enough to engage in a range of activities that pitch them against communities’ (Ukeje,2011: 
89). A lot of reasons have recently been attributed to this development, but the major reason is 
the importance placed on the oil business by the Nigerian state, which seems to consider the 
growth and security of the industry more important than the wellbeing and security of its 
citizens, especially those living within the oil communities. With security portending different 
meaning for the state and oil MNCs on one hand and the oil village communities on the other, 
therefore, “in the Niger Delta, national security contradicts the security of nationals because of 
the politics of oil” (Ibeanu,2008: 20). Incidentally, as the state continues to build up the 
security around the oil industries, it in turn militarises the oil village communities the more, 
and the entire Niger Delta in general.  The current threat of militancy encapsulates a feedback 
from “a wide dimension of crisis spun by the struggles around oil and the potential explosive 
features of the militarized Nigerian political terrain, where every inch of political space is 
locked in a zero sum game of the state takes all” (Obi, 1997: 2). Unfortunately for oil village 
communities, their traditional leadership is one of the worst affected by the crisis.  
 
Paradoxically, oil politics and struggles are no longer limited to the exemplars of the ‘oil 
complex’36 but have very much included local communities or what this research sees as non-
state violent conflicts, especially where communities or groups engage in fierce struggle over 
which group are to be employed to guide and watch over pipelines. According to Claude Ake 
(as quoted by Ukeje, 2008), the state evidently deploys swarms of soldiers, naval ratings and 
                                                 
36  The fierce relationship between the state and Oil MNCs on one hand and the local oil village communities on 
the other. 
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mobile policemen around the vicinity of oil installations and production to safeguard the 
petrobusiness, facilities and personnel, in order not to hinder oil exploration and production in 
a community where such violent conflict is going on. All in all, this environment of unbridled 
militarisation and securitisation is “essentially a contradiction of accumulation and 
development” (Ukeje, 2008:2).The employment of locals especially “youths” from oil village 
communities to carry out pipeline surveillance activities pitches each group against the other as 
they struggle for selection due to the huge payment they receive from oil MNCs for such 
services. For instance, Nigeria National Petroleum Company (NNPC) was reported to have 
paid about $40million to four former militant leaders for the guarding of oil pipelines (Wall 
Street Journal Europe, August 22, 2012). Using previous rivalry between these militant groups 
as a yardstick, the tendency that other groups not included in the contract will resume attack on 
the pipelines leading to violent conflicts are very likely. Unlike Nolte’s (2007: 217) 
explanation about local community security arrangement in other parts of Nigeria, like in the 
South West ‘where private security provision is dominated by vigilante groups, they often 
operate on the basis of local political concerns and forms of mobilisation, which may include 
language, faith and tradition practices’, this could not be said to be the same in the oil village 
communities in the Niger Delta. While Vigilantism as private security provisions in South-
West Nigeria (like Oodua People’s Congress) work for the interest of local communities, 
vigilantism as private security provisions in oil village communities work for the interest of oil 
MNCs who pay them for such functions, thereby often fuelling violent conflicts among groups. 
 
Apart from the deployment of security to safeguard the petrobusiness, there are many cases 
where security forces, especially the military and mobile police have been directly deployed to 
attack a community.  This is either for obstructing oil exploration and production activities or 
for being perceived to be harbouring people (often referred to as militant) who are hindering or 
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attacking oil installations (Human Right Watch, 1999a). In 2003, the Nigerian state established 
a Joint Task Force (JTF), an army led-unit which includes men from the Navy, Army, and 
paramilitary Mobile Police (MOPOL) and the regular police, code-named “Operation Restore 
Hope”, with a mandate to protect major installations, and curb the kidnapping of oil workers 
and other violent activities aimed at frustrating oil production in oil village communities 
(Amnesty International, 2005: 2). More resources have been deployed to provide security for 
the oil sector than to provide security for the local people who dwell in those communities. For 
instance in the 2008 fiscal budget proposal, NDDC which is meant to provide development to 
the oil communities was allocated 79 billion Naira, while security for the region was allocated 
a whopping 444.6 billion Naira (vanguard,11 July, 2008;Vanguard,14 February, 2008). Thus, 
showing the importance the state places on state militarism and violence, rather than 
committing such amount to tackling the developmental problems such as unemployment, 
environmental issues and lack of social amenities affecting the region.  Therefore, according to 
Ukeje (2011:89) ‘a pervasive but ill-conceived notion is that every threat to law and order in 
the contemporary Niger Delta is viewed as another attempt to undermine oil production and 
state security’. Subsequently, the need to massively invest in security like the JTF (security 
service) in the region in order to secure an unhindered flow of oil resources production is 
considered a better security approach than investing in human security like infrastructural 
development. 
 
Omotola (2010:49) opines that “the oil companies, for their part, have always expressed 
preferences for a more violent approach to secure their oil installations, workers, and 
production. They expressed this preference by calling on the state to deploy more troops into 
the region and are willing to offer assistance in that regard”. With such securitisation of the 
region, even mere peaceful demonstration are crushed, like the opening of fire on protesters 
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from the Ugborodo community at the Escravos oil terminal on the coast of Delta State by 
soldiers from the Joint Task Force on 4 February, 2005 (Amnesty International, 2005: 2).  
Another  example of oil MNCs involvement, Shell in 2008 is claimed to have spent $99m on 
‘third parties’ for security, which included the services of 600 Nigerian government police and 
700 members of the controversial state joint task force(JTF), made up the army, navy and 
police(The Guardian, August 19,2012). The outcome of the use of state violence is that it 
creates suspicion among the people and further fuels violent conflicts among them, especially 
if any group is seen as less affected by the new development. Omeje (2004:429) posits that “the 
strategic nature of oil to the economic survival of the state and to the prosperity of its dominant 
elite factions practically heightens the prospects of the state's use of military violence against 
oil-related threats and conflict in the present historical conjuncture. Beleaguered and desperate, 
the state is scarcely impartial in its management of domestic threats and social conflicts”; this 
thereby continually polarises groups and communities in the region.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Drawing from the literature reviewed in this chapter, it seems apparent that the violent conflict 
in the oil village communities has been strongly influenced by the nature of political and socio-
economic developments in Nigeria or within the Nigerian state since the emergence of oil 
resource as the economic mainstay of the country. Oil resources have created a particular sort 
of structure. The influence of oil has taken an initial institutional structure and then altered it to 
support elite that derives its rent from oil. At the same time, the elites have used and adapted 
the structure in terms of creating allies (local chiefs) and other paramilitaries that can be 
deployed against those who are reliant on the incomes from the oil but have no say in that 
income (the local communities). From this perspective, it may be argued that it produces 
different definitions of what security might mean. 
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From this chapter, it also seems clear that violence in the oil village communities date back to 
the discovery of oil resources in large commercial quantities in the late 1950s. The subsequent 
displacement of the main sources of livelihoods of the oil village communities instituted the 
foundations of the eventual violent conflicts in the 1990s. In the chapter, it is also argued that 
this period of oil resources dominated economy in Nigeria transmitted negative effects on the 
Nigerian state. Subquently, such oil resources effects like changes in socio economic 
conditions, struggles for power, leadership and local rulership, struggle for access and 
dependence on oil benefits and economic opportunity, illicit and shadow economy, and rent 
seeking behaviours were also transmitted to the oil village communities. As argued in the 
chapter, such oil-fuelled effects on the oil village communities, have in turn fuelled violent 
conflicts not only between the oil village communities on one hand and the Nigerian state and 
the oil MNCs on the other, but also non-state violent conflict amongst and within the oil village 
communities, as part of the struggle to gain, control or own access to oil benefits and 
opportunities. Chapter six looks at the analysis of socio-economic conditions, greed vs. 
grievance in oil village communities. 
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                        CHAPTER SIX 
OIL RESOURCES, SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND 
ECONOMIES OF VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA’S OIL VILLAGE 
COMMUNITIES  
 
“Oil fouls everything in southern Nigeria. It spills from the 
pipelines, poisoning soil and water. It stains the hands of 
politicians and generals, who siphon off the profits. It taints the 
ambitions of the young, who try to scoop up a share of the 
liquid riches-fire a gun, sabotage a pipeline, and kidnap a 
foreigner” (National Geographic, February, 2007).  
 
6   Introduction 
 
This chapter aims at analytically identifying the roles of oil resources in re-defining the socio-
economic conditions of the oil village communities in Nigeria. The chapter examines how oil 
resources and its fuelled new socio-economic conditions have influenced cultures of grievance, 
greed and militancy in oil village communities. This is with regards to establish a study which 
show that oil resources activities lead to various forms of violent conflicts and development 
crises in most developing countries where it is found in abundance. Thus, this chapter looks at 
the new socio-economic conditions and social relations introduced by the discovery and 
production of oil resources in these communities in the Nigerian context. Therefore, this 
chapter seeks to answer the questions: What are the effects of oil resources on the socio-
economic conditions of oil village communities; and to what extent have oil resources 
produced a culture of grievance, greed and militancy in oil village communities? 
 
The conflict situations in Nigeria's oil rich region of the Niger Delta have led to various 
researches in the region. In many cases, the nature and failure of the Nigerian state have been 
attributed as the main cause of the crises. However, in examining these violent conflict 
situations, there are less mentions or linkages between the oil resources and the changes it 
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brought to the socio-economic conditions and social relations of the oil village communities. 
This chapter therefore implores both secondary (documentary evidence) and primary data 
(gathered through interviews, focus groups discussion and non-participatory observation) in 
providing an analytical understanding of the extent and how oil resources contribute to violent 
conflicts in these oil village communities. With this attempt, the discussion based on the 
research findings affirms that the changes in socio-economic conditions and social relations 
brought about by oil resources are likely to have produced the cultures of grievance, greed, 
and militancy leading to violent conflicts. The data gathered from the field are analysed within 
the framework of structural conflict theory and two supporting theories as identified in the 
framework of the research (c.f. chapter three).  
 
6.1 The Nature of Oil Resource: Effects on the Socio-Economic 
Conditions of Oil Village Communities 
 
This section examines the effects of oil resources on socio-economic conditions of oil village 
communities, with interest on factors such land and landownership, unemployment, 
environmental factors and struggles for local economy. 
6.1.1 Land, Landownership and oil resources 
 
In Nigeria, just like most African states, land is the main factor of production and this is based 
on the fact that these countries are mostly agrarian in nature. The agrarian nature of these 
countries means that land and landownership form part of the nature of the state's existence and 
could be a source of violent struggles especially in the rural communities. Derman et al 
(2007:2) write that “land rests at the centre of theories of conflict and scarcity due to its 
assumed growing scarcity”. These real and assumed scarcities become more imperative and 
visible when natural resources become the driving principle behind the usage of the land.  
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Remarkably, the introduction of Land Use Decree of 1978 (which was later known as the Land 
Use Act of 1979) radically re-positioned Land rights and legislation in Nigeria. The Act 
invariably empowered petrobusiness by neutralising 'all traditional impediments to land 
acquisition under customary laws’ and thus freeing land for oil activities, as well as for 
industrial and agricultural development purposes. The Act in theory makes land a property of 
the state and vests its allocation and administration in the state Governor (FGN, 1978:2). This 
suggests that new conditions were introduced in a bid to make any and all land available for 
ventures which a state governor deems more economically viable for the state. In the case of 
communities with oil resources, their land became available for petrobusiness. 
 
The change in land rights and land legislation re-defines land ownership, nature of land usage 
and more importantly places priority on land usage for oil resources over other forms of usage 
in oil village communities. In exploring the linkage between land and land ownership to violent 
conflicts in the oil village communities in Nigeria, the research posed this question to the 
participants; what do you think are the contributions of land and land ownership to violent 
conflicts in your communities? In giving answers to this question, issues raised by participants 
form a myriad of specific factors which singularly or intertwiningly are found to exist in the 
new conditions defined by land, landownership and oil resources. Among them are: land as 
source of livelihood, indigene-settler land crisis, and the struggle for inclusion in land 
ownership.  
 
 Participants maintained that the discovery and production of oil resources in their communities 
meant a loss of their land and fishing waters to petrobusiness, which thereby affected their 
sources and nature of livelihoods. This change in sources and forms of livelihoods meant that 
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their agrarian occupations became either diminished or are lost entirely. Again, this in turn 
meant more scarcity of farming land or fishing area and thus affected their livelihoods greatly. 
This change which has affected the people's forms of economic subsistence equally meant that 
more people in oil communities become landless, leading to many forms of violent struggles 
over the remaining farming land or fishing water. A member of the first FGD painfully reflects 
on the destruction and changes brought about by the oil resources on their old forms of 
livelihoods: 
“For a long time we were into farming and fishing. But with 
the result of oil exploration, we don't have fertile land as oil 
production is affecting us. The rivers for fishing are without 
fishes again due to oil spillage into them. And this developed 
hardship for the people. Our land are either collected from us or 
given to the oil companies for oil wells by government for little 
compensation.  Or we have oil pipelines cross all over the land 
that we have nowhere to farm. Our lands now belong to the 
government, which gives such land to the oil companies to 
explore oil. We now depends on what we get as land dwellers, 
as we are banned from  such land and this has led to so many 
problems in our communities”(OR, Male,FGD;Nov.2007). 
 
 
This statement depicts the feelings of the people over the nature and manner in which they lose 
their land to petrobusiness. Their sources of livelihoods are drastically affected by the oil 
activities. A “youth” leader in one of the communities also informed the researcher about the 
new wave of violent struggle for inclusion in land ownership (land found to harbour oil 
resources) created by oil resources in these communities. According to him: 
“There have been a lot of crisis in the sense of these oil and gas 
production as host communities. People (referring to particular 
community) have signed documents with them (referring to oil 
MNCs about to operate in a community) as landlords, whereas 
the others around us like ….and others don’t have. What leads 
to crisis among communities are rightful ownerships of these 
lands/places where these explorations take place. Every 
community wants to join in the ownership, even to the extent 
of applying violence to be associated with ownership of such 
land” (RO, Male, UzComm, YL, Interview; Jan.2008). 
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In an interview with a community leader, he stated that they believe that their livelihood is 
threatened once their ancestral land is taking over by government for oil. He explained thus: 
“Government forgets that land is in short supply in this region and that people will fight over 
the remaining land to be able to farm” (A.A, Male, BaComm, CL, interview; Nov.2007). 
Supporting this view, a women leader in trying to describe their situation said that their 
“footpaths struggle with raised pipeline, well heads and flow stations, while people are fighting 
over left over land for farming” (J.M, Female, Sacomm, WL, interview; Jan.2008). 
 
Another “youth” leader while explaining the land struggle situation recounted  a story of two 
peaceful neighbouring communities that were suddenly thrown into violent communal crisis 
immediately oil was discovered in their jointly owned communal land. According to the 
respondent: 
“OkComm and AlComm are an Ijaw and Urhobo communities 
respectively.The particular land that oil was discovered, ok 
comm were claiming that their parents were farming in the 
place before, but the land is closer to AlComm. These were two 
communities who had lived together and inter-marry each 
other.  But immediately oil was discussed in the place, there 
was crisis, crisis in the sense that money to come from land 
compensation and so on has disintegrated them” (VM, Male, 
OdComm, YL, Interview; Dec. 2007). 
 
A similar story was given about Od and Og oil communities. Since 1968 that SP (oil MNC) 
started its oil activities with the building of the F-terminal, and NA (oil MNC) with its flow 
station, the once peaceful Ijaw ethnic neighouring communities who share the same cultural 
heritages are now sworn enemies. There are claims and counter claims over land ownership 
and on owes the land where the oil facilities located. This situation resulted in the 2001 
communal violence that left hundreds of people dead and loss of property (B.S.I, Male, 
Odcomm, CDC-skp, Interview; Dec. 2007; Vanguard Newspaper, January 12, 2008). 
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The above views from these participants  confirms how the acquisition of land for oil 
resources’ explorations force communities into violent struggles, all in the bid to claim 
ownership of their long existing farm lands. Therefore in their effort to demonstrate ownership, 
violent conflicts ensue. Similarly in most land ownership cases in the oil communities, the 
Nigeria state and oil companies fail to mitigate or resolve the conflicts.  As noted by one of the 
human right activists interviewed:  
                       “Government made land use officially its prerogative using the Land  
                        Use Act; using it to encourage the expansion of oil sector in the region  
                         but forgetting that land is highly valued in our society and  that the  
                         topography of this region will even make the claim of ownership even  
                         worst, as  this land use policy will further fuel conflicts and struggles  
                         arising from landownership in these communities” (A.M-O, Male,Wa, 
                         CL, interview; Dec, 2007). 
 
 The problems resulting from the land and landownership and other fall-outs like loss of 
livelihood, is part of the ‘contradiction of security’37 which the Nigerian state is unable to 
handle, manage or reconcile. This is because of its character, as there are differences in 
‘perceptions and conditions of security advanced by local communities and those advanced by 
state officials and petrobusiness'(Ibeanu, 2000:24). Thus, this condition brings about a resultant 
self-help situation in the oil village communities as each community strives to prove ownership 
of the land earmarked for oil explorations not even productions. This was further explained by 
a Community Development Committee(CDC) member from Gbcomm as follows: 
           “yes, we had some previous conflicts over land, but the arrival of oil made it worst 
            and even changed the direction of fight over land. They ignored our customary 
           land rights and traditions, thereby making people and communities treasures  
           treasures payment by oil companies for land over peace and good neighborliness”  
           (D.W, Male, CDC Member, interview; Dec.2007 
It is evident from the FGD and interviews cited above that peaceful co-existence which exists 
in oil village communities give way to violent struggle and competition over land each time 
                                                 
37Ibeanu (2000:24) refer to the situation as 'a contradiction of securities', where the Nigeria state because of her 
weak nature is unable to address conflict situation or violence because of her interest in protecting oil business. 
151 
 
land is to be taken from them for oil explorations and productions. The aim of this new 
situation is about getting some forms of financial reward for 'their land' from oil MNCs who 
would be exploring oil in the land. The data illustrated how the livelihoods of the oil village 
communities are changed from an agrarian–food sufficient community to landless communities 
that depend on monetary handouts from oil MNCs. It further showed that violent struggles and 
conflicts erupt at each time such lands are to be acquired for petrobusiness. Affected 
communities and families take to violence in their bid to either show or claim ownership of 
such earmarked land. On the whole, it was evident that existing socio-economic conditions in 
these communities which are based on land as the major means of livelihood is radically 
affected or changed.   
 
Re-echoing the whole discussion that disputes over land as a result of oil resources exploration 
are a feature of their communities today, a community women leader lamented thus:  “all and 
all, brother fighting brother over land” (M.O.E, Female, OkComm,DC -WA, interview; 
Nov.2007). In essence she was referring to the violent situation over land, either on discovering 
of oil or the remaining land for farming and how it has polarized their social relations. This 
notion is in line with Ibeanu’s opinion (1999:171) about “triggered violent conflicts as villages 
contest the ownership of land on which crude oil is mined”. This implies that a form of 
structural violence is planted within these oil village communities with oil resources, land and 
landownership becoming evident. The above discussion clearly demonstrates the contribution 
of land and land ownership to the violent conflict in oil village communities. It was evident 
from the data that the discoveries of oil resources involve acquisition of land and waters, which 
in most instances are mostly farming land and fishing waters.  
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 These changes in land and land ownership affect the old social relations, which gives way for 
a new one that is now based on oil gains and money. Although the change in land ownership 
and in nature of livelihoods are seen as a holistic situation resulting from the Land Use Act of 
1979, which empowered the oil sector and there by 'accentuated the crises and conflicts arising 
from land throughout the Niger Delta'(Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria, 2006:33).However, the 
changes that emanates due to the policy related to land and land ownerships introduce a 
structural induced scarcity, which as part of structural conflicts means that some people are 
alienated and discriminated against by the new policy (C.f. chapter 3).  The nature and extent 
of possession of land in various oil communities resulted into economic inequality which gives 
raise to violent conflicts.  
 
As argued by Cramer (2003) economic inequality is hugely important to explaining civil 
conflicts, but only insofar as the economic is considered inseparable from the social, political, 
cultural and historical. Therefore, it may be possible to draw a linkage between land and land 
ownership and resultant economic inequalities emanating from it, which at the same period 
empowers some over the others.  As explained by two members of the second FGD who were 
from Ut-unComm, their community has always received few benefits from the contribution of 
their land to oil resources, unlike their others. Claiming that was why their “youths” violently 
closed down a development agency for oil communities in December, 2007 as they suffer from 
poverty, environmental issues and loss of land as source of livelihood like the other 
communities who are always rewarded. Therefore, they are ready to do more if they don’t get 
the same benefit as other oil village communities (C.O, Male and U.O, Female, FGD, 
Feb.2008). As observed during the field research, such circumstance has in most instances 
warranted the use of violent struggle by the much aggrieved party in a community to express 
their discontentment (Field note, Warri, Dec.2007). Looking at these conflict situations 
153 
 
critically, it is evident that oil resources create situations which made other resources like land 
to be inequitably distributed, as it re-structure the local economy for few people to hold sway in 
the new economic condition , while the remaining population suffers from shortages. This is 
referred to as structural scarcity (Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998:301). Providing an explanation on 
the situation, an NGO development partner working in the region stated that: 
“When oil companies come in contact with these oil 
communities, they identify who are land owners and in most 
communities, there are land owners and landless people. And 
so, they oil companies would want to deal with the land 
owners, and while they do that, they are more or less polarising 
the communities between 'the haves' and 'the   haves not', those 
who have lands the oil companies deal with, and pay 
compensations and enrich; and those who have no land, they 
don’t or would not deal with. This polarisation leads to 
animosity in these communities. Therefore in a peaceful 
community, if oil is discovered or pipelines are lead across 
their land, they are ultimately polarised, leading to violent 
struggles over ownership and access to oil benefits” (DS, Male, 
Wa, PW: Interview; Dec.2007). 
 
The evidence from the interviews from all the participants indicated that oil resources polarise 
relatively peaceful communities through re-structuring their land ownership system, land use 
and nature of production. As this re-structuring takes place, there is a development of unequal 
advantage within such communities. This means that people who either own or control such 
land, family or communal, or have access to oil companies are invariably empowered 
economically. However, there is an unequal benefit for everybody in the community as some 
get less compensation and are therefore disempowered more through losing their land to 
petrobusiness. In such situation, the material benefits that are fall-outs from oil resources re-
define the people’s social relations, especially where their socio-economic conditions have 
been re-structured through their relations to their land and its usage. Table 6.1 will 
demonstrates that such socio-economic conditions see arable land lost to oil production and 
could spark off struggle for control of remaining land or struggle to benefit from such lost to oil 
resources. 
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TABLE 6.1-Cultivable Land Lost To Oil Exploitation – Related Activities in 
Okrika Local Government Area of Rivers State, 1991 
 
No. of 
Persons 
Affected 
Name of 
Oil Field 
No. of 
Wells 
Land 
Area 
(Ita) 
per 
Well 
Total 
Land 
Area 
(Ita) 
Lost to 
Oil 
Wells 
Total 
Land 
Area 
(SQ.HA) 
for other 
Shell 
activities 
around 
the Well 
Land Area 
for 
Helicopter 
landing 
Land 
Area 
lost to 
flow 
station 
(SQ 
HA) 
72 Bolo 10 6.3 6.3 1.2 1.4 6.3 
66 Iwokiri 9 6.3 53.7 1.2 1.4 6.3 
61 Mbikiri 8 6.3 50.4 2.4 1.4 6.3 
221 Agokien 34 6.3 214.2 2.4 2.8 6.3 
81 Ele 11 6.3 69.3 2.4 2.8 6.3 
141 Oraberekiri 21 6.3 132.3 1.2 1.4 6.3 
 
Source:United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Niger Delta 
Human Development Report, Abuja, Nigeria, 2006. 
 
Examining table 6.1, it shows the massive nature of oil resource activities and how it affects 
people living within these communities. For instance, Agokien oil field affected 221 persons, 
in most instances, the people counted may only be male family heads, excluding women and 
children who depended on them.  An addition of oil operation around the community hosting 
Agokien oil field shows that 225.7 square hectare of arable farming land is lost to oil resource 
operations.  As demonstrated by both primary and secondary data, such communities more 
often than not are thrown into one form of violent struggle or the other.  
 
With the above discussion, it would not be out of place to reason that that there is a linkage 
between land, livelihoods and unemployment in these oil communities. Therefore, a discussion 
of oil resources and unemployment will further deepen our knowledge on how it contributes to 
violent conflict in such host community.  
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6.1.2 Oil resources and Unemployment 
 
This sub-section further explains the linkage between oil resources activities and loss of 
livelihoods leading to a new socio-economic condition, which is unemployment. The rapid 
increase in unemployment in the various oil village communities over the years has led to the 
assumption that as petrobusiness increases in size and operations, the original means of 
livelihoods of oil village communities decrease considerably (see section5.2).The 
unemployment situation in oil village communities which are mainly rural is linked to the loss 
of their traditional sources of livelihoods, which are farming land and fishing waters. These are 
in addition to oil production effects on the environment such as oil spill on the left-over land 
and waters (POI, male, Nsukka, DC, Interview Feb, 2008). Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the extent 
of oil productions’ effects on the environment, which have farming and fishing as main sources 
of employment and livelihoods. Farming land and fishing are lost to the new oil economy 
 
Pointing out the pervasive nature of unemployment in the oil village community, a participant 
who is a director of one of the interventionist agencies set up by Nigeria’s federal government 
to handle issues of underdevelopment caused by oil resources in the Niger Delta, said:  
“It is one of the major causes of the conflicts that we are having 
today. There is massive unemployment, or say in Delta state, 
there is no one organisation or establishment in Delta state that 
employs up to 500 workers, none! So unemployment is high in 
Delta state, and is criminal. And if you look at the population 
growth, and the unemployment situation, the whole thing 
becomes a vicious circle that strengthens violent conflicts. 
With no farming land and fishing activities due to either oil 
company take-over of the land or because of oil spillage, the 
people especially the youths are restless and violent at any 
slightest provocation” (OU, Female, Wa, S.Dir. Interview; 
Dec.2007).    
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These radical changes in the nature of livelihoods are mainly due to various oil activities which 
among other things have continually denied people access to their ancestral land which has 
been the main source of livelihoods and means of production. This in common terms means 
that oil resources activities adversely affect farming and fishing occupations. In other words, as 
more oil deposits are discovered, there are displacements of more people from their farming 
land and fishing waters. As a result of the displacement, people from such affected 
communities especially the farmers and fishermen lose their sources of livelihoods, and “in 
many cases want to start fishing in their neighours’s waters, which often result to ownership 
crises (F.U, Male, Warri, ERL,interview; Nov.2007). 
 
Similarly, a community leader stated that:  
              “Among the major grievance of our communities, is lack of employment 
               opportunities for the indigenes of oil producing areas. Our youths are  
               angry, especially when they see people coming from other parts of the 
               country to work in their communities, while they roam the village looking 
              for means of survival or when they are not given  jobs by the oil companies 
              like others from other oil communities after using our farms for their float 
               station and oil wells”  (O.T, Male, OkComm, interview; Nov. 2007).  
  
Citing the Od and Og violent communal crisis, a member of the Woman Association from Od 
community stated that it was the prevention of youths from OdComm in 1995, from getting 
employed in the then on-going F-Terminal Integration Project (FTIP) by OgComm that created 
the suspicion, and led to the violent conflicts between the two community in 2001(M.I.D, 
Female, OdComm, Sec.WA, Interview; Dec.2007; Vanguard Newspaper, January 12, 2008).  
        
This shows that the Niger-Delta region is seriously confronted by problems of unemployment, and 
with the loss of a greater part of its source of livelihoods to oil resources activities, there are fierce 
struggles to gain employment in the only booming sector in the communities, which is the oil 
companies. Although high unemployment is not entirely peculiar to the oil village communities 
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alone, but as rural areas, they fall into the sector that has the highest level of unemployment in 
Nigeria, which is 25.6%, as against national unemployment rate which is 23.9% (National Bureau 
of Statistics, 2011). This level of unemployment could be seen as the part of the reasons for 
chronic poverty in rural areas, which has 66.1% for absolute poverty and 73.2% for relative 
poverty (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012).  
 
 However, even with the boom and growth in petrobusiness, the dwellers of these communities 
are hardly given employment, and even where such opportunities are allocated to the 
communities, they are personalised. A Female participant in the first FGDs remarked that 
          “… in short, to get a job  in an oil company or government is not about if 
             you can do it, is about who you know and your connection, if you be [are]  
          poor man pikin [child], forget am [it]”(A.A,Female, Warri, FGD Nov.2007).        
       
This revelation from this participant demonstrates the level of socio-economic exclusion that 
exist in oil communities, as community leaders personalise employment slots allocated to them 
by oil companies (Field note, Warri, Nov.2007). Consistent with this, an interviewee explained 
that he got the DESOPADEC job because of this role as a “youth” leader (Field note, Warri, 
Nov.2007). 
 
In the same vein, another community CDC member recalled that: “the only period the oil 
companies want to service their oil heads and wells, are the periods they give us casual 
employments. It is always tense, as people struggle over who gets into the casual worker lists 
and in most instances resulting to violent fights between communities or within a community” 
(V.U,Male, Olcomm, Sec- CDC, Interview; Jan.2008). Interestingly, it is worth noting that 
owing to the technical nature of the oil industry, most jobs created by the petrobusiness require 
highly skilled manpower and the majority of the unemployed, especially the “youths”, do not 
possess those levels of skills (DS, male, Warri, Peace worker: Interview; 
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Dec.2007).Furthermore, to show the fall-out of unemployment or underemployments in these 
communities, a development Consultant interviewed maintained that the new employment 
opportunities created by the oil industry are too highly skilled for people in oil village 
communities, and it rather created economics of violence. In his words: 
[…] even when or where the oil companies want to deal with 
these communities, they discover that these communities could 
not benefit from employment opportunities because they lack 
skills. The “youths” that are there are either illiterates, those 
that are educated, are not educated in areas useful for the oil 
industry. So what the oil companies did to deal with the 
situation were to pay these “youths” that they cannot employ to 
just stay at home or to keep them out of their operations. So 
every month they pay these “youth” money they have not 
earned. And so, the “youths” discovered that at the first 
instance, that the reason they (unemployed) are paid money is 
because they were causing trouble for not being employed by 
the oil companies, and that is why they are paid. And so 
logically, if they cause more trouble for not being employed, 
they will keep getting paid by the oil companies (POI, male, 
Ns, DC, Interview; Feb. 2008). 
 
This situation breeds violence as the unemployed especially the “youths” continued to demand 
for jobs that they are not qualified for in order to keep the money coming, since the oil industry 
could not provide the type of job that could absorb them. This is consistent with the view 
echoed by Human Right Watch (1999:8) that 'those with full-time employment in the oil 
industry are paid high wages for skilled work, but they are a well-paid minority surrounded by 
a mass of unemployed or underemployed'. This demonstrates that oil resources cement 
economic inequality as people who are given such few oil jobs, becomes better off in oil 
village communities. In many cases, as will be revealed and discussed later, such process lead 
to fierce struggle and affects social relations in these communities. In furtherance of the 
situation, Amnesty International (2005:2) noted that the oil companies in order 'to alleviate the 
frustrations of  communities without development or employment,…offer "ghost" jobs, paying 
money to people who are not expected to work'. And in cases where there are such jobs, only 
few places are available, and in most instances there are lots of other factors which come to 
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play to determine who gets such position. Factors such as politics, privileges and 
patrimonialism in the community influence who gets such job opportunity and in most cases, 
such situation degenerates into violence within such communities as people struggle for such 
few well paid oil jobs. Table 6.2 illustrates the prevalent nature of unemployment in the oil 
production region of Nigeria.  
Table 6.2 Unemployment Rates by State in the Niger Delta (2003-2008) 
STATES 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Abia 14.80 11.40 9.65 7.90 13.50 10.90 14.5 
Akwa-
Ibom 
12.30 14.40 14.40 14.40 15.30 13.50 34.1 
Bayelsa 3.50 7.10 14.00 20.90 16.00 6.90 14.5 
Cross- 
River 
7.90 12.00 11.55 11.10 16.90 11.80 14.3 
Delta 14.90 17.10 10.80 4.50 13.80 18.90 18.4 
Edo 4.80 3.10 6.50 9.90 8.60 5.10 12.2 
Imo 19.90 22.10 19.30 16.50 21.50 7.60 20.8 
Ondo 16.80 7.30 6.75 6.20 6.70 5.80 14.9 
Rivers 6.60 15.30 11.15 7.00 25.00 4.70 27.9 
All Nigeria 12.60 14.80 13.35 11.90 13.70 14.60 19.7 
 
Source: Social Statistics in Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics, 
2009(General Household Survey Report NBS/CBN Survey 2007 and 2008) 
 
  It is evident from the interviews and supporting literature that oil resources to large extent 
changes the existing dominant nature of employment and livelihoods in any community where 
it is discovered, especially where farming land or fishing waters are acquired for oil activities. 
However, it does not reproduce corresponding employment positions to take care of those 
displaced from their original jobs or source of livelihoods. This creates a form of structural 
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inequality within the host communities. As shown in table 6.2, the 2008 national 
unemployment rate was put at 19.7% while Niger Delta region was at 22.07% which is above 
the national level. Supporting this evidence, Francis et al (2011:24) submit that ‘62 percent of 
the inhabitants are below thirty years of age, unemployment is high, and there are few 
opportunities for advancement’. This to a great extent has fuelled violent conflict in most oil 
communities in many ways, especially in a situation where the few opportunities which come 
as casual jobs are to be contested for by numerous unemployed “youths”. As demonstrated by 
both primary and secondary data, such communities more often than not are thrown into one 
form of violent struggle or the other over land, job opportunities and other benefits created by 
oil resources, like in the case of two neighbouring communities.  
 
  6.1.3    Oil resource Activities and Environmental Factors 
 
 
From interviews and FGDs, it is evident that oil resources activities caused various forms of 
environmental crisis, which fuelled negative socio-economic conditions and social relations 
among dwellers in oil village communities. These adverse effects which are seen more as 
environmentally induced arguably stand as the first major source of conflicts between oil 
companies and oil village communities. The nature of the environs in the Niger Delta which 
hosts Nigeria oil village communities is such that it is made up of aquatic, swamp mangrove 
forest among others. The distortion of the bio-diversity of this region by oil activities resulted 
in environmental degradation and environmental scarcity as witnessed today (Social Action, 
2009). 
 
However, in trying to understand how these environmental problems cause by oil resources 
affect existing socio-economic conditions in oil communities, it is imperative to establish the 
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linkage between oil resources and environment and its subsequent ramifications which create 
the perennial environmental conflicts. A participant in the second FGD declared this while 
answering a question on the benefits of oil resources to his community; 
We are not actually deriving anything from oil resource, but 
rather misery. In those days before the exploration of oil, our 
basic occupation have been farming and fishing. We depended 
on our products, which were in abundant but today the reverse 
is the case. There are oil spillages from these companies, which 
destroy our rivers and farmland. We can no longer farm, as our 
farms are now full of oil wells and pipelines. Our rivers have 
no fishes again, as the fishes are now deep into the ocean. The 
benefits we get from oil are the struggles in our communities 
over land to farm or portions of fishing waters. Local people in 
the communities frequently engage in communal fights in 
farms and in the rivers. In short, there are no visible benefits 
from oil production, but the damage on our environment and 
struggle over compensation from such damages (TK, Male, 
Warri, FGD; Feb.2008).  
 
 
Relating a story of what happened in her community, a woman leader gave an account of an 
incident in her community, saying, “there was oil spillage and the oil company paid deaf ear to 
our complaints. Our youths were provoked; they hijacked the vehicles of the oil company, 
blocked the roads and chased their workers away. The next day they came for dialogue with us 
and agreed to pay us some compensation” (VA, Female, Tr- WA, OdComm, Interview; 
Nov.2007).  Probing further on impact of environmental degradation on women, I asked another 
woman during the second FGD, if oil resources affect them differently from the men, she 
replied that “we are the ones who do the cooking, washing and fetching of water, when the river 
is polluted; we suffer most, because our children will need to eat, they don’t ask their fathers for 
food but us” (G.A, Female, Warri, FGD, Feb.2008). A similar view was expressed by another 
woman during the first focus group discussion; she said that 
          “we have families to feed, when oil spillage occurs, it pollutes the entire 
           water and damage our cassava soaked in it, causing hunger and waste”  
            (E.O, Female, Warri, FGD; Nov. 2007).  
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Informing the researcher on the extent of such pollution, a community traditional head, stated 
that when such oil spill occurs, the entire environment and surroundings are entirely covered by 
crude oil deposit from such oil spill. The situation is always unbearable as farms, drinking 
water, fish traps, fish gears, fishing breeding grounds, ponds and all aquatic life in the mangrove 
are devastated. When such incident happens, oil companies care more about their pipes working 
again than finding a way of paying us for our damage farms and cleaning up our environment 
(HRM.JT, Male,GbComm, Interview; Dec.2007; Vanguard, May 15, 2008). A similar story was 
told by a “youth” leader about his community’s oil spill experience. He said that: 
      “The last oil spillage which occurred in our community had quantities of crude  
        oil pumped into the land and river of our community, causing destruction 
         to the people. Our only source of water was polluted while farmlands with 
         crops, as well as economic trees were destroyed by the spill”. (H.O,Male,  
         YA-Sec, UgComm, interview; Jan.2008) 
 
Another participant also echoed that in his community NA (oil MNCs) paid little monetary 
compensation for a latest oil spill, but left without properly cleaning the polluted environment. 
He further said that the affected farms are no longer in use, while the distribution of the money 
awarded to them was hijacked by their community leadership (E.B., Male, Warri, FGD; 
Feb.2008) 
 
The submissions made by these respondents suggest three issues associated with oil resources 
and the environment, in respect of the role oil resources play in fuelling violent conflicts in oil 
communities. First, there is evidence from the submission that oil production activities degrade 
the environment and this in many ways affect the source of livelihoods of oil communities. 
Subsequently, in their bid to either farm or fish in the remaining portions of land or waters, 
violent conflicts often ensue as the contest for the remaining land or fishing water. Second, it is 
also evident that oil activities reduce and affect the outputs from farms and fishing water and 
this cumulates into a form of environmental scarcity. Thirdly, in situation where environmental 
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degradation is as a result of oil spill, the issue of compensation payment is raised. The issue of 
compensation, which would be discussed later in this chapter, has become one of the major 
causes of violent conflicts or struggles in various oil village communities.  Finally, in many 
African societies, women are home makers; therefore they take the responsibilities of cooking, 
cleaning, fetching water among other domestic chores. When oil spill occurs in oil village 
communities, it put the women through series of psychological trauma. 
 
Furthermore, it is equally evident to point out that environmental issues do not stand alone or 
could not act alone in causing violent conflict. In most instances, it either acts in conjunction 
with other variables or trigger other factors that cause violent struggle. In one of the interviews, 
I posed this question to the Peace worker working in oil village communities: Between 
environmental problems which arise out of oil activities and issues of underdevelopment in 
these communities, which of these factors do communities react much violently to? The 
interviewee declared: 
“These communities if well-developed will take the issues of 
environmental problems such as oil spill with lighter concern, 
if the issue of underdevelopment is addressed. But the 
peculiarity of the Niger Delta would be absolutely difficult in 
forgoing the environment, but it would down play the struggle, 
although it is an avenue for getting compensation, so it is 
tricky” (DS, male, WA, PW, Interview; Dec.2007). 
 
In other words, as these communities slump further down the ladder of poverty and 
underdevelopment, they therefore make their living out of the environmental problems caused 
by oil activities. This declaration goes to confirm the earlier submission by interviewee TK 
indicting that environmental issues intertwine with other factors to fuel violent conflicts. 
 
An interpretation of this expression, is in line with some views in literature, Libiszewski 
(1992:9) opines that 'the idea of struggle over increasingly scarce resources which is often used 
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to characterise the linkage between environment and conflict is not totally wrong, but it does 
not explain very much…Surely the scarcity of a resource represents an important challenge for 
every society’. But if this will lead to conflicts and how these will develop always depends on a 
multitude of other factors which are socially and historically conditioned. This is in addition to 
the interviews which show that other factors like socio-economic, political, cultural and 
development issues play important roles in causing environmentally-induced conflicts. This 
therefore justifies this study’s use of structural violence approach to understand the various 
interwoven and intervening factors that lead to violent conflicts in oil village communities. 
 
However, notwithstanding that there are lots of ambiguities in the understanding and meaning 
of what constitute an environmental conflict, but nevertheless, in most natural resources 
conflicts like oil resource conflict, there are direct inter-play of environmental scarcity and 
environmental degradation. Again, Even with the study of environmental conflict been 
criticised for its methodological weakness, it does not rule out the evidence of the existence of 
environmental factors in host communities of such resources (see chapter 2). The two 
processes exist side by side in oil village communities and are attested to by the damage, new 
conditions and changes they have created in these communities. Consequently, environmental 
degradations which occur during most oil production process are easily confirmed by 
environmental changes in these communities. Environmental degradations which occur as 
results of oil resources activities come in forms of land and water pollution by oil spill and air 
pollution by gas flaring. Using Tables 6.3 as an example, it gives insight about the quantity of 
oil spill that occurs in oil village communities, whenever an oil spill occurs. 
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TABLE 6.3 Summary of Some Oil Spills in the Niger Delta: 1979 – 2005 
 
EPISODE YEAR STATE 
QUANTITY SPILT IN 
BARRELS 
Forcados terminal oil 
spills 
1979 Delta 570,000 
Funiwa No.5 well blow 
out 
1980 Rivers 400,000 
Oyakama oil spillage 1980 Rivers 10,000 
System 2C  Warri – 
Kaduna pipeline rupture 
at Abudu 
1982 Edo 18,000 
Sohika Oil spill 1983 Rivers 10,000 
Idoho Oil spill 1983 Awka-Ibom 40,000 
Jones Creek Oil spill 1998 Delta 21,000 
Jesse Oil spill 1998 Delta 10,000 
Etiama Oil spill 2000 Bayelsa 11,000 
Ughelli Oil spill 2005 Delta 10,000 
 
Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Niger Delta 
Human Development Report, Abuja, Nigeria, 2006. 
 
A thorough consideration of Table 6.3 and Appendix G and show the amount of oil spills and 
the effects of these oil spills on the environment. Apart from the environmental hazards which 
oil activities bring in cases of oil spills, the after effects of such development, or what I call “oil 
spill settlement”38 leaves the communities polarized and conflict prone. For instance, at each 
occasion where a financial compensation is agreed by the oil MNCs, a group or some group 
within the particular oil village community involved are left worse off than they were before 
the oil spill incidence. They either receive less financial compensation when compared to 
others or are totally left out. In most of the responses gathered during the interview, it was 
referred to as part of the 'divide and rule'39 tactics of oil MNCs. An environmental right 
                                                 
38 “Oil spill settlement” is a system of financial inducement embarks upon by oil MNCs, in which the ring leaders 
and vocal members of a community affected by oil spill are selectively and secretly paid, in order to either have 
them work against their communities or keep mute. 
39 Divide and Rule policies as freely used by many respondents to refer to policies and actions of oil companies 
which tend to either pitch members of a particular community against themselves, or one community against the 
other or policies  which are used purely to neutralize any strong and united representation by a community or 
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activist/lawyer in his opinion stated that “before now, elders were the only ones dealing with 
the oil companies on the settlement and more often than not, they under declare the actual 
amount paid as compensation for such spill to their community and pocket the rest, and this has 
often thrown communities into conflicts, if discovered” (F.U, Male, Warri, ERL, Interview; 
Nov.2007). Another “youth” leader openly mentioned a name of an Ijaw traditional ruler who 
stopped a multi-million Naira project which an Oil MNCs was supposed to execute for his oil 
village community as part of an agreed compensation for degrading their environment. In 
return, his company was awarded a huge contract of lesser amount, and this sparked off a 
violent conflict in the community leading to the burning down of his palace and blockage of 
the company's activity in that community (OT, Male, GbComm, YL, Interview; Nov.2007). 
 
Similarly, one of the “youth” leaders in UgComm while responding to an interview question, 
bitterly complained about the clashes among communities as they struggle to control either 
their 'environment' or the benefits from  oil activities.  He declared thus:    
“The clashes between communities are about land and water 
boundary adjustment, which lead to oil exploration benefits. 
Each neighbouring community wants to benefit from the oil 
activities. Out of this, is the problem of families', groups', 
communal' and ethnic struggles and conflicts over ownership 
and possession of such resources   It is a survival of the fittest” 
(EOO, Male, UgComm, YL, Interview; Jan. 2008) 
 
While I listened to this submission from this “youth” leader, he believed that oil resources 
activities have created a situation of ‘socio-environmental vulnerabilities’ within oil village 
communities. With such creations, everything linked to the environment, especially 
environmental degradation sparks off violent conflicts within the concerned parties in such 
community. Therefore, it implies that the environmental scarcity which they experience arises 
                                                                                                                                                          
communities. In such cases, acts such as selective financial or material empowerment could be used by oil 
company to get the ring leaders off the community’s course for redress (Field note, Warri, 2008). 
167 
 
out of the social effects of oil resources. As oil communities face increase in environmental 
scarcity, there is increase in salience of group boundaries, which causes more segmentation of 
communities’ social cohesion. The result is struggles and competition over resources such as 
land. This struggle could either be for farming or for oil resources purposes especially where 
such land has been designated for such oil resources.  As earlier noted, environmental conflicts 
acts alongside other factors, it is therefore evident to note the presence of other factors which 
aids environmental conflicts. The struggles and conflicts over environmental resources are 
linked to the new discovery, which are oil resources.  
 
In another development, there is also the issue of inequality and social exclusion as those with 
access to oil benefits or opportunity are better off. Drawing support from literature, Ibeanu 
(2001) notes that the, “…uses of the environment are socially constructed. Such construction of 
the environment involves values, expectations, structures and institutions that influence human 
interactions with the bio-physical environment…In short, the environment exists in unity with 
social, economic and political processes”. Therefore, there is a causal link between the 
environment, oil resources and violent conflict, and when you examine these factors; there is a 
prima facie link between the three factors. 
 
6.1.4 Oil resource and Poverty 
 
To understand the role oil resources play or have played in creating and heightening poverty in 
oil village communities, it is important to understand the involvement of the other factors: land 
and land ownership, unemployment and environmental issues. The research has discussed these 
three factors, but has deliberately avoided drawing any conclusions from them. This is to 
enable the analysis of the relationship between oil resources and poverty to be done separately.  
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However, there is no gainsaying that there is a linkage between poverty in oil communities and 
the three previous factors discussed. Emergence of poverty in oil villages is often linked to loss 
of sources of livelihoods, in this case farming land and fishing waters. More often than not, 
poverty is the obvious outcome of negative impact of oil activities. According to an interview 
response from a Community head in OkComm: 
“At a certain time in the lives of our communities, fish and 
food were abundant, people had food and enjoyed themselves, 
but now in these communities, there are no fishermen. The oil 
companies influenced our life styles, and it had a short 
duration. People are paid while the oil processions are on, and 
after that, nothing! They drill and go away, destroying the land 
and waters. While they were here, they did not put any 
infrastructure for the communities, to make up for their 
activities. If they do these violent agitation won't be this bad, 
and now there is no other source of employment after the 
drilling ended, leaving the people fighting over scavenged land 
and fishing waters or other activities such as watching over 
used pipelines and oil equipment, they have left us poor and 
suffering, which was not our case before” (EE, Male, 
OkComm, CH, Interview; Feb 2008). 
 
A woman leader from Ut-Un Comm was blunt in expressing her opinion about the change in 
the nature of livelihoods and poverty situation in the oil village communities. While reflecting 
on how oil resources have affected the source of livelihoods of the oil communities and the 
nature of poverty, she commented that: 
“If you go to our farms and see the extent of damage on our 
livelihoods, oil has devastated the area in a very criminal 
manner, and leaving the people in poverty situation. We have 
been impoverished socially, cultural, economically and 
otherwise. Oil has taken away the serene nature of the area, life 
of subsistence farming and local abundance to life of high cost 
of living arising from oil activities, which incidentally does not 
really trickle down to the local inhabitants of these community,   
the only way they get such is through violent struggle” 
(EO,Female, Ut-unComm,WO, Interview, Feb. 2008) 
 
 
A participant who took part in one of the first FGDs also said that: 
         “.…at the end of the day, the whole issue boils down to poverty. 
         It is reflected in the nature of our livelihood, housing and so on. 
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        The worse of it all is that each passing day we are descending more  
        into poverty and conflict while the money goes to Abuja”  
         ( F. A, Female, Warri, FGD; Nov.2007).   
 
A similar view was expressed by an interviewee from one of the development agencies, while 
underscoring the reason for the violence. He stressed that “these young men and youths have 
no objection but to resort to violence when there are no jobs. And as you can see, the violence 
is not only against the government and the oil companies but against their community and 
opinion leaders. A reason why the commission is working hard to train and create jobs for 
them” (M.T.G, Male, DD (YD), NC, PH, Interview; Feb.2008). 
 
While explaining about the pervasive nature of poverty in oil village communities based on his 
various work in Niger Delta, another participant stressed that it is one doctor to between 82, 
000 to 132,000 people in the oil village communities as against the national average of 40,000. 
Safe drinking water is accessible to only 27 percent (31.7 percent for national average), and 30 
percent of households (33.6 percent for national average) having access to electricity (POI, 
Male, Ns, DC, Interview; Feb.2008). 
 
 Judging by the above views, it is a clear case of impact of oil resources on livelihoods. It is 
obvious from the situations the respondents above presented, that the old forms of livelihoods 
of the people made them happier than the new form of livelihoods imposed on them by oil 
resources and its activities. Secondly, the above submissions show an emerging cycle of 
structural violence which exist in oil communities. Poverty here goes beyond lack of material 
benefits but other forms of benefits. However, it is also indicated the change in socio-economic 
activities of the people, which leaves them struggling for oil benefits or opportunities.  Again, 
from responses of our interviewees, it could be inferred that the arrival of oil production and 
allied activities also raised their cost of living. Nonetheless, oil activities should increase the 
170 
 
growth and development of host communities, which in this situation is not the case here. It 
rather changed the existing socio-economic conditions in host communities without 
corresponding economic conditions. Thereby leaving the new situation it has created to 
shoulder the overburdened socio-economic situations. New situations created by oil activities 
includes-: destruction of previous sources of livelihood without replacement and environmental 
issues. Below is Table 6.4 on incidence of poverty in Niger Delta. 
 
 
 
Table 6.4: Incidence of Poverty in the Niger Delta in Percentage. 1980 – 2004 
 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2005) 
 
 
 Analysing above table, the incidence of poverty in the Niger Delta shows rise in poverty in 
1980 has an average figure of 17.4% and then rose to an average of 60.1% in 1996, which is a 
rise of 42.7% within 16 years of oil production activities. Analysis from interview data 
suggests that changes in the socio-economic structures of host communities examined meant an 
imposition of a new way of life and social relations. The new way of life brought a condition of 
inequality, especially unequal access to the new source of livelihoods. This form of structural 
violence means that oil resources- linked economic opportunities are not equitably distributed. 
 1980 1985 1992 1996 2004 
Nigeria 28.1 46.3 42.7 65.6 54.4 
Edo/Delta 19.8 52.4 33.9 56.1 Delta   45.35 
Edo      33.09 
Cross River 10.2 41.9 45.5 66.9 41.61 
Imo/Abia 14.4 33.1 49.9 56.2 Imo    27.39 
Abia   22.27 
Ondo 24.9 47.3 46.6 71.6 42.15 
Rivers/Bayelsa 7.2 44.4 43.4 44.3 Rivers    
29.09 
Bayelsa  
19.98 
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Rather, two new socio-economic groups of the advantaged and the disadvantaged for the new 
socio-economic conditions are created. This development brings about a new conflictual 
relationship between the disadvantaged and the advantaged, which results into violent 
struggles. 
 
Expressing a similar view, Ibeanu (2008:18) writes that ‘Niger Delta’s poverty is in part the 
consequences of oil production, which have destroyed livelihoods by destroying farmland and 
fishing waters’. This picture supports the position of the oil communities and in very clear 
terms and imagery, a new dissolute life that oil resources activities imposed on its host. 
Understandably, the other five other geo-political regions in Nigeria have not really felt better 
considering the enormous wealth the country has made from oil resources. However, Niger 
Delta, especially the oil village communities are peculiar and different judging from the 
adverse effect of environmental problems from petrobusiness despite contributing over 50% of 
the country’s GDP.  
 
In this discussion, one thing remains very common and obvious, and that is that the poverty 
experience here started first as a demand-induced scarcity40. This basically has to do with the 
dispossession of land belonging to the people in favour of petrobusiness. This is further 
heightened by environmental factors that oil activities heap on the people. An explanation of 
the situation using the theoretical framework shows that poverty comes as part of the changes 
in socio-economic conditions, which as part of structural violence could fuel violent conflict. 
 
                                                 
40Homer-Dixon (1999:19) explains that ‘Demand –induced scarcity arise only with resources that are (to use 
economists’ term) rivalrous. A resource is rivalrous when its use by one economic actor reduces its 
availability for other.  
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Interestingly, this discussion raises a lot of moral and academic debates such as: why do these 
oil communities take to violent conflict knowing that the poverty situation in Nigeria is not 
peculiar to their communities alone? Secondly, are there fundamental differences between the 
nature and causes of poverty in the oil village communities and the rest of the country?  In 
trying to reflect over these questions, the research takes a look at the effects of oil resources in 
these communities as against the rest of country. Experiences such as environmental factors, 
unemployment, landlessness  have direct impact on the people's livelihood. However, there are 
claims about the existence of similar factors or causes of poverty in other part of the country, 
incidentally, these causes of poverty are not direct outcome of any natural resources production 
as witnessed in oil village communities. In sum, the above research tries to fully grasp the 
dynamics of the poverty situation in the oil village communities and how such situation 
manifests into violent conflicts. This the research has done by looking beyond poverty as a 
single causal factor but including other factors such as unemployment and environmental 
issues.  
6.2 Petrobusiness: Grievances, Greed and Criminality 
 
 To answer the second part of the study’s research question 1; interviews, focus group 
discussions, observation and documentary reviews such as newspapers, reports and research 
findings were used. The investigation focused on examining the extent, if any, to which oil 
resources contributed to issues of grievance, greed, criminality and militancy in oil village 
communities.  This will thereby establishing the relationship between the new socio-economic 
conditions, and the new culture of greed and grievance in fueling violent conflicts in oil village 
communities. 
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6.2. 1. Grievances due to ‘underdevelopment’41 and Changes cause 
by oil activities 
 
These study findings reveal a pattern of intricate relationship between underdevelopment and 
the reaction of oil village communities to negative oil activities. Expressing the height of the 
underdevelopment in these oil village communities, A.M.O (Constitutional right lawyer) 
queried the situation in this manner: 
“The oil communities over time feel very strongly that they are 
highly marginalised. Marginalised in the sense that if you go to 
the oil communities, especially the ones in the river line areas 
where the bulk of the oil comes from, if you see their standard 
of living, it is very low and poor. They have no potable water 
to drink, they wash, bath, and drink from polluted streams. A 
few kilometres away, you have boat houses, where oil 
companies, their staff and security men, all will be on. They 
have 24 hours power supply and drink bottled water. Oil 
communities see all these. The oil companies enjoy these 
amenities and still drill their oil away, and you think they will 
not one day rise up against these oppressors” (A.M-O, 
Male,C/L, Warri, Interview; Dec2007). 
 
As observed during my fieldwork, the situation of underdevelopment or lack of development 
was frequently cited by the various oil village communities as reasons to why they resort to 
violence. For the genuine agitators, the situation represents living in penury in midst of plenty 
(Field note, Gbaramatu, Nov.2007). Explaining about the situation in her village, a young 
unemployed graduated who took part in the 2nd FGD, described her village in this form:  
                         “My village is wired for electricity but no electricity as it is not 
                          connected to the national grid. We have a pipe-borne water that 
                          that was commission since ten years ago, but has never worked. 
                          All our household chores are done in the stream; the same stream 
                           serves as source of drinking water and waste disposal”(O.I,Female, 
                          Warri FGD; Feb. 2008) 
 
Interestingly, the one million man march in Abuja, Nigeria’s federal capital in 1998 is said to 
have increased the knowledge of oil communities on the real worth of oil resources to Nigeria, 
                                                 
41  Underdevelopment or lack of development  in this  context represents  the non-presence of basic amenities like 
roads, hospital, electricity, schools,   
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especially the “youths” who on visiting Abuja for the first time saw bridges, highways and 
skyscrapers, and wondered why their communities are continuously underdeveloped through 
oil exploration for Abuja to be developed (J.O, Male, YL, Ut-UnComm, interview; Feb.2008).  
 
Similarly, another “youth” who took part in the one-million man march gave his opinion on the 
lack of development in the oil communities as thus: 
“… for example go to Olobiri, they just suck the oil and 
abandon that village. No good pipe borne water, no electricity, 
no good school and education, the roads linking the village is 
not even good. But go to Abuja and see what they [Referring to 
the Nigerian state] have done at Abuja.  There is no   
electricity, you may get one if your community or village is 
close to the oil company, but if yours is not, there would be no 
light”. (UT, Male, Warri, FGD; Feb. 2008) 
 
This revelation of underdevelopment went a long way to support a popular claim during the 
interviews and FGDs about the role of awareness and enlightenment in fuelling the violent 
conflict. The more the oil communities understand their relative deprivation especially in 
comparison to their contributions and that of others parts of the country, the more they feel 
aggrieved (Field note, Warri, Feb.2008). Again the more any particular community perceive its 
own underdevelopment in comparison to other oil village communities, the more it resorts to 
the use of violence in attracting recognition or benefit from petrobusiness (Field note, Warri, 
Feb.2008;Amensty International, 2005). 
 
With the awareness and enlightenment that came with the Abuja discoveries as against the 
underdevelopment of the oil communities, DS pointed out that: 
“… judging from the developments they saw in Abuja and the 
underdevelopment in the Niger-delta, they understood that the 
development of Abuja is from oil and this prompted them to 
ask questions and more agitations for development of the   
Niger Delta. Especially, they questioned their leaders [referring 
to leaders from Niger Delta] on why they left their 
communities/ area in this situation [underdevelopment] or 
allow this underdevelopment to go on, they found out that their 
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leaders more or less have mortgaged their future by dealing 
with the oil companies, and so on and so forth without 
considering the development of their areas. So, this gave  rise 
to insecurity and instability as well as conflict in the Niger 
Delta” (DS, Male, Warri, PW: Interview; Dec.2007). 
 
 
What was evident from the interviews and FGDs was that oil communities consider their 
relative lack of development as fundamental issue that fuels the violent conflicts.  For the oil 
communities, underdevelopment stands as the major cause of their grievances. When the 
question, between lack of development and environmental degradation like oil spill which 
attracts most violent reactions from oil communities? was posed to a community relation 
officer from oil MNCs, his answer was thus: 
“To be very truthful to you, all that these communities want is 
development in terms of amenities, but of course oil companies 
pay taxes to government and cannot take over their function. I 
agree we have not met the global environmental standard, but 
this should not translate to violent conflicts if amenities were 
provided” (CP, Male, PH, CRO, Interview; Feb.2008). 
 
 
The above statement from the interviewee (CP) may seem contradictory or contentious to 
earlier held view on environmental degradation, judging that the case of oil village 
communities draws more attention when the environment is mentioned. Nevertheless, the point 
been made here is that the issues of development remains very important and have fuelled 
violent conflicts in most oil communities. A critical look at this revelation shows that lack of 
development is mostly used among the main dwellers of the various oil communities, while 
emphases on the environment comes from mostly the environmental friendly NGOs who are 
cashing in on the global attention giving to the environment to promote the issue of 
development in The Niger Delta, knowing that most parts of Nigeria are facing case or cases of 
underdevelopment. An analysis of opinions expressed by respondents shows that lack of 
employment opportunities for the indigenes of oil producing areas; total neglect by federal and 
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state governments and the oil companies; and general lack of development are major causes of 
grievances. 
 
It is evident from views of respondents above that grievances are mostly on issues of 
underdevelopment and loss of livelihoods.  The less the oil village communities perceive their 
benefits of oil resources especially in terms of development, the more likely they would resort 
to the use of armed violence to secure such entitlements. In situations where social amenities 
were provided for oil communities, oil resources became agent of development therefore 
increasing the environment for peace. However, in situations where the MNCs and the state fail 
to provide social amenities for the oil communities, oil resources become a source for 
underdevelopment and deprivation, thereby fertilising the environment for violent conflict. 
 
From the interviews, FGDs and observation, it is clear that the nature of violent conflicts that 
erupt in the oil village communities are due to a plethora of grievances felt by dwellers in these 
communities regarding activities of oil resources and lack of development. In general terms, 
the issue of “development” here means the provision of basic and standard social amenities, 
such as roads, pipe borne water, electricity, hospitals, schools and jobs. While 
“underdevelopment” means lack of above-mentioned amenities, and in addition to the situation 
where oil activities such as oil spill and gas flaring have deformed existing local resources such 
as streams and rivers. These grievances were first directed at oil MNCs operating in many of 
oil communities, and then at the Nigerian state and later at some members of oil communities 
who are seen as collaborators in under developing their communities. 
 
The case of development of the oil communities or its underdevelopment has been cleverly 
discussed as “how development underdevelops the Niger Delta” by Ibeanu in 2008. In his 
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thesis, Ibeanu raises two issues: first, how the unsustainable nature of oil exploration destroys 
livelihoods and the environment. Secondly, the lack of attention given to the provision of social 
and essential amenities likes roads, electricity and education by the Nigerian state and Oil 
MNCs, while they are abundantly available at oil camps and quarters.  Ibeanu (2008:29) further 
opined that “this has heightened the sense of relative deprivation in communities and made oil 
installations ready targets of the anger”.  This deprivation and the subsequent grievances could 
easily be understood within the framework of structural violence. For example, the road to this 
violence against the oil village communities started as the oil production began in 1956-8, but 
actual physical violence could be dated to the 1990s.  
 
6.2.2 Grievances over Compensations  
 
Findings from interviews, FGDs and observations, reveal that there are various violent 
struggles in the oil communities over compensation. These compensations are mainly payment 
for land acquired for prospective oil exploration, or payment due to environmental damage 
especially from oil spill in communities. Accordingly, compensations in cases of acquisition of 
land are paid either to an individual or family. Furthermore, in situations where a piece of land 
is communally owned, the community leadership or executive negotiates and receives such 
compensation on behalf of members of the community. The same arrangement is equally 
applicable in cases of compensations for oil spill.  
 
Firstly, in the course of this research, it was evident from the interviews that there is such high 
distrust about ways in which compensations are disbursed. Evidence from the field also shows 
that oil companies and oil village communities are often in conflict on whether an oil spill is 
sabotage or not. In many instances, this has resulted into unexpected crisis, especially where 
the oil company had initially accepted liability, only to turn back after some days to accuse 
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such community of sabotage (CBH, Male, OlComm, CL, Interview; Jan.2008). For example, 
International Crisis Group (2006) reported about Azuzuama in Bayelsa state, where a MNCs 
oil pipeline has devastated the livelihoods of the inhabitants of the community. On contacting 
Agip, the oil MNC involved, they claimed ignorance of the spill but later confirmed that 
corrosion could have caused the spills but that the company was not ruling out the possibility 
that saboteurs had used acid to hasten up pipeline deterioration in order to demand for 
compensation (ICG, 2006).  This is among the many frequent causes of conflict in most oil 
communities. In instances where an oil company either denies culpability or is too slow to act, 
the affected oil community takes measures such as protests, shutting down the oil operations or 
taking the oil workers as hostages to press home their demands as seen in previous interviews 
cited in this research. An emerging point from this submission could be that deployment of 
violent confrontation by oil village communities makes the payment of their compensations or 
claims paramount. Thus, it could mean that peaceful communities may not have their demand 
taken as important (Field note, Warri, Feb.2008; DS, Male, Warri, PW, Interview; Dec.2007). 
 
Secondly, it was also evident from the interviews that there is an existence of a “selective 
empowerment style”42, in which the ring leaders in such affected community or communities 
are selectively compensated either by awarding of contract, employment or financial rewarded 
to reduce their involvement in the struggle against the oil company. A visible angry “youth”, 
who took part in the second FGD said that: 
        “not until the “youths” got involved in negotiations, our elders and leaders 
         were always ‘settled’ by oil companies; they will then come back and ask 
         us to give them[oil MNCs] more time”(BE, Male, Warri FGD; Feb. 2008) 
 
                                                 
42 The term “selective empowerment style” is  an act of making some selected members of an oil-bearing 
communities, especially those the oil companies considers as arrow –heads  of conflicts or the elite or leaders 
benefits from petrobusiness either in form of contracts, employments or financial payments. 
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Again, as reported by Okonta and Douglas(2003:59), “the local communities have accused 
them[referring to Shell]of brutally suppressing peaceful protests and using financial 
inducements to divide the community whenever  there is an oil spill, so that they cannot present 
a common front and successfully press for compensation”. The implication of this is the 
tendency of fuelling violent conflict among members of oil village communities on discovering 
this sort of empowerment policy which the affected oil company has used.  
 
The second aspect arises from within the oil communities where their representatives, village 
development executives or community leadership who represent an entire community during 
negotiations for compensation, on receiving the agreed financial compensation, mismanages it. 
In many instances, the most affected peoples whose farmland or fishing nets were affected or 
destroyed by such oil spill get little or no compensation at all.  A “youth” Executive during 
interview said this about community leaders and compensation: 
“They negotiate with the oil companies, and agree on the 
amount to be paid. This monetary payment is control by 
community elders and executives. And immediately the money 
is paid, conflicts arise. Just like money paid to the state for the 
community that do not get to the communities,  the money the 
communities get as compensation do not flow down to the 
members of the communities as well, the crisis starts with the 
sharing of the compensation”(AS,Male,OkComm,YE, 
Interview; Nov.2007). 
 
In fact, grievances over the nature and manner of distribution of compensation received from 
oil MNCs presents most conditions for violent struggles and circumstances for a full blown 
intra-communal violent conflict. This therefore could arise from situations where money paid 
by an oil company ends up in pockets of few members of the community.  Again, this could be 
part of the reason for the fierce struggle for leadership in oil village community (see discussion 
in Chapter 7).  Thus, oil resources create economic opportunities which allow local/community 
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leadership to engage in the same manner of corruption linked to oil resources at the established 
governmental and state level. 
 
Again, oil resources at this stage of existence within the communities’ socio-environment has 
created a “rentier psychology”43 among the oil village communities, and further fosters the 
institutionalisation of a patrimonial culture in community leadership driven by oil rent and 
benefits. In the view of Omeje (2006: 3), ‘The distribution of rentier revenues in this context, in 
the absence of stable and well-developed legal, political and bureaucratic institutions, tends to 
encourage corruption’. This means that since oil resources have re-structured the existing 
economy in these communities, there is the tendency that the new social relations introduced 
includes “rent-seeking culture”44. With oil resources negatively impacting on their sources of 
livelihoods, seeking compensation for their land has virtually made them “rentier 
communities”45. They seek any form of compensation, be it compensation for prospective oil 
exploration or oil spill on farmland or for the fishing waters. When their expectations are not 
met, they could resort to violent conflict, as they now claim to be enlightened about the value 
and importance of oil.  
6.2.3 Greed and Web of Criminality in Oil Communities  
 
 
Greed and criminality are two critical fall-outs of natural resources economy and remain a 
major cause of violent conflict in natural resources-rich continent of Africa including Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta. Greed and criminality in some literature are perceived as the cause of outbreak of 
                                                 
43 “Rentier Psychology” is developed out of the activities of a rentier state, which involves the conditioning of the 
mind and behaviour of people linked to the oil resource (in this instance, the oil village communities) to the belief 
of demanding and making financial and material gains from oil resources or its agents-petrobusiness. This also 
includes job opportunities in the oil industry or payment of salaries without working, 
44  This implies a new way of life that is built on seeking oil related rents, revenues, benefits and opportunities 
such as compensation, financial hand-outs, especially with the loss of means of livelihoods to oil resources. 
45 This is used to represent the status of oil communities as dependent on oil related rents. Like rentier States, 
“rentier communities” show the same trends in a micro level, as all economic activities of the communities such as 
earnings revolves around the oil industry. 
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civil wars in countries with abundant natural resources. The economic theory of civil war 
argument with Paul Collier as one of its major proponent ( see section 2.4.2) believes that rebel 
groups ‘justify their actions in terms of a catalogue of grievances: repression, exploitation, 
exclusion’ (Collier, 2007:18). Rather, Berdal (2005:691) relying on other studies on the subject  
points that ‘the longevity, internal logic and, indeed, the ferocity of civil wars have all been 
affected by the greater ease of access to economic and financial resources that belligerents 
whether governments or rebels, have enjoyed in the 1990s’. In many instances, access to such 
natural resources such as oil has promoted criminality. In the case of the oil fuelled greed in the 
oil village communities in Nigeria, the exhibition of greed was difficult to distinguish from 
grievance at the earlier stage of the conflict until the situation degenerated from protest, to 
persistent vandalisation of oil pipeline which was commonly referred to as sabotage, to 
kidnapping of oil workers and militancy, and to outright war with the Nigerian state over the 
control of the resource. ICG (2009) wrote that criminal and political militants have used 
everything from targeted attacks to oil bunkering to hostage-taking to make clear their 
discontent. The result is the current violent situation. 
 
6.2.3.1 Illegal Oil Bunkering 
 
Illegal oil bunkering remains one major catalyst of the recent violent conflicts which occur in 
oil village communities in Nigeria. Although this might be disputed because of the focus on 
direct conflicts between oil communities and Oil MNCs or Nigerian State, but evidence from 
the field shows how the struggle to control various illegal bunkering sites and routes sets 
groups against the other, either within a particular community or groups, or among  various 
communities. Illegal oil bunkering started as uncommon practice which takes place any time 
there is an oil spill due to either faulty oil installations or pipelines, or due to a deliberate act of 
vandalisation of the oil pipelines of the MNCs. The gushing out of either crude oil or refined 
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petrol from the burst pipelines creates an economic opportunity for some dwellers to make 
some money by collecting and selling the product in black market (TY, Male, FGD; Feb.2008; 
HRW, 2003). DS (A Peace worker), he stated that: 
            “on realising the huge amount of money that could be made from the sale of   
             the siphoned oil, the practice gradually became widespread and a regular and 
             common means of making a living for some people, especially the youth” 
             (DS, Male, Warri, PW, Interview; Dec.2007). 
 
Another male respondent in the first FGDs expatiated on the illegal oil bunkering activities 
asserting that: 
I am an Ijaw, and lots of Ijaws are into it [benefitting from it] 
and we are telling the government in clear terms, you people 
[referring to government] are also stealing our oil, so we are 
not stealing it because it is our property, we will take it and sell 
it and that is just the truth” (BD, Male, FGD; Nov.2007) 
 
A participant in the FGD mentioned above gave more insight on their perception about the 
“legality” of their oil bunkering: 
We use it to empower ourselves [referring to making a 
livelihood, as explained by him], I have a brother who is an 
illegal oil bunker, and this empowers my family. Most of our 
leaders, politicians and people in power pay them to siphon the 
oil for them to the high seas. The illegal oil bunkers pay the 
Navy for them not to block their sea routes...so you can’t say 
that we are stealing it (EK, Male, FGD; Nov.2007). 
 
These illegal oil bunkering activities embarked upon by some dwellers in these oil 
communities were insignificant when compared to the major illegal bunkering activities 
undertaken by international criminals with their Nigerian collaborators in the security services 
and oil companies (ICG, 2006). For example, the oil companies were accused of insincerity in 
the fight against illegal oil bunkering in Niger Delta. Brig.-Gen. Tukur Buratai, the Brigade 
Commander, 2 Brigade, Port Harcourt and Commander, Sector two, Operation Pulo Shield 
noted that “The bunkerers will not operate if the oil companies are playing their part very well” 
(The Punch, May, 29, 2012).It is a common knowledge that in the oil communities, the oil that 
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the dwellers siphon are leftovers from the broken pipes discarded by these international 
criminals (OU, Female, Warri, S.Dir. Interview; Dec.2007). However, the change in the nature 
of the conflict from peaceful agitation to violent conflicts or armed conflict and militancy 
meant that any group that has opted for militant struggle against the Nigerian state and oil 
MNCs needs arms to persecute it (POI, Male, Ns, DC, Interview; Feb, 2008).Therefore, it 
could be assumed that it became imperative that these agitating groups turned  militant groups 
within the Niger Delta region needed to engage in illegal oil bunkering in order to support their 
men and as well as to purchase arms. Commenting on the situation in the oil communities, ICG 
(2006a) noted that illegal oil “bunkering” – theft – has accelerated the conflict and provided 
anti-government militant groups as well as criminals with funds to purchase arms.  
 
For example, HRW (2003) in one of its publications, ‘Nigeria: Delta violence a fight over oil 
money’ noted that the Warri crisis involving the three major ethnic groups—the Ijaw, Itsekiri, 
and Urhobo—were among other things, mainly about controlling the theft of crude oil. For 
instance in Delta state, the fight for the control of illegal bunkering opportunities has 
significantly fuelled the violence and worsened the human right abuses suffered by the people 
(HRW, 2003). Subsequently ,  the loss to Nigeria through illegal oil bunkering  “amounts to 
figures in the order of U.S.$750 million to $1.5 billion annually at oil prices between nineteen 
to thirty dollars a barrel, assuming bunkering at around 150,000 bpd (close to 55 million barrels 
a year); or $3.5 to $6.2 billion annually”(HRW,2003:18). This shows how financially huge and 
rewarding the activities are, and why it could constantly set groups and communities against 
each other as they try to illegally benefit from the oil money in one way or the other. 
 
In addition to the illegal oil bunkering is the huge amount of money oil MNCs pay to groups to 
watch over these pipelines to avoid either vandalisation and deter illegal oil bunkering. 
According to ICG (2006), oil companies to deter this act make discreet payments to militant 
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leaders in return for “surveillance” and protection of pipelines and other infrastructure. This 
has constantly set groups or camps against each other, with those chosen to carry out security 
surveillance fighting against those who were left out, and the later turns to illegal oil bunkering 
as their last resort. Therefore for some members of the oil communities, their targets were 
either to get financial settlement from the Oil Companies or to get their share of the oil 
resources by engaging in illegal oil bunkering from the various pipelines in the communities. 
 
This could be why the then Nigeria’s Chief of Navy Staff, during a courtesy call on Governor 
Emmanuel Uduaghan of Delta state about illegal oil bunkering situation in the Delta, said that 
“Militancy in the Niger Delta may go but criminality [illegal oil bunkering] will not go 
because, the saboteurs and those who want to grow faster than their legs would continue to 
introduce more sophisticated dimension to achieve their aims” (Thisday,November 20,  
2009).A further analysis could be that people may drop their arms against the state, but since 
the socio-economic conditions introduced by oil resources leaves them with a curtailed means 
of livelihood and economic sustenance, engaging in criminal activities like illegal oil bunkering 
may continue. 
 
6.2.3.2 Kidnapping, Militancy and Violent Revolts 
 
The height of greed and criminality in the oil village communities and Niger Delta region are 
kidnappings (which started from the kidnapping of expatriate oil workers to indigenous oil 
workers and to ordinary Nigerians), militancy and rebellion against the Nigerian state. 
Incidentally, the escalation of the various agitations and protestations into violent conflicts 
started with the country’s return to civil rule.  However, to understand the greed and criminality 
factor in the oil village communities, it is pertinent to situate the existing violence within the 
context of the denials and social exclusions and alienations suffered by the people. 
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In the first FGD, while discuss the issue of greedy vs. grievance, this question was posed: Are 
illegal oil bunkering and ransom kidnapping in oil village communities not signs of greed and 
criminality? A participant from this group said that:  
They are the one that is greedy [referring to The Nigerian 
government and oil MNCs] we have been oppressed, and we 
just got to know that we are been oppressed, so we are fighting 
back. So any means we can use to get our money, we are going 
to use it. Until we see that the government and oil companies 
are doing something to our benefits, the conflict cannot stop. 
The federal and state governments have put us aside, so are the 
oil companies, for the illegal bunkering, people will continue to 
do it, until things are properly put in order (EK, Male, FGD; 
Nov.2007). 
 
 
However, in answering a similar question, a community leader pointed out that the “youths” 
rather no longer take order from the elders and when there is a crisis between the communities 
and oil MNCs, “youths show their anger through violence, using guns, machetes and 
kidnapping”(GP, Male,Ut-UnComm, CL, Interview; Feb.2008). 
 
To another participant in the second FGD, his views were that: 
                 “Although we are not in support of the use of violence by our youths,  
                  but these amenities you now see from oil MNCs came through  
                  youth’s militancy”(JEK, Male, FGD; Feb.2008). 
 
It was evident during the interviews in the sampled communities that criminal and militant 
activities such as kidnappings, did not receive the support of the elderly respondents, although 
it made government and oil MNCs to do more for the communities, as many of the young 
respondents see such violence as a means of drawing the attention of the state. To the “youths”, 
criminality such as hostage taking of oil workers is a tool for negotiation regarding their 
deprived conditions. 
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However, what becomes the problem is about drawing a line between genuine intent of the 
community and personal gains fuelled by greed. There is a current awareness by the people to 
mobilise as a group against the oil MNCs and oil resources production. With the loss of their 
free access to such benefits, they (former petrobusiness’s associates from the communities) 
went into outright criminal activities. For instance, an elderly participant in the first FGD 
claimed that criminal activities were rather associated with people who were formerly seen as 
powerful by oil MNCs and who were constantly settled, and have now been overthrown by 
popular revolt (EK, Male, FGD; Nov.2007).In describing the popular revolt against few 
individuals within their communities, another FGD participant said that: 
               “...so these miscreants no longer have the patronage from oil companies,  
               they no longer enjoy what they were enjoying before this time. So what 
               they did is to go into criminality” (O.O, Male, FGD; Nov.2007) 
 
From all the submissions, it is evident that all the greed-fuelled criminal and militant activities 
are direct responses to the effects of oil resources on the lives and livelihoods of the oil 
community dwellers. Even though some of the activities were for personal gains, the root of 
such violence was laid by oil resources through its newly created socio-economic conditions 
and social relations. Consequently, the new condition meted out poverty, unemployment, 
underdevelopment and loss of livelihood in general, resulting in a culture of greed, militancy 
and criminality.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter explored and showed that oil resources to a large extent have great influence on 
the socio-economic conditions of oil communities where it is located. Oil resources change the 
means of economic sustenance, in otherwise livelihoods of such community, especially in areas 
of land ownership. This thereby polarises such oil communities and making them susceptible to 
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crises and conflicts. Oil resources re-structure the social relations of host communities creating 
a new economic class, especially in relationship to petrobusiness. Therefore, the changes in 
socio-economic conditions and social relations brought by oil resources influence the cultures 
of grievances, greed, criminality, which results into violent conflicts in oil communities.  
 
In this study, the effects of changes in socio-economic conditions and social relations brought 
about by oil resources were gauged using variables such as landownership, unemployment, 
poverty, and factors such as grievances, greed, criminality, militancy and violence as a 
mechanism. All these variables and factors are interwoven and interlinked, as each one has a 
spillover effect on the others.  
 
 
 The chapter argues that singularly or collectively the negatives effects from oil resources breed 
new social relations which financially empower those who were able to gain access to 
petrobusiness. However, gaining access to oil resources is achieved through so many means, of 
which adopting violent struggles strategy reigns supreme. Therefore, in more concrete terms, 
oil resources with its financial largess brought about visible inequalities among the people, thus 
setting them against each other as they struggle for the scarce farming land or fishing waters, 
financial benefits, employment or compensations from oil companies.  
 
The chapter further argues that the effects of oil resources increases as oil production grows 
and over the years was greeted by non-violent protestation and grievance by the oil 
communities but were suppressed by oil MNCs using many “divide and rule” tactics, such as 
financially inducing vocal members of any aggrieved oil community or awarding contracts to 
such parties to gain their support against their communities. The aftermath of these acts were 
the various intra-communal violent struggles that occur especially where oil resources benefits 
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such as compensation were involved. However, these unchecked and suppressed grievances 
gave room to other forms of violent and criminal expressions. Incidentally, these violent 
agitations and the need to gain access to oil resources opportunities or to get benefits from oil 
resources resulted in the growth of various forms of greed, criminality and militancy in the late 
part of 1990s and into the year 2000s in these oil village  communities.  
 
These violence and criminalities which were expressed in forms of illegal oil bunkering, 
hostage taking and outright militancy are spearheaded mainly by “youths”. They cite years of 
alienation and deprivation from their sources of livelihoods and negative effects of oil activities 
on their environment by petrobusiness as the major reason behind their actions. Based on this, 
the next chapter discusses the struggle for leadership and power in these communities and 
accesses the extent to which oil resources influence the quest for power in oil village 
communities, in the bid to gain access to oil resources opportunities.  
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                 CHAPTER SEVEN 
LEADERSHIP AND POWER STRUGGLES IN THE OIL 
VILLAGE COMMUNITIES 
 
7 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter examines the violent struggles for leadership and power in the oil village 
communities in Nigeria. It critically investigates the extent to which oil resources have 
influenced the nature of politics, leadership and power struggles in these communities, using 
the theoretical and analytical framework developed in Chapter three. The chapter provides 
empirical data based on interviews, FGDs and other secondary data to examine the influence of 
oil resources on the nature of leadership and power struggles in oil Village communities in 
Nigeria. Based on this, the key question guiding the investigation and analysis is: To what 
extent have oil resources influenced the nature of politics, leadership and power struggles in 
oil village communities? The chapter has five sections including the introduction and 
conclusion sections.  
 
7.1 The Changing Nature of Local Governance and Leadership 
Struggles.  
 
In examining power, local governance and leadership struggles in oil village communities, I 
found evidence of changes in the nature of these factors. Firstly, the new social relations 
created by oil resources (as stated in Chapter Six) meant that “Power is oil and oil is power”, 
thereby subjecting all social relations and local governance issues in these communities to the 
whims and caprices of those controlling oil resources (Obi, 2002:97). Evidently, this is because 
the new economic conditions are centered on oil resources, which further alienates the people 
from their original forms of livelihood resulting in the use of violence to gain access to this 
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new socio-economic condition. As Obi(2002:98)opines, “those who monopolize such control 
of oil (violently acquired) will not willingly give it up or transfer it, those who are excluded 
from the ‘spoil of oil’ will do anything to get to power”. Although Obi in the above quotation 
was referring to the role of oil in transition politics in Nigeria, especially at the national level, 
evidence from the field research for this thesis have shown that the same situations exist in 
local oil village communities, as oil resources have so much influence on the nature of local 
and communal leadership and governance.  
 
Thus, oil resources have created a regime of violent struggles for power and authority that are 
used by individuals or groups to gain access to the rents and opportunities associated with it. 
Describing the main motive behind the violent struggles in very plain words, a CDC member 
said that: 
“There is a very strong quest for leadership in our 
communities; everybody wants to be the president-general of 
oil producing community or the president of the “youth” 
council, so that you can actually get what comes with it. Some 
leadership who gets in there enriches themselves instead of 
working for the general good of the community. There is a 
strong quest to become a community leader, because Mr A 
when he was president-general was able to build a house and 
bought two cars, Mr B wants to get into the corridors of power, 
so he too can also do what Mr A did, for himself and members 
of his family” (MN, Male, BaComm, Member CDC, Interview; 
Nov.2007). 
 
What this means is that material and financial benefits and opportunities associated with oil 
resources play a very divisive role in oil village communities.  Again, as echoed by another 
“youth” who participated in focus group discussion:  
                   “Community youth leaders live like kings, whatever they want  
                    from oil companies they get, and in many cases, those who 
                   are not getting form their own groups too”(WC, Male, FGD; 
                   Nov.2007). 
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As illustrated by the theoretical framework described in Chapter Three, oil resources can 
directly fuel structural violence within a community, which could pitch one group against the 
other, and could see such groups fight over leadership and local governance positions. In some 
cases, economic agenda can be very prominent, especially since the communities’ original and 
main socio-economic conditions have being greatly affected by oil resources activities. Judging 
from the nature of the oil industry, especially its demands for skilled employees, the only 
available means of participating in petrobusiness left for the majority of people, in order to 
have access to the benefits of oil resources, is to be in the community or “youth” leadership, or 
to participate in any form of local governance and authority. Again, for petrobusiness, in order 
to secure continual existence and businesses in these oil communities, promotes some forms of 
negative socio-political culture in matters concerning “oil-resources local leadership and 
governance relations” (Field note, Warri, Feb.2008, IGC, 2006; HRW, 2003). A detailed 
analysis of the nature of power and leadership struggle is given below. 
 
7.1.1The Struggle for Community Leadership and Local Governance  
 
Chapters Two and Five of the thesis covered the researcher’s investigation of the various 
effects of oil resources in Nigeria, and the links between oil resources and conflicts. 
Furthermore, this investigation laid the foundation for a study that would provide the missing 
link ignored by the existing literature on oil resources conflict: a study on the effects of oil 
resources violent conflicts in oil village communities. Rather than studying Nigeria’s oil 
resource violent conflicts. As earlier stated, this study is about Nigeria’s oil village 
communities as independent microcosms, rather than as part of Nigeria as an oil producing 
state. However, when drawing inferences from observations of Nigeria as an oil producing 
state, one of the general understandings is that oil resources have influenced its political 
economy – its governance and politics – and in many instances have determined and sustained 
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its regimes (see Karl, 1997; Khan 1994; Le Billion 2001 among others). Watts et al (2004) 
observed that in Nigeria oil rents have historically kept parasitic ruling elite and providing the 
financial resource for the state to secure a sort of political consent among regions and within a 
competitive multi-ethnic state. A further analysis of this submission, as demonstrated by 
empirical evidence from the oil village communities investigated, shows that oil resources have 
equally created and sustained similar parasitic ruling elites and groups in these communities.  
 
Secondly, it is useful to know that this creation runs across all forms of authority –  traditional, 
charismatic and legal, thereby creating a condition that “renders oil a prime target of zero-sum 
politics, or the prize of political wars over the oil patrimony” in oil village communities (Obi, 
2002:97). And, in order to achieve such dominance over ‘who gets what benefits and 
opportunities from oil’, violence and armed struggles are applied to gain power and authority to 
participate in local governance. In giving reasons for such violent struggles for positions in the 
communities, an interviewee (DS) said that: 
They fight to get into such positions due to privileges that come 
to people by virtue of occupying such position, especially oil 
benefits that goes on in such community. They can recommend 
contractors to the oil companies for jobs and they can 
recommend themselves as well. These are some of the gains 
members of the community executive enjoy and with this 
everybody struggles to be elected into it (DS, Male, Warri, PW, 
Interview; Dec.2007). 
 
This in clear terms points to part of the new social relations created by oil resources,  which 
also means that leadership and positions of authority or governance in the communities are 
now highly priced, due to the “oil resource privileges” that are attached to them.  
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Giving support to this finding, another interviewee questioned why there would be no fights for 
power when community leaders or community development executives decided who would get 
the job opportunities given to the community by oil companies. He then stated that:  
                “it all boils down to who gets what; and the bottom-line is the money 
                  that comes from oil, and getting such power or authority determines 
                 everything. In oil communities today, you might be surprised that you have 
                 three different factions contesting for the leadership of such a community”  
               (A.M-O, Male, C/.L, Warri, Interview; Dec2007). 
 
This confirms the explanation that “conflicts over power and material issues tend to be seen by 
all contenders in zero-sum terms” (Gurr, 1994:359). The above submissions clearly answer the 
fundamental question of why the struggles and ‘zero-sumness’ of local governance and 
leadership which exist in the investigated areas, as the answers confirm the assumption that 
these positions bestow unfair advantages when it comes to the distribution of oil rents and 
opportunities among people occupying local governance positions in oil communities.  
 
As argued by structural conflict theorists, (see Chapter Three), the behaviours of people are 
affected or influenced by the unequal distribution of advantages in society, which can result in 
the use of violence by each party in the conflict in order to either maintain or gain an advantage 
or to change a disadvantageous position. In many oil communities, confirmation of undue 
advantages on some members have led to series of violent conflicts (Field note, Warri, 
Feb.2008, IGC, 2006; HRW, 2003).Thus, this assertion demonstrated the deep seated nature of 
the conflict and suspicion, with a particular member arguing that: 
                    “some of our leaders were used by the oil companies. They will be  
                    selected and paid, and are used to blind the rest of the community  
                    as the exploitation goes on.  Now when such a community notices  
                    such deceit, especially the youths, they fight their own leaders, (kill  
                    them, burn down their houses and so on), and questioning them  
                  about their positions and involvement” (MR.E.S, Male, FGD; Nov.2007) 
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A typical example of one of such cases of oil community violence is the celebrated case of 
rivalry between the Ogoni 4 led by Dr Garrick Leton and the Ogoni 9 led by Ken Saro-wiwa. 
The struggle for control of MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people) led to the 
killing of the four Ogoni Chiefs. According to Okonta and Douglas (2003:129):  
“There were also accusation and counter accusation of betrayal, 
and a few Ogoni chiefs were specifically pointed out by angry 
Ogoni youths as collaborators who were working with Shell... 
Some MOSOP activists said they have evidence that a former 
MOSOP President had been compromised by Shell, and they 
rebuffed attempts by a handful of individuals to mediate 
between Leton and Saro-wiwa, with a view to giving Leton his 
old job as President....There was dissension, true, but nothing 
so irreconcilable as to result in the senseless   slaughter of 
Ogoni by a few Ogoni”. 
 
Similarly, I had an interview in Birmingham, UK, with a respondent- D.TM, on finding out 
about the killing of his father, a past chairman of Ugborodo Community trust fund and oil 
village conflict in the community. D.TM said that Mr.S.A.K. Metseagharun(his father)46was 
killed in broad daylight by some people from his community. This is because they feared that 
his election as the chairman of their Community’s trust fund would stop them from 
squandering and embezzling the community’s trust fund. According to him: 
 
Ugborodo community is equally referred to as Escravos; it is a host to 
some oil MNCs including NLNG. It had its community trust set up in 
1968. There was not much fund in the trust account until the 1980s, and 
within the 1980s and 1996, Chief Sandys Omadeli-Uvwo who was the 
chairman had embezzled monies paid to the community as either 
compensation or part of CRS for the community by oil MNCs, without 
other members of the community being aware. However, his inability to 
account for the massive fund paid by NLNG in 1996 raised the 
awareness of fraud in 1998. With this development, a new election was 
conducted in 1998, and my father Mr.S.A.K. Metseagharun became the 
new chairman of the community trust (CDC). The group led by the 
former chairman who had refused to leave the position or recognise my 
father’s leadership, used youths whom they have bought over to disrupt 
                                                 
46 With the consent of the respondent, names were used here, since the data is already in public domain. It is in 
newspapers, journal articles and reports. The family of Mr.S.A.K. Metseagharun had approach Justice Oputa 
Truth Commission set up in 1999 by former President O. Obasanjo, asking for the truth about the involvement  of 
Chevron and Delta state government in the murder of their father, as the alleged killer were immediately given 
local and state positions. 
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and question my father’s leadership. Chief Omadeli-Uvwo and others 
including an uncle of mine, Mr Thomas Metseagharun (whose angry is 
that my father will not allow the money to   be “eaten”) went to court to 
stop the new community’s executives from managing   the trust.  While 
the case was still in court, some of the violent youths bought over by 
Chief Omadeli-Uvwo and his cohorts, on the 23rd of September, 1998, 
just two months into his leadership as chairman of the trust brutally 
murdered my father at Okere road in Warri. Those who were charged 
for his death includes Mr Omamofe -Pirah (who was later appointed the 
chairman of Chevron-   GMoU for Iteskiri) and we are relations. Oil 
resources has brought the culture of dog eat dog in our communities” 
(D.TM, Male, Birmingham, Diaspora oil community Member, 
Interview; March, 2008) 
 
 
Furthermore, it is believed that Mr.Metseagharun’s murder represents a gang up between few 
people supported by the state government and Chevron against Ugborodo community. This is 
judging from the actions of Chevron in recognizing a Community development committee that 
was voted out by the people, and the state government for recognizing the interim leadership of 
this voted out CDC even why some of their members were facing charges for the murder of 
Mr.Metseagharun (Warri Mirror, Nov.30 2007; Faleti, 2000). 
 
Evidently, the two cases cited show how deadly and violent such struggles for leadership and 
power in local community governance can be. In clear terms, the entire violence revolves 
around oil rents and opportunities. This invariably promotes a culture of violence, which is 
easily deployed in getting recognition or gaining the opportunities provided by oil resources. 
For example, opportunities such as decent education scholarships from oil MNCs are award 
mainly to children and wards of local leaders or are used as a means for pacifying those 
considered as ringleaders of communal agitations or struggles. Drawing from literature on such 
practices, Peel (2005:6) writes that: 
“These kinds of schemes raise important questions about 
whether companies use scholarships as means of pacifying 
opposition or winning favours from community leaders. For 
example, according to company records, in 2000-01 Texaco 
funded Bello Oboko, a highly controversial Ijaw ethnic militant 
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and critic of the oil industry, to do a one-year M.Sc course in 
environmental science at the American University in 
Washington. The confidential internal report prepared for Shell 
in 2003 said that ‘scholarships and employment opportunities 
are often presumed divided among people that have 
connections with [Shell] staff”. 
 
As further shown by the nature of these conflicts, the causes of violent struggles for leadership 
and power in these oil communities cannot be separated from the emerging socio-political 
cultures which oil resources have entrenched into the fabric of these communities. (This will be 
discussed fully in Section 7.2). Significantly, these socio-political cultures are well supported 
by oil resources, thereby making local governance positions ‘deadly attractive’ and important 
in gaining access to oil rents and opportunities.  
 
 Again, evidence has shown that the effects of oil resources on power and leadership struggles 
do not only start with the direct fuelling of violent conflicts, but can also start with the eroding 
and diminishing of the importance and presence of traditional authorities. This it carries out 
through routes such as: compromising those in charge of such traditional authorities by 
financially or materially enriching them to the detriment of their subjects. It could also be by 
by-pass such traditionally mandated authorities and raise a new set of ‘leaders’ whom it 
empowers economically through activities such as acting as surveillance for oil installations or 
acting as private security or through outright financial payment. In most of these cases, such 
newly empowered groups either take on a role parallel to that of the traditional authorities or 
oppose most communally agreed decisions taken against their benefactor (i.e. the oil MNCs) 
who they work for(ERA,2000). In some situations of this nature, the “youth” leadership (as we 
will see in Section 7.1.2) becomes the re-enforcing institution by acquiring the mandate of such 
communities. An example is the case of the “youths” of Sangana in Brass Local government 
area of Bayelsa state, who were poised for a showdown with Continental Oil and Gas limited 
(Conoil) over what they described as ‘non-consultation of their traditional ruler and the chiefs’ 
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council by the company in relating with the community... [and] by-passing [of] the chiefs, 
leadership of the youths and other relevant stakeholders to satisfy a few persons in the coastal 
community’ (Vanguard, September 1, 2009b). According to M.T.G, DD (YD), headship or 
leadership of a community becomes an issue of conflict once oil is discovered. “Everyone who 
has any stake in the community, or link to the community starts laying claim to one form of 
authority or another. In many instances, the educated and well-connected ones who may have 
been living outside these communities use their influences to try and become chairmen of the 
community development committees or presidents of the council or leaders of the youths”. 
Such issues result into violent crisis, especially with resistance to such imposition coming from 
the real dwellers in the communities (M.T.G, Male, DD (YD), ND, PH, Interview; 
Feb.2008).As identified in Chapter Six, radical changes especially in the livelihoods of some 
members of the same community, who by their closeness to the oil MNCs have received oil 
resources benefits or rents, can spark off intra-communal conflicts. 
 
7.1.2 The Emergence of Women in Community leadership 
 
 The full emergence of women as part of decision making in the oil village community arose 
out of their participation in the challenges against oil MNCs activities. This is unlike the 
situation were the community’s traditional authorities is dominated by men (often referred to as 
the elders council). Dominant women leaderships which emerged in many of such oil village 
communities became instrumental in mobilizing women to protest against issues that affected 
their sources of livelihood, such as farms and fishing waters. In many cases of oil spills, 
women mobilized themselves against such oil company (Turner and Brownhill, 2004). Such 
mobilization by women created an avenue for them to have a say on how their communities 
were governed by the male dominated community leadership. Tracing their emergence as part 
and parcel of decision making in their communities, a woman activist/Leader said that: 
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              “We were not given any decision making role in the community. Rarely 
               do men allowed us to be present when they take decisions that affect us.  
               Our sons were even superior to us in such meetings. But our persistence  
                and struggle against oil companies and our mediatory role when our men  
               fight over such oil compensation brought us in”(Ms.AL, Female, Warri,  
               WA, Interview, Feb.2008). 
 
 Another Female participant in assess their new found role and struggles against oil companies 
said that:  
                 “It gave us the will to question how we are governed by our elders, 
                  leading to our inclusion into community leadership like community  
                  development Association to represent the women” (VA, Female, 
                  OdComm,Tre-WA, Interview; Nov.2007). 
 
Lending support to the above view, one women leader during her interview said that, “we have 
to fight for our rights because our elders who are our husbands on collecting any compensation 
money go about marrying more wives instead of sharing such money with their families.  They 
forget that we were the ones farming on such lands and using the proceeds in feeding the 
family” (Mrs.N.D, Female, CDC Member, Uzere community, Interview; Jan.2008).Therefore, 
as families suffer from the adverse effects of oil resources, women are mainly affected due to 
their responsibility as home makers. As they struggle against the effects of oil resources, they 
are confronted by “a discriminatory tradition that gives power to men over the affairs of the 
community, thereby allowing men to share money gotten from oil resources compensation” 
among them (OU, Female, Warri, S.Dir. Interview; Dec.2007). However, as oil resources bring 
changes to social relations, “women have seized such opportunity to have a voice in how the 
affairs of their communities were determined”, by joining in the protests against negative 
activities of oil MNCs (Ms.AL, Female, Warri, Women Activist, Interview, Feb.2008). This 
therefore implies that like every conflict, there may be some positive changes from a conflict 
situation. Oil resources may have fuelled structural violence in oil village communities, but it 
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indirectly helped in creating opportunities for women to voice their opinions in the affairs of 
their communities. 
 
7.1.3 Youth dominance in community leadership and local 
governance  
 
Historically, various African societies recognised the role of “youths” in building their 
societies, but their activities were subject to the authority of community rulers and elders.  But 
today in Nigeria’s oil village communities, the case seems to be different, as confirmed by my 
observations, interviews and FGDs. To understand the current domineering presence of 
“youths” in community affairs and leadership, the field interviews and FGDs posed this 
question to informants: What are your views about the role of “youths” in community 
leadership, and is this connected to oil resource activities? Most responses given to this 
interview question confirm that “youths” through their militancy and violent activities, have 
tended to become the determinants of major decisions in most oil village communities, 
especially in relation to oil rents, compensation and opportunities. In short, they are the 
perpetrators of various violent struggles for oil rents and opportunities as demonstrated by 
interviews and FGDs in chapter 6. For example, one of the “youth” associations from an oil 
village community in Delta state, under the banner of the youth wing of the Host Communities 
of Nigeria (HOSCON) made a submission to the Delta State House of Assembly in 2006, 
warning them that: 
“…it would not take lightly the alleged plan by the state house 
of assembly to make certain allocation to local governments in 
the state from the 13% Derivation fund....however, [They] 
advised the lawmakers to expedite action on the establishment 
of the Host Community Commission, whose members shall be 
drawn from oil producing communities based on production 
ratio...“we view this plot as not only an invitation to crisis, but 
a calculated attempt to undermine the constitutional recognition 
of host communities (in oil producing areas) of Nigeria... Any 
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deviation from the status quo is an open invitation to chaos, 
crisis and violence”. The group stressed that it expected 
nothing less than the other oil producing states adhering to the 
constitutional provision...” (Thisday, July 25, 2006). 
 
This goes to show that “youth” associations in the oil village communities have grown into 
formidable forces that are highly influential, especially in matters concerning their 
communities. A participant further stresses his perception of the role of “youths” in community 
leadership and the consequent violence as follows: 
“They [referring to the youths] have taken over everywhere. 
The elders have been made completely irrelevant. It is painful 
but that is the reality. The youths have hijacked the authority 
and power, just to benefit from spoils of oil. It is the youth that 
are strong, they can carry the guns and can generate the 
conflicts, they can kill and they can do anything. So the elders 
just gave way” (DO, Male, Warri, FGD, Feb.2008) 
 
 Further, Ukeje  et al (2002) supporting the above responses wrote that  “ in their bid to fight 
for their rights as individuals, groups and communities, the youths damage oil companies’ 
equipment and machines. They no longer take orders from the elders, and often embark on 
guerrilla warfare, thus, heightening the fear of insecurity in the oil producing communities”. 
Again, another respondent boldly recapitulate youth’s ascent to power and leadership positions 
in oil communities in the following words: 
“…the elders are patients and slow to action, but the youth are 
not. And due to evolution of the society, the youths are getting 
old and have taking over. And for 40 years, they have seen the 
injustice meted on their communities.  The elders believe in 
evolutionary changes but the youths believe in radical changes. 
And after the death of ken saro-wiwa, the tension has risen 
more” (DV, Male, AD (Adm) DES, Warri, Interview, 
Nov.2007) 
 
 
The explanations provided by DO and DV in their interviews, the story by thisday newspaper 
and Ukeje et al, similarly linked the violent conflicts spearheaded by “youths” in the oil 
communities to oil resources, especially to the distribution and acquisition of oil rents and 
opportunities. Significantly, they demonstrated that there is a changing trend in the nature of 
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leadership which is catalysed by oil resources. As supported by evidence, it shows that the “old 
trend”47  upheld by community elders was non-violent and had accommodated all unfavourable 
outcomes from oil resources and petrobusiness with less demand for oil rents and 
opportunities, while the “new trend”48 championed by “youths” is characterised by violence, 
especially physical violence, and constant demands for more oil rents and opportunities for oil 
village communities (Field notes, Warri, Dec.2007). Thus, Ikelegbe (2001:443) describes them 
as follows: 
The youth associations are a more recent feature of civil society 
in the Niger Delta. Expectedly these groups have been very 
vociferous, militant and even violent in their articulation, 
activity and methods. They have been the key players in the 
violent conflicts in the region. The youth groups have been 
more mobilisational in their approach, raised awareness and 
provided a grassroots base for the Niger Delta agitation...  
 
 A critical analysis of Ikelegbe’s observation presents a very salient point that has been notably 
under-discussed in most previous research into oil fuelled violence. There are fewer emphases 
on the failure of the elite and elders of these communities as a contributing factor in the 
involvement and domination of leadership and governance by the “youths”. The failure of the 
elite and elders of these communities to champion the problems of their communities leaves 
this role to the “youths”. In the course of our fieldwork, I found evidence that the “youths” of 
these oil village communities, in trying to raise such awareness of deprivation or alienation 
from the new relations of production, resorted to the use of violence. As they succeeded in 
drawing attention of oil MNCs and the state using such violent approaches, they resorted to 
more violence to get their subsequent demands (Field notes, Warri, Dec.2007;DS, Male, Warri, 
                                                 
47  The old trend means the pre-late 1990 era and a system of local governance which believed in lengthy 
negotiation with no recourse to violence or armed struggle against the oil companies or the Nigeria state. This era 
started with the inception of oil production in commercial quantity and with all the types of violence meted out to 
the people by the Nigerian state and petrobusines (Field note, Warri, Feb. 2008). 
48 The new trend means the present era which is run by the “youth”, especially their philosophy of deploying 
violence and armed struggle to achieve their object. This they easily attribute to their present knowledge of the 
importance of oil resources, acknowledging the influence of education and the mass media, which are unlike what 
their parents knew in former times (Field note, Warri, Feb.2008). 
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PW,Interview; Dec.2007). One of the commonly used violent methods is the seizure of oil 
facility by angry “youths”. Citing grievances ranging from oil spills and claims for 
compensations to issues of  unemployment, the “youths” of an oil community could become 
volatile in order to have their demands met (BBC News, 2007; The Punch, 2007).  
 
However,Adetoun (2005:50) while identifying some recurring factors in the Niger Delta 
conflict, also identified two burning issues that existed between the elite/elders and the 
“youths”. According to Adetoun:  
1. The youths of some communities are pitched against their elders, accusing them of 
duping their communities of various benefits for their own selfish ends. 
 
2. Rival youth groups within a community seek to be recognized as the authentic 
representatives of their people and claim various benefits from the oil companies. 
 
These observations by Adetoun, when critically interpreted, also show that the “youths” are not 
immune from the same leadership struggles that exist within the main community leadership 
and the elite/elders; nor can they escape the struggle over positions in order to gain access to oil 
benefits.  As noted by POI, “the youths are product of their environment and are influenced by 
the factors in their environment. Therefore, struggling for power to acquire such benefits will 
not be an exemption” (POI, Male, Ns, DC, Interview; Feb, 2008). Another participant 
remarked that the violent conflicts among “youth” groups within oil communities cannot be far 
from “rivalry over patronage and rent-seeking, and control of oil resources related business” 
(OU, Female, Warri, S.Dir.ND, Interview; Dec.2007). 
 
In addition to these views and the points raised by Adetounon show why “youths” become 
involved in struggles and rivalry for local leadership and governance;  access to rents and 
opportunities or benefits coming from oil companies operating in their area. With such 
unprecedented inter and intra-communal violent conflicts among “youths”, this evidence 
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suggests that the intentions of these “youths” (just like the intentions of the community elders 
whom they engage in fierce opposition) may also be about getting into leadership and 
governance positions in order to gain access to oil rents, benefits and opportunities. Another 
community elder remarked that although the “youths” have helped in making oil companies sit 
up to their responsibilities but “their rivalry and fight over youth leadership have divided our 
community, because they all want to buy big cars”(Ms.AL, Female, Warri,WA,Interview, 
Feb.2008).Another example of such “youth” leadership rivalry and struggle was reported in 
Thisday newspaper on October 16, 2009: 
Tragedy struck at the venue of a meeting convened to reconcile 
two warring youth factions in Effurun, Ovwie Local 
Government Area of Delta State, when the factional head of 
one of the parties in dispute, Mr Destiny Ogbeni, a.k.a. Yellow-
man, and his younger brother were killed. About a dozen others 
reportedly sustained various degrees of injury, with some of 
them admitted at three hospitals in Warri and Effurun. Thisday 
learnt that the death of the well-known Youth leader came as a 
surprise, because he was stabbed to death at the venue where 
the council chairman had summoned them for a peace talk.....he 
was mobbed by some members of the opposing group who  
accused him of suffering from sit-tight syndrome [refusal to 
leave office]. ... as the situation degenerated and cudgels, 
knives, missiles and guns  were used in the free-for-all [Fight] 
ensued...effort were in top gear by some community leaders, 
including the Ovie of Uvwie,HRH Emmanuel Abe I,  to broker 
peace between the warring youths to avert further bloodshed. 
Uvwie Local Government hosts several oil and gas 
companies... (Thisday, October 16, 2009). 
 
This incident, when examined in the context of the observation noted in the research findings 
as to why “youths” could be struggling for leadership positions, confirms the fears earlier 
expressed. Four major issues come to mind while reading this story: warring “youth” factions; 
violent fights; sit- tight syndrome or refusal to leave office; and the presence of oil and gas 
companies. One can make a connection between the four main points, as one faction wants to 
remain in leadership, in order to retain access to oil benefits, at the expense of those in 
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opposition, who want to assume such leadership position(s) to be able to gain access to oil 
benefits. In the course of these struggles for leadership, violent conflicts occur. 
 
7.1.4 The Influence of Oil resources on Local Politics and Power 
Struggles  
 
The transition and return of Nigeria to full civil rule in May 1999, opened up democratic 
spaces, allowing many more people to participate in civil rule and political governance in many 
ways, such as local councilors, State assembly members etc. However, participation in this new 
democratic experience seem to have been ‘reduced to a struggle over who controls the Nigerian 
states’ share of oil rents’ (Obi, 2002:98).Thus culminating in violent politics which have beset 
the country since the inception of  transition to democratic rule in 1998/1999. What remains a 
puzzle in the whole experience are the high level of armed conflicts and struggles which have 
existed in Niger Delta over the last ten years, especially during and after elections. Solving this 
puzzle involves further questioning the role of oil resources activities, if any, in the conflict.  
The research therefore reflects on this conflict vis-à-vis the role of oil in the entire political 
landscape of Nigeria (as discussed in Chapter Five). However, in order to have a firm 
understanding of the links, it is good to situate the whole sequence within the context of the 
theory adopted for this research, thereby building a clear account of the various factors.  
 
Again, In order to have a deeper understanding of the effect of oil resources on the nature of 
leadership and power struggles in oil village communities, the researcher also felt the need to 
look at the struggle for political power at the formal legal level – that is, in political elections 
within and around the oil village communities. Working from the explanations provided by 
some interviewees in response to the question- “What do you think is the role of oil resources 
in the violent struggle for political positions in your communities/area”, it was possible for the 
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researcher to understand the diverse contributions of oil resources to political violence in this 
region. An interviewee in her assessment of the impact of oil resources on politics and 
elections said that: 
Nigerian politics is ‘winner takes all’ and so is that of the Niger 
Delta. Oil has changed the landscape of politics in the Niger 
Delta, the Niger Delta struggles. There is now too much 
aspiration for elected positions because of recent attention of 
federal government to the area, especially in giving funds to the 
state and local authorities in the area. Government and oil 
companies compensate these communities through their local   
authorities, and those who are elected as their representatives, 
who came in through politics benefits so much, and so politics 
has now become a do or die affair in Niger Delta. Politics is 
now a motivating factor behind violent conflict, as it is easier to 
get into seat of power, thereby gaining access to the unlimited 
fund provided by oil resource via allocations. These positions 
help them to enrich themselves, so to acquire wealth from oil 
resource is either you take to violent struggle and be recognised 
for settlement or you contest for political position and make 
sure you win by any violent means possible (OU, Female, 
Warri, S.Dir-ND. Interview; Dec.2007). 
 
The explanation provided above depicts the influence of oil resources benefits on the struggle 
to win political positions. There are many recorded instances and cases of electoral violence in 
oil village communities since the return to democracy (DS, Male, Warri, PW, Interview; 
Dec.2007; HRW, 2005; HRW, 2008; HWR, 2008a).Again, other participants in the interviews 
and FGD provided similar explanations of the role of oil resources in politics.  According to a 
participant in FGD, “oil money and politics goes together in this area and has led to the 
insecurity and sometimes, even the insecurity is deliberately generated for them to have a 
leverage to negotiate certain things with government...if they can generate enough restiveness, 
they can get political appointments, funds allocation and contracts” (OB, Male, Warri, FGD, 
Feb.2008). This particular argument was further elaborated by another participant in FGD, who 
said that: 
        “local politicians and political leaders instigate such violent conflicts in 
          oil village communities to gain or remain relevant, in order to benefit 
          from situations involving oil companies or the government” (KA, Male, 
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          Warri, FGD, Feb.2008).  
 
Citing a typical example of the influence of oil resources on local politics, an interviewee said 
that: 
For instance councillorship is the fashionable thing in local 
authority areas, considering the funds available at their 
disposal. The councilors serve as negotiators during crisis 
between oil communities and oil companies, and such positions 
provide opportunities for them to gain from oil resources (F.U, 
Male, Warri, ERL; Nov.2007). 
 
This statement above was further buttressed by a claim that “youth” associations and CDC 
members in oil communities form the foot soldiers of local Politicians, and they are used during 
elections to cause mayhem and electoral violence (Ms.AL, Female, Warri, WA, Interview, 
Feb.2008; HRW, 2003). They “transform from representing their communities to representing 
highest paid politicians”, and this has in many cases split such association into different rival 
groups in a particular community (DV, Male, AD (Adm) DES, Warri, Interview; Nov.2007). 
Again, the researcher observed that “youth” association or CDC is a training ground for future 
participation in state politics. Influences and goodwill acquired during headship of a strong vocal 
CDC or violent “youth” organization (especially an oil community with large presence of oil 
operations) are later used to get into the state either as an elected or appointed member of 
government, such as local councilors, Members of State Assembly, State Commissioner, Members 
of Various State board   (Warri Mirror, Nov.30 2007;Field notes, Warri, Dec.2007). For Instance, 
due to his destructive activities and bitter complains by Shell Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria Limited (SPDC) and Chevron Nigeria Limited, Late Eric Igban,the then Youth Chairman 
of Ugborodo Community was appointed a Special Assistant to former Governor James Ibori on 
community affairs. Mr. Thomas Ereyitomi, the then Chairman of Ogidigben/Ugborodo 
Community Development Committee was appointed as a member of the Delta Waterways 
Security Committee set up by Delta State Government(Warri Mirror,Nov.30,2007)This same view 
was re-echoed by another participant while discussing about the power struggle and violent killing 
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in oil communities (D.TM,Male,Birmingham,Diaspora oil community 
Member,Interview;April,2008). 
 
Evidently, there is a link between oil resources, violence and political positions. The 
boundaries between them are further weakened by greed and economic opportunism, especially 
in considering the benefits provided by oil resources. A retired headmistress who is now a 
women leader in her community put it in this manner: 
“Oil control influences political struggle because political    
positions help in influencing decisions in this area” (FUU, 
Female, OkComm, CL. Interview; Nov.2007). 
 
 Describing the violent elections in Rivers State (an oil producing state with many oil village 
communities) in 2007, HRW (2008:11) reported that “Polls in Rivers State have been among 
the most violent and brazenly rigged in the country. In large measure this is because Rivers’ oil 
wealth has increased the financial spoils of political office”. However, this may be contested on 
other grounds, looking at socio-political issues other than oil benefits which could have 
warranted the fierce struggle for political positions. Taking a historical review of Nigeria’s 
political development, as done in Chapter Five, it has been demonstrated to a large extent that 
oil resources have a major role in Nigeria’s socio-political development. Since its discovery, it 
has become the focus of Nigerian socio-political and economic problems, with prolonged 
military rule, corruption at all levels of government and highly rewarded official positions. As  
the  Nigerian state and political offices continue to be highly rewarded, owing to oil resources 
rents and benefits, politicians in and around the oil village communities (as in other  parts of 
the country) continue to deploy all the weapons within their arsenal to win elections. In one set 
of elections, for example “for six weeks in July and August 2007, dozens of people were killed 
and more than 150 injured when armed gangs-competing for a greater share of illegal state 
government handouts-staged pitched battles in the streets of Port Harcourt, the Rivers State 
208 
 
capital. Using automatic weapons, explosives and machetes...” (HRW, 2008a). Armed violence 
during elections in oil village communities is typical of the violent struggle to control state-
resources, which are enormous due to the allocations that accrue to these states from oil 
activities in their domain. This could be seen as a confirmation of a submission by Klare 
(2001:222) that ‘most resource wars of the future will occur in the developing world – notably, 
in countries where the national government is weak or corrupt and where local and external 
actors are competing for political power’. 
 
With the evidences presented, it may be convincing to link oil abundance to specific political 
issues or development like political violence in oil Village communities. Relying on data 
gathered from this research’s field work, it is evident that oil resources re-positioned the socio-
economic conditions of communities where they were discovered. The changes in the socio-
economic conditions in the short or long run facilitate an outbreak of violent struggles to gain 
access to the new economy-oil resources. Therefore, it is not out of place to link the socio-
economic conditions of an oil village community to the nature of its evolving politics, as the 
two are always re-positioned together. For example, available evidence links a major part of 
the proliferation of arms in oil village communities of Nigeria or the Niger Delta as a whole to 
political struggle, as politicians recruit and arm lots of unemployed youths in these 
communities, using them to cause violence in order to get themselves into political positions 
(POI, Male, Ns, DC, Interview; Feb, 2008). The changes in socio-economic conditions, such as 
in the amount of employment and the nature of livelihoods, means that the unemployed, who 
are mostly youths, become vulnerable to electoral violence and crisis, as their services are 
easily recruited for violence. The promises of jobs and other assistance from politicians 
energize them into committing more violence in rigging their supported politicians into office 
(DS, Male, Warri, PW, Interview; Dec.2007). To further buttresses the above opinions by 
participants in the research’s interviews and FGDs, the International Crisis Group said: 
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In 2004, several key Ijaw and Itsekiri militants were appointed 
to local and state government positions. In 2006, President 
Obasanjo’s government reserved an oil block drilling license 
for a company linked to members of the Federated Niger Delta 
Ijaw communities (FNDIC), which actively coordinated and 
led Ijaw fighters during the deadly conflicts in 1997, 1999, 
2003. Shell has also admitted giving service contracts to 
FNDIC members (ICG, 2006:2). 
 
This shows that violent struggle and militancy are readily rewarded with either political 
appointments or outright benefits from oil resources, especially where it is perceived that such 
rewards will promote the continuation of petrobusiness. The evidence adduced in support of 
the argument advanced in this section of the chapter further shows the effects of oil resources 
on politics and power struggles, and it is of varying and interlinking sorts.  
 
On the whole, it was evident that to analyse and understand the violent conflict situation in the 
oil village communities requires the application of structural violence approach, while drawing  
support from environmental conflict theory and greed vs. grievance in  providing  adequate 
explanation of the cause(s) of the conflict. For example, in analysing the effects of oil resources 
on local politics and power struggles, it is obvious from available data such as KA (Male, 
Warri, FGD) on local politicians fuelling conflicts and Warri Mirror (2007) on appointment for 
violent “youth” leaders. Therefore oil resources have empowered those who have had access to 
them, whether through legal or illegal means. Such financial and material empowerment, which 
had restructured social relations in communities (according to the structural conflict theory), 
means that those who have access to oil resource benefits are more financially capable of 
standing for office in elections. Again, the greed and opportunism are able to demonstrate that 
the economic and material benefits from oil remain the one major driving force behind violent 
conflicts as profited by political leaders (IGC, 2006). As the majority of people living in the 
communities continue to experience various forms of socio-economic restructuring due to the 
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presence and abundance of oil, they are further thrown into poverty and loss of livelihoods, 
which leave them scrambling for political and other leadership positions in order to gain access 
to the benefits of oil.        
 
7.2 Oil Resources and the Emerging Socio-Political Culture 
 
 
Critically assessing the nature of the Nigerian state vis-à-vis its socio-political culture, it is 
evident from available data the research looked at in chapter 6, 7 and part of chapter 8, that the 
country’s chronic underdevelopment is an issue arising from its socio-political culture because: 
The country have made so much money from oil and so much 
is claimed or believed to have been released for development, 
but you turn around without seeing what the money is used for. 
The money has ended up in private pockets of those entrusted 
with its management or execution of the project for public 
goods. Public service today is about ‘eating’ the oil money 
(A.M-O, Male, C/L, Warri, Interview; Nov.2007). 
 
 
What this shows is that the presence of oil resources has helped to institutionalise a socio-
political culture of bad governance. Nigeria’s more than 50 years of production and 
commercial exportation of oil, instead of promoting economic development and other forms of 
good governance, have created a culture of massive corruption, embezzlement of public funds 
(of which 80 percent come from oil resources) and all other forms of socio-political and 
economic behaviours that work against development. With oil resources forming such a large 
part of the state’s earnings, “the state has increasingly become a magnet for all facets of 
political and economic life, consuming the attention of traders, contractors, builders, farmers, 
traditional rulers, teachers, as much as that of politicians or politically motivated  
individuals...”(Joseph,1987:1).  The persistent struggle to profit from oil-resources-funded 
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political and public offices, or to have share of the “National cake”49 as  it is commonly known 
in Nigeria, remains the major contributory factor to the violent struggles over leadership 
positions both in the formal–legal authorities and in the traditional authorities (especially where 
funded by the state) in Nigeria. Furthermore, to have a share of the National cake implies “to 
exploit an office of the state” or any informal authority linked to the state or oil resources, to 
the benefit of the occupier (Joseph, 1987:1). This therefore has been the trend of political and 
traditional governance in Nigeria, especially since after the unprecedented increase in the 
government’s earning from oil rents in the 1970s. Interestingly, oil village communities’ legal 
formal and traditional authorities are not exempted from this socio-political cultures and 
behaviours of endemic corruption, embezzlement, mismanagement of public funds, clientelism 
and patrimonial approaches to governance and public offices. 
 
7.2.1 Prebendalism, Neo-Patrimonial Culture and the Distribution of 
Oil Benefits and Opportunities 
 
According to Joseph (1987:1), clientelism and prebendalism are the ‘two fundamental elements 
of the socio-political system which affect and often determine the allocation of public goods in 
Nigeria’. A Peace worker in his interview captured the scenario in this form: 
The community development associations embark on 
development projects that are not people-oriented but  just one 
which will enrich them and their associates. There have been 
instances were oil communities fought over the type of 
development projects to be sited because their  executives have 
styled the projects to enrich themselves without considering 
what the entire community wants (DS, Male, Warri, PW: 
Interview; Dec.2007). 
 
                                                 
49 National Cake refers to public office or any form of participation in governance which is bank rolled by the 
Nigerian state. In this case, the elected or selected officers managing the affairs of the people see their office or 
appointment as an avenue for personal enrichment (Field note, Warri, Feb.2008). 
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This assumption is further supported by a community liaison officer with oil MNCs, who 
recalled how their meeting with a community development committee (CDC) degenerated into 
a free for all fight because the community “youths” invaded the meeting to beat up their leaders 
who incidentally were negotiating to have the construction of local drainage giving to them 
than to reputable construction company (BE, Male, PH, CRO(SP), Interview; Feb.2008).  As 
noted in many  cases, after an MOUs  is drawn up between the oil communities and oil 
companies, “apart from the fact that most of these awards were annexed by a few individuals, 
contracts awarded were either not executed at all, or they were shoddily executed ’ by such 
communities’ CDCs”(Faleti,2000:12). 
 
Evidently, many of the projects and programmes executed in some of “these communities do 
not guarantee sustainable development but to enrich families and cronies of the people either 
appointed or elected to administer the public goods” on behalf of such oil communities (DS, 
Male, Warri, PW, Interview; Dec.2007).Drawing insights from the above submission, it can be 
argued that the existence of these cultures in oil village communities and Nigeria in general is 
guaranteed by oil rents. Soliciting further support from literature, Ross (2001:356) argues that 
“oil does greater damage to democracy in poor states ..., and a given rise in oil exports will do 
more harm in oil poor states…” This further implies that a rise in oil exports means a rise in oil 
activities in the oil village communities, which will ultimately result in a rise in the generation 
of rents and thereby lead to a rise in violent struggles to control and personalise oil rents paid 
to, or to attempts by community leaders to distribute oil benefits or opportunities to the 
advantage of their families and friends. This can also explain why there are fierce struggles for 
power and leadership positions, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The alleged killing of Mr 
S.A.K. Metseagharun for the fear that his headship of Ugborodo trust fund will mean that the 
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CDC will become accountable to the people, show how deep the struggle to control such oil 
fund has become (see section 7.1.1). 
 
For instance, it was evident that oil resources promoted this kind of socio-political culture and 
violent conflicts through unequal distribution of oil benefits and opportunities among oil 
village communities. AS (a “youth” executive) and TK in second FGD acknowledged that if  a 
community discovers that the number of barrels of oil which are extracted from its land is 
higher than those extracted from their neighbours, but their neighbours are more highly 
favoured in terms of oil benefits and opportunities, they resort to violent attacks on the 
neighbouring community, especially if the person in charge of such distribution hails from the 
favoured community(AS, Male, OkComm,YE, Interview; Nov.2007; TK, Warri,FGD, 
Nov.2007). This statement was also acknowledged by HRW (2003) report on Warri Crisis.  In 
many instance, Communities have gone to war against each other over amount of oil 
production, rewards and appointment (Vanguard, January 12, 2008). 
 
Incidentally, in some instances where the two rival communities are from two different ethnic 
groupings, this has been described as ethnic-related conflict or being fuelled by ethnicity; 
available evidence seem to disprove that  as many of the cases are from the same ethnic group. 
Ikelegbe (2005:209) sees it first as the reason behind “the acute struggle for the control of 
resources, which increases vulnerability to conflict, violence and war”. Ikelegbe further 
submits that, “the struggle by rulers, counter elites and merchants for access to such resources 
for accumulation and political consideration through patrimonialism, has meant increasing 
appropriation and privatization through exclusive contracts with  foreign firms, corruption, 
external and indigenous commercial network, emergent challenges from the excluded and 
ensuing conflicts and violence”(2005:209).  This system of selective financial and material 
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empowerment further polarizes and restructures existing social relations, leading to more 
inequalities and structural conflicts. 
 
 A further analysis of above evidences show that, with the subjection of oil benefits and 
opportunities to the rules and dictates of prebendalism and neo-patrimonial distribution, the 
likelihood of oil benefits and opportunities reaching all concerned becomes difficult or 
unattainable. In the course of the inequality that this generates, the left-out groups are 
compelled to resort to greed, criminal opportunities and violence to gain from oil resources. 
Secondly, oil resources benefits and opportunities distributed through a prebendal and neo-
patrimonial culture restructure existing social relations by empowering some members of the 
community who have access to them more than others. In the long run, it leads to revolts and 
violence in the community. 
 
 
In examining some of the causes of violent conflicts and struggles in oil village communities, I 
found evidence of the existence of prebendalism and patrimonial culture in the distribution of 
oil rents, benefits and opportunities. Evidence from interviews, FGDs, observation and 
documentary review  indicated a high rate of ‘personalisation’ of common wealth or oil rents, 
benefits and opportunities to serve the interest of self, family, friends or one’s own community, 
to the detriment of others who might have a claim to the common wealth. There is also a 
general consensus among respondents interviewed and the supporting documentary evidence 
that the deployment of violent conflict was all part of the quest to control and maximise oil 
rents, benefits and opportunities.  
7.2.1 The Culture of Violence and “Settlement” 
 
Violence and settlement are today a major part of the oil business in Nigeria. In short, they 
have become a culture as well as a means of gaining access to oil benefits and opportunities.  
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Using fieldwork interviews and FGDs, violence and settlement cultures can be approached 
either from the angle of individual efforts, in which case ringleaders are selected by 
petrobusiness  and settled; or from the angle of oil  village communities, in which case 
demands made by a community are seen as the grievance of the entire community which needs 
to be satisfied. In either of these cases, the use of   “violence is seen as the surest means of 
getting the attention of the oil companies”, and once an individual is identified as the master-
mind of violence against an oil company, he or she is up for settlement (POI, Male, Ns, DC, 
Interview; Feb, 2008). In the same vein, any community that is perceived as becoming violent 
or known to be violent will always have their complaints quickly dealt with (DS, Male, Warri, 
PW,Interview; Dec.2007). In line with this assumption, oil village communities that use 
peaceful approaches to seek redress or in making demands are easily neglected until they resort 
to violent struggle (B.S.I, Male, OdComm, (CDC) Spk, Interview; Dec.2007). 
 
The culture of violence has become part and parcel of these oil host communities, especially 
since the late 1990s (Francis, et al, 2011).As explained by a “youth” leader that:  
             “we now know that each time we close or shut down a flow station, 
                or a gas plant, and they lose money, they hurriedly attend to us”  
                (EOO, Male, UgComm,YL, Interview; Jan. 2008).  
 
This view seems to be in agreement with Omeje’s position on the centrality of this culture of 
violence and settlement. According to him, “the societal processes of oilification are part and 
desperate responses of local people to the institutionality and dynamics of petro-politics and 
petro-accumulation” and the only assured means of ensuring access to the benefits of oil 
resources is violent conflict (2005:32). 
 
A community leader interviewed during my fieldwork gave more insight of into this culture of 
violence and linked it to the policies of oil companies. He said that: 
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                   “oil companies play some kind of games by developing a community, 
                    if that  community is using violence, if they could fight and threaten  
                  them, and make trouble, they will attend to them, but the ones that are 
                   peace-loving are usually abandoned, until they use violence or make 
                    trouble” (CBH, Male, OlComm, CL, Interview; Jan.2008). 
 
Confirming the above position, a participant in FGD boldly captured the establishment of 
violence as a mechanism for getting oil benefits and opportunities in the following words: 
Some ethnic groups and communities tend to be violent, and in 
doing so, we have come to see that violent actually pays, 
because if a community or ethnic group does not get what it 
wants it resort to violence to get it. I don’t stand corrected, I 
know what I am talking about here, The Ijaws [The biggest 
ethnic group among the oil Village communities], are more 
violent in Delta state, and when they go rampaging and violent 
over what they are entitled to, they get it. But some other 
communities who are very calm, who are taking dialogue in the 
face of aggressive provocation, do not get what they expect 
(E.O, Female, Warri, FGD; Nov. 2007). 
 
Again, in a situation that is described as unfortunate, the rise in “youth” leadership as discussed 
earlier in this chapter has aided this culture of violence, “as youths are the main perpetrators of 
these violent and armed struggles against oil activities and companies, may be due to 
unemployment” (OU, Female, Warri, S.Dir(ND). Interview; Dec.2007). 
 
Similarly, to summarizes the push and pull nature of violence and settlement in the oil village 
communities drawing from literature, Ibeanu (2002:165) wrote that: 
Thus, even as greater amounts of money are sunk in the Niger 
Delta as a means of pacifying the region, even greater conflicts 
have resulted.  The best that has been achieved is a matrix of 
concentric circles of payoffs and rewards built on blackmail 
and violence. The closer a person is to the center, the greater 
his/her capacity to blackmail oil companies and therefore the 
greater his/her payoff. In time, members of the raucous inner 
circle fade away in a whimper and silence as a new core of 
vocal “community leaders” emerges: more blackmail, more 
payoffs. Consequently, conflicts and violence are never 
eliminated, they are only recycled through new purveyors.  Yet 
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in all this, the true representatives of the people are 
systematically sidelined and silenced, most times violently. 
 
This submission by Ibeanu also quietly  explains the reasons for the struggle for leadership and 
power in these communities, as settlement and oil benefits become the driving force, and once 
a lone voice or a gang is settled, another person or group emerges and wants to be settled. It is 
significant to note that today in Nigeria, the oil village communities are perceived as a very 
violent area, not just by the Nigerian state and petrobusiness, but among the states that make up 
Nigeria. Militancy, “youth” restiveness and all forms of agitations have become part of the life 
of the people.  
 
In addition to the above is the existence of oil-linked affluence for a few which, from my 
observation, comes from association with petrobusiness and from striving by all means 
possible by those unable to gain such access to oil resources, who subsequently take to other 
forms of oil–linked illegalities such as oil bunkering and kidnapping, in order to gain from the 
oil resources (Field note, Warri, Nov.2007). 
 
    7.3 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter analysed and explained the influence of oil resources in the struggle for 
leadership and power in oil village communities. In addressing the question: To what extent 
have oil resources influenced the nature of politics, leadership and power struggles in oil 
village communities, the chapter dealt with the question in two sections: first by examining the 
changing  nature of political and leadership struggles in village communities; and secondly by 
examining oil resources and  the emerging socio-political cultures. 
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The findings indicated that the changing nature of political and leadership struggles in the oil 
rich communities are greatly influenced by the rents, benefits and opportunities which flow 
from oil resources. Politics are now characterised by struggles for community leadership and 
local governance, “youth” dominance in community leadership and governance, and violent 
struggles in elections and the distribution of political positions. Compared to the power 
struggles at state level, the struggle at community level is to participate in local governance, but 
is similarly ‘oilified’ by benefits and opportunities. Violent conflicts are ignited as people 
fights to participate in local governance or to serve as a local representative of their 
community.  
 
   Furthermore, the chapter explained that as more people are alienated from “oil benefits”, the 
need to resort to violent conflicts increases, especially where there are clear indications that 
people based on their closeness to petrobusiness are seen as benefiting from oil resources by 
using their position. This chapter also argues that these positions of power and leadership 
influenced by oil resources promote some particular forms of social relations and political 
cultures which enable managers of collective goods (like oil rents and oil-linked opportunities) 
derived from oil resources to appropriate the benefits to their individual advantage (see the 
arguments in Chapter Five). Therefore judging from the available evidence, the outcome of these 
situations is the fierce quest for leadership positions and power in oil communities, all with the 
intention of managing and benefiting from either the oil rent or other opportunities provided by 
oil resources. 
 
The evidence showed that emerging socio-political cultures also serve as factors which fuel and 
promote the various violent struggles and conflicts over leadership and local governance 
positions. Thus, an aftermath of a restructured socio-economic conditions and social relations are 
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the emergence of culture of violence. Therefore, from the evidence that this research collected, I 
conclude that, ‘the nature of politics, leadership and power struggles in oil village communities 
has been seriously influenced by oil-resources-related-activities’. Next Chapter will look at the 
roles of Nigerian state and oil MNCs in fuelling oil resources conflicts in oil village 
communities. 
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                       CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE NIGERIAN STATE, OIL COMPANIES AND THE 
MANAGEMENT OF PROBLEMS FROM OIL RESOURCES 
 
8 Introduction 
 
This chapter is concerned with the management of oil related problems, socio-economic 
opportunities and interests of oil village communities by the Nigerian state and oil MNCs. The 
chapter aims at examining whether the nature and patterns of such management exacerbated 
violent conflicts in the oil village communities. This addresses the final sub research question: 
“Has the style of management of oil resources problems, socio-economic opportunities and 
interests of oil communities by the Nigerian state and oil MNCs contributed to violent conflicts 
in the oil village communities, and if so, in what ways?” The examination and analysis of 
various policies and programmes of the Nigerian state and oil MNCs will help me in 
addressing this sub research question, and will be carried out using data gathered from primary 
sources (Interviews, FGDs and observation), and secondary sources comprising of newspapers, 
magazines, press releases, annual reports, books etc.  
8.1 Overviews of Various Major Management Failures  
 
There are so many dimensions to understanding and examining violent conflicts in oil village 
communities. However, negative changes in socio-economic conditions which imply loss of 
source of livelihoods, environmental scarcity, poverty and inequalities in the distribution of oil 
resources benefits and opportunities have remained major factors which exacerbate violent 
situations relying on available data gathered from the field.   
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However, this section tries to explain that the emergence of these oil related conflicts are also 
due to the failure of the state and oil MNCs to manage the changes brought by oil presence 
mentioned above. For instance, “the social effects of environmental scarcity are often 
insidious... and can in turn lead to clashes between ethnic groups and to social rebellion” 
(Homer-Dixon, 1998:87). My observation during my fieldwork and as supported by data in 
chapters six and seven, show that the new socio-economic conditions from oil resources often 
fuel violent struggle among groups who subsequently fight over the new economy (Field note, 
Warri, Dec.2007).  This according to HRW (2002:9) is also because: 
                             “The presence of the oil companies in the Niger Delta exacerbates  
                             communal tensions of the type seen across Nigeria. The weakness 
                             of conflict resolution structures—whether the courts, responsible 
                             elected and appointed state officials, or the law enforcement agencies 
                             —means that many disputes in Nigeria are settled violently that 
                             could have been resolved through peaceful means”. 
 
Unfortunately, as indicated by HRW, the Nigerian State and oil MNCs seem unprepared for 
outcomes arising out of oil resources activities. A participant in the interview said that: 
                    “…every community [oil village communities] sees the oil produced in  
                    their community as their own too! With their land involved, they will 
                    do anything to gain from it” (VM, Male, OdComm, YL,interview,Dec   
                    2007).  
 
Another participant in the second FGD angrily demanded that: 
                       “If our land is taken over for oil, and we also suffer the effects of oil 
                       Operations, should we then be chasing them [oil companies] for our 
                       benefits?” (TK, male, Warri, FGD; Feb.2008). 
 
   
Drawing support from literature, Ikelegbe (2005:216) opined “there is so much to fight for in 
the oil economy. There are enormous legal and illegal resource opportunities, particularly in 
terms of benefits from the oil companies.” Especially, where there are rooms to gain from such 
benefits, every strategy is deployed to enable it work. Thus, “in the face of protracted 
grievances of neglect and injustice, compounded by the inability of the rentier state to make 
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significant sacrifice to uplift the Niger Delta region, the oil village communities are compelled 
to resort increasingly to the use of violence”, against one another in a bid to gain access to oil 
benefits and opportunities(Omeje, 2005:332). It is worthy of note that it is the violence meted 
on these communities by Petrobusiness that catalyses these armed and violent conflicts 
between and among oil village communities. Drawing further assumptions from interviews 
with bureaucrats working with development intervention agencies and staff of oil MNCs, it 
was evident that some actions, programmes and policies of the Nigerian state and oil MNCs 
which were geared towards ensuring oil exploration and production are triggers of violent 
conflicts among oil village communities. 
 
8.1.1  Communal land struggle and the conflict handling mechanism 
of oil MNCs 
 
In Delta state, little is known or documented about violent land conflicts among communities 
before the discovery of oil in commercial quantity, although it is documented that there were 
existences of land ownership disputes before 1956 in these oil communities (Imobighe et al, 
2002).Unarguably, there have been changes in the nature of the conflicts and increase in the 
level of armed violence engulfing claims for land ownership, going by the various land related 
conflicts in oil village communities(Field note, Warri, 
Feb.2008;DS,Male,PW,Interview;Dec.2007).This happens especially “where such communal 
land is discovered to contain oil or is earmarked for oil exploration activities” (POI, male, Ns, 
DC, Interview; Feb, 2008). Citing Warri as an example (Warri is seen as the centre of 
petrobusiness in Delta state), Imobighe et al (2002:3) stated that “the violent trend... which is a 
new and recent phenomenon in the history of the Warri crisis, goes back to the early 1990s 
while the more recent unabating bloody conflict dates back to March 1997”as communities 
struggles over land ownership.  For instance, the violent conflict in 2001 over ownership of the 
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land where Forcados terminal is located between Odimodi and Ogulagha communities, led to 
the setting up of a panel of Ijaw elders led by Chief Edwin Clark by Delta State Government to 
resolve the conflict. Among the findings of the panel was that “SPDC and its servicing 
companies, especially some of the staff have helped to fan the embers of suspicion, distrust and 
hatred among the two sister communities” (Vanguard, January 12, 2008). Referring to the 
conflict between Odcomm and Ogcomm oil communities, a participant from one of the 
communities said that NA’s (Oil Company) refusal to credit his community with the ownership 
of land where the NA’s facilities  are, is due to instigation from their neighbouring community 
(B.S.I, Male, OdComm, CDC-Spk, Interview; Dec. 2007). 
 
Further examination of land related oil village communities conflicts show that the oil MNCs  
could deliberately adopt an avoidance conflict handling style50, thereby allowing the 
communities to contest for the ownership of such land and fishing water amongst them in 
whichever way or form, while they wait for the eventual winner. During an interview, a senior 
oil MNCs official stated that: 
“We [referring to Oil MNCs] don’t get involve; the claimants 
take themselves to court of law. We don’t go into such piece of 
land that are been contested, we wait for the issue to be 
resolved. We have new technology which allows directional 
drilling, we can drill without going into that piece of land, but 
if for any safety reason, if we need to go into such contested 
land, often what we do is to bring all the contestant together 
and tell them their entitlement for the piece of land, but it will 
be deposited at the court where the contestants have gone to 
prove ownership, and whoever wins will be handed the money” 
(UN, Male, SP-P/H, H-S&P, Interview; Dec. 2007) 
 
 
Consequently, such communities have witnessed and are still experiencing era of communal 
violence due to contestation of ownership of oil prospective land and waters (Vanguard, 
                                                 
50  Luc Reychler (2001) describes the avoidance style of handling conflict as unassertive and uncooperative. The 
party simply withdraws and refuses to deal with the conflict. This style is also called Flight. 
224 
 
January 12, 2008).In adopting avoidance conflict style, MNCs forestalls unity among oil 
village communities, thereby limiting the ability of the communities to engage in a collective 
demand. In some cases, they seem to deliberately fuel the contestation (EOO, Male, UgComm, 
YL, Interview; Jan. 2008). Okonta and Douglas (2003:60) typified efforts at stopping collective 
demands of oil communities by Shell, in which ‘Shell Police’ are given ‘service money’ for 
intelligence gathering, bribing and befriending villagers from oil spill communities. “These 
villagers would then instigate conflicts in the village over competing claims for money, a 
situation Shell would subsequently exploit, claiming that it would not pay any compensation 
since the community was divided on the issue of who would get what”.  Another example of 
failure of oil companies in handling land disputes among communities is the case of Aja-
Omaetan Community of Warri-North Local government. In 2006, the community have to 
petition the then State Governor, James Ibori over “the ownership of Chevrons DIBI oil field 
with the Ogbonbiri Ijaw Community”, claiming that Chevron after 25 years of acquiring the 
area from them (Itskiri villages) for operations suddenly co-opted some Ijaws villages as part 
of the DIBI field operation area even “when they have no geographical link with the field” 
(Vanguard, July 10, 2006).This action from Chevron goes further to re-confirm the claim and 
analysis in Chapter 7.2.3, about the culture of violence and why some communities deploy 
violence to gain recognition and benefits. In this case as shown by a way of further 
explanation, Chevron deciding to include the Ijaw villages in the DIBI field operation area than 
finding other means of resolving the crisis. And this could be to avoid the Ijaw communities 
attacking its oil facilities and possibly the oil workers (Field note, Warri, Feb.2008). However, 
Chevron’s action failed to take cognisance of the predispositions of the action fuelling further 
and future violent communal clashes among the communities, as some communities will see 
their non-violent approach as counter- productive in the struggle for oil benefits and 
opportunities, and will subsequently try the use of violence. 
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It is evident from above data that each community tries as much as possible to demonstrate that 
they are bona-fide owners and original landlords; and could go any length to prove it by 
engaging in fierce struggle for ownership and claims of such contested land. In situations like 
this, as clearly shown by evidence from the field, management of interests of the contending 
communities becomes very important especially before such claims and counter-claims of land 
ownership become violent. 
8.1.2 ‘Divide and Rule’ Policies  
 
The term “Divide and Rule” as commonly used by local oil communities during my fieldwork 
and in some literature, is a strong perception of policies of oil MNCs as being discordant, and 
breeds economic exclusion between or among oil community. This perception may not really 
be an established fact going by the original idea of the term ‘divide and rule’, but owing that 
the policies failed to achieve its objective, and rather helped in fuelling violent conflicts among 
village communities, it was branded a planned policy for causing division among oil village 
communities in order to maintain oil production. 
 As noted in chapters 6, 7 and above, oil village communities resort to the use of violence over 
policies that tend to deny them access to oil resource opportunities and benefits, or policies that 
give more benefits to their neighouring oil communities. Among such policies which oil 
communities regarded as ‘divide and rule’ policies is the designation of some communities as 
‘host community’. This policy confirms some rights and privileges on some communities 
within oil MNCs operational area, while having others left out. This is among one of the many 
policies of oil MNCs that fuelled rivalry and violent conflicts among oil communities in 
Nigeria. Using instances cited by participants during interviews, it was evident that these 
policies were discriminatory, thereby fuelling ferocious and vicious struggles for recognition 
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among communities. Interestingly, the aim of such violent conflicts or struggles is to gain 
access to oil resources opportunities. The research probed participants from oil MNCs to find 
out their criteria for the designation of communities as host community. I asked; “what are 
your parameters for designating a particular community as ‘oil producing or host community’ 
and the next community who shares a common boundary where the oil production takes place 
as ‘non-host community or oil producing”? Explaining the situation, a senior oil MNCs official 
acknowledged thus: 
                       “Our criteria used to be communities which our pipelines traverse,  
                       oil wells, flow stations, terminals and other related oil facilities are 
                       located. But we have since moved away[to cluster communities]   
                       from that type of definition which tended to set one community  
                      against the other” (JJ, Male, MR-PGPA, CHR; Interview; Feb. 2008) 
 
However, a participant in the first FGD acknowledge the removal of the tag ‘host community’ 
on oil communities with large oil operations but not the feeling of marginalization from 
communities with only pipelines and well heads, as they still feel that much benefits are 
accorded to host communities.  The participant said that: 
                     “We feel left-out and marginalized by actions of oil companies, 
                     because the pipelines are still part of their operations. We know 
                     that the communities with big operations wants to have every 
                     benefits to themselves, forgetting us” (OR, Male, FGD;Nov.2007) 
 
Another participant acknowledged the divisive effects of the policy such that: 
                    “those [communities] left out of it do not feel happy, it has led  
                    to suspicion and tension among communities” (C.O.T.,Male 
                    OkComm, interview; Nov. 2007).  
 
 
In many instances, especially where such “communities share a communal land or where there 
were claims and counter-claims over ownership, the resultant host community-rights on the 
eventual winner of the land dispute always fuel inter-communal conflicts”(DS, Male, Warri, 
PW, Interview; Dec.2007). 
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Further analysis of host community labeling bases on how it affects social relations among 
communities, indicates that these policy were mainly concern about continual flow of oil and 
less concern about the social cohesion of the dwellers.  For example, International Crisis Group 
(ICG: 2006b) wrote that; 
“The “host community” system is a clear example of policies 
that have inadvertently exacerbated division....in the absence of 
a stable, reliable, regulatory framework, even rumours about oil 
exploration prospects have on occasions been enough to spark 
deadly conflict”. 
 
 
This policy to a large extent polarised the relative peace that existed in these communities 
because the oil MNCs considered only the direct impact of their operations. Impact such as 
environmental degradation, oil spills or cases of land acquisition in which they (oil MNCs) are 
obligated by law to pay compensation to the affected communities or parties are prioritized as 
serious. Again, the policy of designating communities as ‘host communities’ adopted by the oil 
MNCs neglected the negative social impact of oil business industry (such impact as rise in cost 
of housing, increase in the cost of living, increase in the struggle to control the local economy, 
increase in population, promotion of prostitution and violent robbery) on the entire area which 
includes the “non-host communities”. 
 
According to some participants, the “host-community” policy is part and parcel of the ‘divide 
and rule policy’ deployed by the oil MNCs to keep the oil village communities from having a 
common front against the ills of petrobusiness. Another participant in the first FGDs cited a 
case of two communities who share common boundary in W-S-W Local Government. SP 
which is the operating oil MNCs designated one of them a “host community” over a piece land 
which surprisingly is in-between these communities, thereby favouring one above the other. 
Subsequently, this discriminatory policy led to a violent inter-communal conflict between the 
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two communities (E.O, Female, Warri, FGD; Nov. 2007). Furthermore, another participant 
complained that:  
                  “SP deliberately omits the names of some communities in the production 
                  map (A map that shows all oil wells and oil communities) in order to shy 
                  away from Corporate Social Responsibilities”(OT, Male, GbComm,YL, 
                  interview; Nov.2007). 
 
In this situtions,  tension, envy and suspicion are built up among communities, especially 
where one community is favoured by an oil MNCs and the neighbour gets nothing, this could 
ensues inter-communal communities (H.O, Male, UgComm, YA/ Sec, interview; Jan.2008). 
Again, oil MNCs hardly regards as their social responsibility the spill-over effects of 
environmental damage on neighbouring non-host communities (F.U, Male, Warri, ERL, 
interview; Nov.2007). There are known cases such as the Odimodi and Ogulagha communities 
where such situations have in turn sparked off communal violent conflicts between these two 
sets of communities. Especially where the non-designated communities have been badly 
affected by these impacts and had received no form of compensation for it, while their 
neighbours are enjoying the benefits of oil resources because they host the operational base or 
have oil wells within their domain(Vanguard, January 12,2008). 
 
Furthermore, the policy of designating some communities as “host communities” meant that 
such communities are well privileged in terms of receipt of oil benefits and opportunities such 
as compensation, financial and non-financial incentives like employment opportunities from oil 
MNCs, which have contributed to various intra-communal violent conflicts. This led to 
ChevronTexaco issuing a statement that its aid policies, especially the “host communities” 
development assistance had helped in fuelling violence, as it is “inadequate, expensive and 
divisive”. It further acknowledged that “The system of designating some communities as host 
communities left those not designated feeling alienated and underprivileged, inadvertently 
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leading to or adding to the causes of conflicts among communities”(IRIN,July21,2006). 
Although, ChevronTexaco announced that it was going to revamp the aid policy by using a 
development assistance that targets “cluster of communities in its operational area with 
distinctions”, what it never considered is that the new policy would further increase the 
struggle for leadership in these cluster communities. It will further develop the communities 
into rentier communities and increase the culture of rentier psychology, and selective 
empowerment fuelled by its old aid policy.  
 
Therefore as discussed in chapter 7, the contributions of these policies such as host community 
policy to violent struggle for leadership and local governance positions are very enormous. As 
people fight over positions of authority to be able to gain access to oil benefits coming to host 
communities or to the cluster communities.  HRW in February 2005, on the violent conflict in 
River State  detailed that: 
“Customary and statutory payments are also made to “host 
communities,” or those who own the land and fishing grounds 
where drilling or other activities take place. Designation as a 
host community thus brings significant benefits in the form of 
compensation, community development funds and promises of 
labour and security contracts. The oil companies negotiate such 
agreements and contracts with individuals whom they identify 
as community representatives, notably the top traditional 
leaders or chiefs. These policies have fueled inter-communal 
conflict by funneling large quantities of money to the tribal 
leaders, many of whom fail to share the benefits with their 
community. As traditional leadership positions became more 
lucrative and the tribal elders more powerful, the competition 
to occupy them intensified. Beginning in the mid 1990’s, 
prominent local leaders competing to assume top chieftaincy 
positions in an area recruited youth leaders and provided them 
with money and weapons to assist in their often violent 
struggles to control villages.Such violent clashes occurred in 
several villages…”(HRW, 2005). 
 
What was evident from this observation by HRW was that communities designated as “host 
communities” are thrown into series of violent struggles and conflicts over means of gaining 
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access to such oil benefits and opportunities. With occupying local leadership and authority 
providing access to oil benefits, the struggle for such positions further heighten the violence in 
the oil communities due to policies which tended to economically empower a selected few. As 
also observed in chapter 6, such policies by oil MNCs restructures existing socio-economic 
conditions in oil communities or within the region, and has further been noted as promoting 
inequalities leading to violence. Applying the case within the context of our theoretical 
framework, it would be situated within structural conflicts theory, as dwellers of particular 
designated community or in the case of two neighbouring communities are suddenly drawn 
into violent conflicts because the oil policies tend to discriminate some of them, bringing 
inequalities and empowering only a selected few.  
 
However, during my fieldwork, neither the oil industry regulator (DPR), nor any of the oil 
MNCS could provide me with a copy of the list of communities designated as ‘Host 
communities’. The secrecy made it difficult for the researcher to identify such communities 
contained in DPR list, leaving me to rely on physical presence of oil activities and claims from 
communities. This same incident was encountered in one of the development agencies, where I 
could not get list of the benefitting communities or criteria for labeling such communities oil 
producing communities. However, the researcher was told that the commission cannot 
ascertain that, and considering that the impact of oil resources is on direct and surrounding 
communities. Therefore  they have decided to treat all communities as oil bearing/producing. 
However, this response seem questionable to the researcher as he had previously witnessed two 
incidents of protestations and violent revolts at the headquarters of the commission by 
communities who claimed they were left out in their development programmes and projects 
(Field note, Warri, Nov.2007). 
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8.2 Appointments and Economic Opportunities:  
This submission below opens up the issue of primitive accumulation which in this situation is 
supported by oil resources.  Karl (1997:138) writes that: 
“One of the great ironies of petro-state is that administrative 
reform, so often put forward to correct inefficiency, instead can 
become a mechanism for the further deterioration of state 
capacity. The reason is evident: because the petro-state is the 
center of accumulation, reform has the potential for setting up 
different filtering processes for organised interests”  
 
 In this case, the Nigerian state is firstly, very committed to promoting the continual 
exploration and production of oil. To achieve this, it establishes mechanisms which help in 
sustaining this very objective of increased and continual oil production. These mechanisms 
which come in the forms of intervention agencies were to specifically help in bringing 
infrastructural and socio-economic development within the oil producing area and as well as 
reducing the impact of oil resources on the communities.  
 
8.2.1 Appointments of members of NDDC  
 
This sub-section takes a look at the appointment of members of Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) as a support to the submission by the preceding section. Following the 
return to civil rule in 1999 and the consequent outbreak of violence in most oil village 
communities, the Nigerian state established a new interventionist development agency to cater 
for the lopsided development and the impact of oil resources activities experience by the nine 
oil producing states, otherwise classified as the Niger Delta region. Citing Chief Ufot Ekaette51, 
“The various Nigerian governments have never shield away from its responsibility to cater for 
the oil bearing communities, going by array of interventionist agencies it has so far put in place 
                                                 
51  Chief Ufot Ekaete was Nigeria’s first Minister of Ministry of Niger Delta. He had between April 1999 to April 
2007, served as the Secretary to the Federation under the government of Chief Obasanjo. He was also a Permanent 
Secretary at the Federal civil service from1975 to1979, was among the Permanent secretaries dubbed the “Super 
Perm Sec”. 
232 
 
to protect and promote the interest and well-being of the people of the Niger Delta” (Thisday, 
April 24, 2009). Even though this is true, judging from the history of  previous agencies set-up 
by  former  administration at various point, what Ekaette never mentioned was that the 
agencies  did not serve the interests of the majority of the dwellers in these oil communities, 
but the interest of a selected few. While explaining to the researcher that oil communities are 
not consulted over the choice of representatives, a participant held that: 
                                 “We have no hand [no influence] over their appointment… 
                                 We know why they are fighting for jobs, is surely not for the 
                                 development of this place but for their pockets” (Ms.AL,  
                                 Female, Warri, W/A, Interview, Feb.2008). 
 
Another participant submitted that the fight over positions in NDDC are because of the amount 
of money which the people appointed can get from the commission, such is the money that “he 
or she can never be poor again” (DO, Male, Warri, FGD, Feb.2008). Consistent with this 
participant’s view, is this report that “personal wealth and political mileage are among the 
principle attractions of the position. Anyone appointed can become as wealthy as he [or she] 
can stretch his [or her] ambition and greed” (Vanguard, June 3, 2009). Describing the agency, a 
participant in second FGD said that: 
                            “NDDC is not for the local oil communities, but for contractors, 
                            politicans, traditional rulers and influential people in Niger 
                            Delta. They the one asking youths of communities to either  
                            protest or fight their neighours, with the claim that the quantity 
                            of oil and gas from their land is  the highest, which makes the 
                            community responsible for producing  the chairman or member 
                            of the NDDC board”(BE, Male, Warri FGD; Feb. 2008). 
  
Evidently, concerns over the selection of representatives or contestation into the board of the 
agency could be because of the financial gains. As explained in chapter seven, getting into a 
leadership or representative position provides a good opportunity to gain access to oil resource 
benefits. The issue of who represents the area in the board has thrown most communities into 
violent conflicts, as communities struggle over who is to produce the representatives. In most 
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situation of a contest, as express by a participant and as observed by the researcher, the onus of 
making such appointment do not lie with the oil village communities, but with the federal 
government who in most instance use such opportunity to compensate their party members 
who are either loyal party men or women or who may have lost an elective election (Ms.AL, 
Female, Warri, W/A, Interview, Feb.2008; Field note, Warri, Nov.2007). This is done in 
regardless of the fact that the government appointed representatives is not the choice of the oil 
village communities, or in some serious cases, may not have lived in the communities or even 
hail from any of the oil village communities.  A participant claimed that: 
                “The agency today has no man from oil village communities on its board. 
                They may come from the state, but not from oil village communities, these 
                appointees of government take the opportunity to divert the mega projects 
                meant for these communities to their communities, thereby instigating 
                the oil communities to resort to violence to get a redress” (M.T.G, Male, DD 
                (YD), ND- PH, Interview, Feb.2008). 
 
 
This sentiment expressed by the above participant seems to reckon with the appointment of 
Chief Onyema Ugochukwu as the first chairman of NDDC in 2001. It generated a lot of 
controversy as he was only from an oil producing state (Abia State) but not from any of the oil 
village communities in the state. His nomination was rejected by the Nigerian Senate on two 
occasions but President Obasanjo insisted on either having him as the chairman or stalling the 
establishment of the commission. This made the Nigerian senate to reluctantly confirm his 
nomination. Again, another of such appointments, was the nomination of Mr. Godwin Omene, 
the then immediate past deputy managing director of Shell Development Company as NDDC 
managing director, and just as in the case of Onyema Ugochukwu, his nomination was later 
confirmed (Vanguard, September 8, 2001). The nature of selections and appointments depict 
how such appointments are given more political consideration than consideration that would 
bring sustainable peace and local representation in affected oil communities. Following the 
problems posed to the appointment and selection processes by the campaigners of local 
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representation, and government repealed the existing ACT to eliminate the insistence of having 
all appointees coming only from oil village communities. President Obasanjo submitted a bill 
for the amended of the ACT establishing NDDC.  Section 12(1) of the NDDC Act 2004 
provides that: "There shall be for the commission, a Managing Director and two Executive 
Directors who shall be indigenes of oil producing areas starting with the member states of the 
commission with the highest production quantum of oil and shall rotate amongst member states 
in the order of production." This automatically meant that an appointee must not come 
specifically from an oil village community to be appointed into the board, but from any area of 
oil producing states (NDDC ACT 2004; p.1). Evidently, the appointments was not to serve the 
purpose setting up the commission but covertly promoting “selective empowerment”  as 
discussed in chapter six and neo-patrimonial culture in 7.2.2. 
8.2.2 DESOPADEC and the oil communities of Delta State 
 
The formation of DESOPADEC (Delta State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission) 
came at the heels of the incessant violence that besieged Delta State in 2003. The commission 
was reconstituted on October 21, 2007 under Chief Willington Okirika, with the mandate of 
managing and using 50% of the 13% derivation funds accruing to Delta state from the 
federation account in developing the oil producing areas of Delta state (Vanguard, December 
16, 2007a). Since its 2007 inception, it has been marred by accusations of underperformance, 
corruption, mismanagement of funds and fuelling rivalry among communities through 
inequitable establishment of development projects. 
 
For instance, an organization of oil village communities in Delta under the auspices of the Host 
Communities of Oil and Gas Production of Nigeria, HOSTCOM, took the agency to court in 
the early part of 2012. DESOPADEC is alleged to have “diverted funds meant for Itsekiri 
devastated communities to building and renovating Nigeria Police Barracks in Warri and 
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provision of infrastructure in Warri Club, a private recreation club”(Vanguard, January 
27,2012). Participants seem to share the same sentiment about the first DESOPADEC Board 
which tenure ended in July 2010, as it is seen as a massively corrupt in 2007. A participant in 
first FGD lamented that: 
                      “Within a few months of the setting up of the commission, 
                      The contracts they awarded ran into Millions of Naria, and 
                      they [contracts] were for exotic cars, not utility cars; is this 
                      the intervention!” (E.O, Female, Warri, FGD; Nov. 2007). 
Similarly, an outcome of such contracts led to Uzere oil village community dethroning their 
king of 27 years in July 2012 for his involvement in a DESOPADEC contract scam.  
According to the Uzere president- general, their king (HRM Isaac Udogeri 1), “failed to 
provide water for his people to drink even when he allegedly had a contract of N25million 
given to him by DESOPADEC” (The Leadership, July 30, 2012). This seems to explain why 
this participant holds this view that: 
                         “DESOPADEC is a cesspool of massive corruption, administrative  
                         Ineptitude, extravagant financial recklessness and patrimony” 
                        (A.M-O, Male, CL, Warri, Interview; Dec2007). 
 
 
 
Similarly, Aja-Omaetan Community in Warri North council area of the state in 2007 petitioned 
the state governor, Dr.Emmanuel Uduaghan over their then appointed representative 
Mr.Johnson Toritsemotse and the former chairman of DESOPADEC.  They claimed that the 
two (Toritsemotse and the chairman) are not conversant with ‘the politics and relationship 
between Itsekiri oil producing communities and therefore are trying to instigate one community 
against the other’.  This is because they were denied their legitimate rights in the distribution of 
projects and season’s largesse on the excuse that their community is not recognised in the Dibi 
field. Their community (Aja-Omaetan) is erroneously seen as not being independent from 
Tisun community, another neighbouring community (Vanguard, January 7, 2008). 
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The views from participants and the secondary data on DESOPADEC seem to explain why 
since its inception, the agency had had lots of accusations leveled against it and the tendency of 
violence owing to its activities. However, the State governor reputed the accusations and in 
February 2008 declaring that “DESOPADEC is not for crisis. DESOPADEC is for peace and 
we should not by our imagination behave in such a way as to bring another crisis to our area 
(Vanguard, February 13, 2008). Interestingly, the position of the Governor has since changed 
following his utterance in public meeting on the activities of the commission. He told a town 
hall meeting that "some persons took home N2.5m monthly. The top echelon of the board 
cruised around town with siren in long convoy of vehicles accompanied by dozens thugs and 
mobile policemen who draw hefty feeding and months allowances that surpass their salaries”. 
He talked about his intention of closely monitoring the commission from henceforth (The 
Nation, September 1, 2009). However, with accusations such as the one leveled by HOSTCOM 
and the recent dethronement of a king, the promised made by the governor seems difficult to 
keep, as the agency seem to be polarizing the oil village communities, promoting inequality 
and fuelling violence among groups in oil village communities. 
 
8.3 Institutionalisation of Security Culture in the Oil Communities 
 
This section examines the culture of securitisation which oil resources have imposed on the oil 
village communities, as this security culture of protecting the oil business has rather increased 
the level of violence and armed conflicts in the oil village communities (ICG, 2009). For 
instance, 2008’s budget proposal of 444.6 billion Naira out of 2.45 trillion Naira to security in 
the Niger Delta showed that the state was more than ready to use military solution in increasing 
the oil production (Vanguard, February 14, 2008). This situation even gained support from the 
international community, especially countries that depend on Nigeria’s oil. For example, the 
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former British Prime minister Gordon Brown during the G8’s 2008’s meeting in Japan said that 
the UK ‘stand ready to give help to the Nigerians to deal with lawlessness that exists in this 
area and to achieve the level of oil production that Nigeria is capable of, but because of the law 
and order problems has not been able to achieve’ (The Independent, July 11, 2008). 
8.3.1 JTF, oil village communities and the Growth of Militant Groups 
 
The formation and imposition of a special security squad made up joint military and police 
force on the oil village communities became one of the policies of the state that came up during 
my field research. Joint Task Force (JTF) also known as Operation Restore Hope was 
specifically created to curb the incessant attack on oil facilities in the region. Their operations 
are aimed at reducing the insecurity threatening the oil industry, which has greatly affected the 
quantity of oil production in Nigeria. However, these increased military presences did not 
reduce the level of militancy and criminality in the region, but rather escalated almost to a full 
scale war, in which oil village communities were attacked by State security forces for allegedly 
habouring militants. During an interview, a community leader stated that: “We now live in fear 
of attack by JTF for being a camp for militants. The bad thing is that your rival community can 
report your community of habouring militants, and you will be attacked” (GP, Male, Ut-
UnComm, CL, Interview; Feb.2008). 
 
                    
A similar view was expressed by another “youth” during one of the two FGD, she said that: 
                      
                 “There are lot of tensions each time we see army or police in our 
                   community. You see people running or hiding as they are not 
                   sure of what will happen”.     
 
The views held by above participants seem to be in consonant with other reports. For instance, 
a community reacted to a media statement by JTF Joint Media Campaign Centre (JMCC) that 
an attacked lunched on JTF were from militants based in their community. The reported stated 
that it is “a deliberate attempt by JTF Media Centre to incite the JTF against the peace-loving 
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people of Okerenkoko community, as there are no militants in Okerenkoko Community, talk 
less of attacking JTF troops”(Vanguard, October 8,2008). 
 
There is evidence from submissions above that even with the increase in the level and height of 
security, the oil businesses seem not to have been secured. Rather, there seems to be a creation 
of a tense environment of security culture in oil communities, which seriously affected 
petrobusiness in Nigeria. ICG (2009a) reported that: 
               “The 92 attacks on the oil industry in 2008 were about one third 
                  above the previous year. Crude oil exports have fallen to 1.6 
                  million barrels per day (bpd) in March 2009, down from 2.6” 
          
 
This seems to explain why the participants hold the views that the use of security cannot stop 
militancy. A participant in one of the FGD declared that: 
                                   
  “We know the terrain more than them [referring to Nigerian security],  
   they can use all the country’s money for security, that can never stop us, 
   the oil is ours, so we have to keep fighting”(BD, Male, FGD; Nov.2007)   
                                   
Consistent with this, is the fuelled violent reprisal as groups like Movement for Emancipation 
of Niger Delta (MEND) declared a total war  on Nigerian oil industry, boasting that “we will 
wipe out the Nigerian oil industry in one swipe”(National Geography, February, 2007).The 
situation escalated even more until the introduction of the amnesty programme in June 2009.  
The concentration of the state in the protection of oil facilities and installations in order to 
maintain oil production in the communities, and neglecting lives and property of the dwellers 
of these communities is a demonstration of the unrelenting structural violence meted on oil 
village communities. Drawing support from Omeje (2005:323), he argues that “that both the 
state and TNOCs share common security perspective and response to threats to oil investment”, 
which seem to be to only protect the oil business at all cost. 
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However, the aim of this policy did not achieve its major objectives as not only did the quantity 
of oil production continued to dwindle. Rather, it led to an increase in the level of militancy, 
kidnapping of oil workers and demands for huge monetary ransoms.  The militant groups also 
engaged in serious illegal oil bunkering activities to fund their rebellious attack on 
petrobusiness in the oil communities. However, the major aspect of their security threats was 
the declaration of full scale war with continuous strategic bombing of oil facilities and full 
military skirmish against The JFT. Evidently, JTF from their activities heightened the violence 
in the region as they kill the local dwellers, rape women and burn down houses as they chase 
after the militants groups. For instance, the invasion and destruction of Odi Community in 
November, 1999  by JTF on the orders of then President Olusegun Obasanjo over the killing of 
12 Policeman by some militants(Thisday, May 27,2009). However, the presence of JTF has not 
in anywhere reversed the situation, and as observed by David Dafinone,52 “the protracted 
intransigence in the region is an indication that military action is not a viable option for 
reversing underdevelopment and restoring peace there” (Vanguard, February 14, 2008c). The 
above points are supported by ICG (2007) report that the deployment of JTF is necessary but 
may not be sufficient. Thus, as the structural violence continues, there is the tendency that 
attack on oil businesses and state security force may persist. 
8.3.2 The Deployment of State Coercive Apparatus by Oil MNCs in 
Handling Communal Protests 
 
 Another facet of institutionalization of security culture that emerged from interviews, FGD, 
documentary review and observation is the use of state security apparatus by oil MNCs in 
handling or managing community protests. However, the contentious question or issue was 
whether such invitation of security forces especially the army was the best approach or practice 
to use, considering the vulnerability of the Nigerian security forces in handling protests and 
                                                 
52  David Dafinone is a former Senator of Nigeria in Second Republic. 
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demonstrations, and the tendency of such deployment further fuelling the conflict. To this 
question, a participant from oil MNCs responded that: 
                       “To us, the invitation of state security forces was to avoid the 
                        breakdown of law and order, or destruction of oil facilities in 
                        cases of occupation of such facilities by demonstrating groups  
                        or communities” (UN, Male, SP-P/H, H-S&P, Interview; Dec.2007) 
 
A similar view was also expressed by another participant from the oil MNCs, who said that:   
                      “We do not go directly to security agencies. But when militant groups  
                      take over our facilities, we turn the situation over to the government. 
                      But if community people with a known grievance take over our facilities, 
                      we also get them to the negotiating table” (JJ, Male,CHR-LG, MR-PGPA, 
                      Interview; Feb. 2008). 
 
Evidently, oil MNCs seem to see the use of state coercive apparatus in protection their facilities 
as the best and last option available not only to them, but to the state who owes a greater 
percentage of the oil rent.  As submitted by another MNCs official who participated in the 
interview, he stated that: 
                     “The Federal government of Nigeria is in a joint venture with oil companies 
                     and therefore would go to any extent to protect its investment, she is a major 
                     owner” (P.O, Male, SP-PH, CRO, interview, Dec.2007). 
 
Similarly, the above situation is supported by Okonta and Douglas (2003:32), in which they 
wrote that “in October 1990 the inhabitants of Umuechem, another oil producing community, 
took to the streets, and  armed troops, called in after Shell’s request for “security protection”, 
killed and maimed them into submission’. This also seems to explain why “the governments of 
Delta, Akwa Ibom and River states are reported to have contributed 15 billion naira ($100 
million) to finance the military operations in Gbaramatu [oil community], Delta State, on 13 
May 2009” (Perlo-Freeman et al,2010:181). 
 
Incidentally, the continuous reliance on state security forces to suppress community protests 
instead of using good conflict handling mechanism seems to motivate communities into 
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developing more violence measures. In most cases, outright militancy are championed by the 
“youths” who engage the security forces in combats relying on their knowledge of the terrain 
of the Niger Delta, which the security forces lack. (DS, male, Warri, Peace worker: Interview; 
Dec.2007). 
8.3.3 The Rise and Growth of Private Security Companies and 
Vigilantes Groups  
 
The use of vigilant groups or private security companies to watch over and protect pipe-lines 
against illegal oil bunkering and vandalisation of pipelines (to cause oil spill leading to 
demands for compensation) have created fierce struggles among groups on who are to carry out 
the security contract. Even with this ‘category of self-help and self-policing’ which acts 
independent of a state police and with the tendency of breaking national laws to achieve 
providing protection to its benefactors(Baker,2002:223), oil MNCs still deploys them to watch 
over pipelines and oil installations. However, the situation in Nigeria seems different, as the 
state has even engaged the services of former militants in policing pipelines. Wall street 
Journal Europe (August 22, 2012) reported that: 
                  “Nigeria is shelling out hundreds of millions of dollars a year to maintain 
                  an uneasy calm in the oil rich delta. … the program has sent young men 
                  a different message: that militancy promises more rewards than risks… 
                  Last year, Nigeria's state oil company began paying him $9 million a year 
                  by Mr. Dokubo-Asari's account, to pay his 4,000 former foot soliders to 
                  protect the pipelines they once attacked”. 
 
 
Similarly, Shell Petroleum Development Company developed an arrangement with oil 
communities in what it called “Community and Shell Together (CAST)" aimed at using people 
in communities in which oil pipelines are laid to protect the facilities from vandalisation’. 
According to Shell’s former  Manager for Pipelines Operations, Mr. Godwin Idoko “ The Cast 
project was initiated to protect oil pipelines in the Niger Delta area, a projected 4,000 youths 
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from different communities would be made to play a whistle blower role when there is any 
attempt at sabotaging oil and gas pipelines in their neighbourhood”(Thisday, July 6,2008). 
 
A contrary view was raised by participants in the interviews and FGD, who pointed out the 
selection process, is as difficult as getting employed in the oil companies, and the contracts 
have always fuelled fierce struggles among community “youth” associations as well as groups 
within oil village communities( Field note, Warri, Feb.2008). A participant explained that: 
                   “Situations were some groups are left out, they resort to attacking the pipelines, 
                   kidnapping or the  other forms of violence or oil resource- related criminality”  
                   (OU, Female, Warri, S.D-ND, Interview; Dec.2007). 
 
This policy has raised more questions than answers it needed to provide to the problem of oil 
pipeline vandalisation. Some of such questions are; does this policy not encourage ‘selective 
empowerment’ which financially and economically empowers certain group in the 
communities, therefore polarizing the existing peace in such communities? Secondly, there are 
questions about the resort to violence and culture of violence, as Nigeria states and oil MNCs 
seem to be awarding such contracts to militant leaders as a means of buying peace. It also 
raises the question of change in leadership and authority equations in the communities as it 
empowers the “youths” more than the elders, as the “youths” are used mainly to watch these 
pipelines. It also raises the question of struggle for access which it provides, which is the job of 
watching over pipelines. Oil resources having displaced their main source of livelihoods and 
with the level of unemployment in these communities, communities are pitched against each 
other in the quota of number of people to watch over the pipelines. In raising these questions, it 
was evident that the policy have never solve the problem of illegal oil bunkering or 
vandalisation of oil pipelines but rather it has provided avenue for increased illegal oil 
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bunkering, increased struggle for community leadership, increased culture of violence and 
inequality in the communities(Field note, Warri, Feb.2008). 
A proper analysis of this policy indicts that Nigerian State and Shell did not take into 
cognisance the rivalry this scheme may fuel in the various communities. Considering the level 
of unemployment, level of poverty, the fierce struggle for access to oil–related sources of 
livelihoods, groups will engage each other in fierce battle to manage the scheme within their 
communities, thereby heightening the struggle for local leadership and power (see chapter7). 
There is also the tendency that there will be lopsidedness in the selection process, considering 
the multitude of unemployed “youths”, and this could fuel inter or intra communal conflicts. 
Finally, it would become a source of empowerment for a just few people, which could be 
considered as a form of inequality. Finally, with presence and production of oil imposing a 
change in their socio-economic conditions, the new scheme or job will also further alter their 
socio-conditions, thereby increasing the grievance situation and culture of greed, especially on 
the part of those not accommodated to watch the pipeline. 
8.4   Conclusion 
 
The chapter examines the policies and projects of the Nigerian state and oil MNCs, with an aim 
of understanding the extent to which and how the management of oil resources related 
problems and polices by the state and oil MNCs fuels violent conflicts in the oil village 
communities in Nigeria. Evidently, it was established that the nature and management pattern 
of policies and programmes initiated by the state and petrobusiness in handling oil-related 
problems such as pipeline vandalisation, land disputes, insecurity in the region and community 
developments have exacerbated violent conflicts in oil village communities. This is due to oil 
related policies which did not take cognisance of the effects of oil resources on the socio-
economic and social relations of the oil village communities. There is also the non-
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consideration of violent struggle for access to oil opportunities and benefits which is achievable 
through occupying leadership and positions of authority in oil village communities. 
 
 
As the new economy of oil resources emerge with new socio-economic conditions, social 
relations, resulting into power and leadership struggles, the Nigerian state and the oil MNCs 
engage in one form of development projects or peace building process to make the 
environment safe for business in oil village communities. With concern  raised on the effects of 
oil resources on the communities, the state institutes one interventionist agency after the other 
to “cater” for the development needs of oil village communities. Evidence from the field 
implies that like every oil resources backed policy, such development projects are opportunities 
for few members from the oil communities to benefit from the abundant oil rents and thus 
resulting into fierce leadership struggles and violent conflicts about who should get elected or 
appointed (please refer to chapter 8.2; 8.2.1 and 8.2.2). The examination and analysis of 
various policies, programmes and actions of the Nigerian state and oil MNCs in the oil village 
communities show that social relations such as struggle for land or compensation, or socio-
economic conditions like employment are handled in such a manner that it fuels violence and 
struggle for power.  
 
Again, the weak nature of the Nigerian state in conflict management was further demonstrated 
and compounded by the state’s over reliance on oil rents and oil revenues. The State maintains 
oil production by using coercive force through state security institutions in providing “a 
negative peaceful” environment for oil business to operate.  This weak nature of the state is 
again exposed by the engaging of private security and vigilantes groups by MNCs to watch 
over a joint venture which the state has the highest stake. It is obvious that oil MNCs seem to 
dictated and directed the security needs of the industry in Nigeria, even though they always 
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claim non-involvement. The security culture rather than reducing the agitation increased the 
insurgency and militancy in the region. 
 
Therefore, based on the examination of the nature and pattern of management of the new socio-
relations created by oil resources by Nigerian state and oil MNCs, the research assumes that 
“The nature and patterns of managing oil resources -related problems, social economic 
opportunities and other interests of oil communities by the Nigerian State and Oil MNCs are 
likely to have exacerbated violent conflicts in oil village communities”. 
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                                  CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMARY, RESEARCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
9  Introduction 
 
This thesis examines how the presence of oil resources fosters violent conflicts in oil village 
communities, and the implications of this phenomenon for the socio-economic and political 
structures of such communities. The work has analysed oil resources conflicts using a single 
case study of oil village communities in Nigeria to illustrate the effects of oil resources in 
contributing to violent conflicts. To understand the effects of oil resources in fuelling violent 
conflicts in local oil communities, the research’s analytical framework was based on structural 
conflict theory approach with the support of environmental scarcity theory and greed vs. 
grievance theory. The selected oil village communities were from Delta state, and were 
examined as a single study, since the indices considered were the same. This chapter has two 
main aims: to summarise the key findings and conclusions of the study; and to present the 
contribution of the research and indicate directions for further research. 
9.1 Summary of the Study 
 
As noted in the introduction, the background to the research problem is the current violent 
conflicts being experienced in oil village communities in Nigeria, which are fostered by the 
exploration and production of oil resources and the control and distribution of oil resource 
benefits and opportunities. In spite of the enormous wealth accruing to the Nigerian state from 
oil resources, the state has suffered from various development crises, among which are violent 
conflicts. In all this, the oil village communities have experienced unprecedented violent 
conflicts, owing to activities centered on oil resources. Oil resources have changed these 
communities’ socio-economic conditions and social relations through increasing struggles for 
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access to oil-backed opportunities and benefits. The issue this research has investigated is the 
extent to which, and the way in which, oil resources have contributed to violent conflicts in 
these communities. The central argument of the thesis, therefore, has been that oil resources 
contribute hugely to violent conflicts in oil village communities through changes in socio-
economic conditions, social relations, power relations, and access to oil benefits and 
opportunities. 
 
The review in Chapter Two of the literature on the structure of violence and conflicts related to 
oil concluded that that the structures and paradoxes of oil resources, such as oil resource 
abundance, oil resource scarcity, the curse of oil resources and rent seeking also exist at the 
local community level. In other words, oil village communities in Nigeria exhibit and suffer 
from oil resources paradoxes such as rent seeking and resource scarcity, but this has never been 
properly investigated because most research uses macro level analysis, which is state-centric, 
rather than adopting micro-level analysis to specifically research local oil village communities . 
The analysis (Chapters Six to Eight) of this study supported this argument. 
 
Following the literature review came Chapter Three, which discussed the theoretical and 
analytical framework based on structural conflict theory as the anchor theory, environmental 
scarcity theory and greed vs. grievance theory as support theories of the framework. Chapter 
Four discussed the research methods, which were mainly qualitative, interviews, focus group 
discussions and documentary analysis. These methods and approaches to data gathering 
enabled evidence to be collated that gave credibility to the findings and conclusions of the 
study by responding to the research questions. Chapter Five presented the background and 
context to the oil economy in Nigeria and the political outcomes, and concluded that the violent 
conflicts in the oil village communities were strongly influenced by the nature of political and 
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socio-economic developments in Nigeria or within the Nigerian state since the emergence of 
oil resources as the economic mainstay of the country.   
 
As discovered in the research, oil resource conflicts in the region started with oil production 
activities. The conflict started with the dispossession of land from local communities, the 
pollution of farmlands and fishing water. The oil activities consequently produced outcomes 
such as poverty, loss of sources of livelihoods, struggle for remaining land and waters. It 
therefore means a change in the existing socio-economic structures and conditions of these oil 
communities, thereby making oil resources and oil resources rent the main and new source of 
existence. As this structural conflict deepens and evolves, it consequently fuels grievances, 
greed, militarism and economic opportunism such as illegal oil bunkering.  In addition, other 
changes brought by oil resource activities include fierce struggles for local leadership and 
positions of influence which give access to oil benefits and opportunities. There is also the 
emergence of “youth” associations both as alternate leadership group to elders and chiefs, as 
well as chief tormentors of oil MNCs.   
 
Similarly, unlike the old tradition that forbids women from participating in decision making, oil 
resources presence and conflicts brought a change of role for women in oil village 
communities, as women became part of the decision making organs, especially in the CDCs. 
This is because as women protest against the activities of oil MNCs and the environmental 
impact of oil on their sources of livelihoods, their protestations consequently forced oil MNCs 
into embarking on many CRS activities for such communities. Secondly, their mediatory roles 
within their communities helped in stopping violent struggles among men especially the 
council of elders and CDCs, and this has further cemented their roles in their communities. 
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9.2 Research Findings and Implications 
9.2.1  Socio-economic conditions, greed vs. grievance, oil resources 
and violent conflicts. 
 
Essentially, the discussion here aims to address the question: What effects have oil resources 
had on the socio-economic conditions of oil village communities; and to what extent have oil 
resources contributed to cultures of grievance, greed and militancy in oil village communities? 
The findings show that the socio-economic conditions created by oil resources have led to 
cultures of greed and grievance which culminate in violent conflicts. The socio-economic 
conditions which come with the new, alien oil economy restructured and displaced existing 
social and economic structures, thereby creating new social relations. The new oil economy is 
characterised by loss of livelihoods and employment; environmental scarcity and 
environmental factors; land scarcity and land ownership struggles; and a new local economy 
which excludes the majority of the population, leading to violent struggles. The nature of the 
new oil economy means that the entire population now depends directly or indirectly on it. The 
changes are indicated in the thesis by references to the original livelihoods of these 
communities, which were farming and fishing.  
 
However, with oil exploration and production activities taking over their farmlands and fishing 
waters, oil village communities are left to depend solely on “rents” and compensation from oil 
MNCs. Paradoxically, instead of oil resources improving the economic and social well-being 
of these communities, they have turned out to be a source of violent conflicts, as shown in the 
thesis. This is clearly exhibited by both peaceful (if such are possible) and violent struggles for 
participation in, and control of, the local economy that has grown up around oil.  
 
250 
 
This is very much heightened by the struggle for other opportunities and benefits that derive 
from oil resources. Such opportunities and benefits are: employment; payments for ownership 
of land; and compensation for oil activities on remaining farming land and fishing waters.  In 
such cases, as demonstrated by the thesis, communities that were originally at peace and shared 
communal farmlands and fishing waters could suddenly erupt in violent conflict over land 
ownership and who should receive the compensation paid by oil prospecting MNCs. The case 
of the Ijaw-speaking OdComm and OgComm oil village communities is well cited. Oil 
exploration activities by SP since 1968, and the establishment of flow stations by the NA on 
communal land belonging to these two communities, has led to a series of violent conflicts in 
these once peaceful communities. It could therefore be argued that oil resources create 
conditions that make conflict feasible. The benefits and opportunities (money, employment 
etc.) are never evenly distributed: for example, they may be controlled by one group; or one 
group may suffer more from the environmental and social effects of oil and gain little from 
these oil benefits and opportunities. Ordinarily, when oil-backed opportunities and benefits 
occur, what happens is that through the new socio-economic conditions, such as poverty, 
unemployment, environmental degradation and loss of livelihoods, the oil creates new social 
relations, which favour those who own it or those who can adapt easily to the new socio-
economic conditions.  Most of such occurrences do not take place without other local dwellers 
agitating for collective compensation, as oil exploration and production affects every member 
of the community. The changes in socio-economic conditions and social relations in oil village 
communities are at the core of violent conflicts.  This is mainly because, intentionally or 
unintentionally, the control and distribution of oil-backed opportunities and benefits introduce 
social exclusion and inequality into these agrarian communities.  They do this through the new 
social economic conditions and social relations, thereby setting communities against 
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communities, or groups in a particular community against each other. In most situations, it lays 
the foundation for protracted grievances and a desire to assume ownership.  
 
Furthermore, the introduction of a culture of greed and grievance in these oil village 
communities has been identified in the thesis. These cultures emanate from the new socio-
economic conditions and social relations which the economy of oil resources has introduced.  
They can make it possible to gain access to opportunities and benefits, depending on the 
position taken by a person, a group, a community or communities. People’s position and 
actions may depend on what aspects of oil production that affects them most. A grudging 
attitude can have a range of causes, from underdevelopment of the community or communities 
to non-payment of promised compensation or selective payment of compensation, or financial 
inducements or other forms of empowerment such as contracts, scholarships or employment to 
just a few in a community.  The cultures of greed and grievance, as shown in the thesis, often 
culminate in criminalities which are centered on and around the oil economy. Interestingly, the 
violent aspect of the entire culture is not only about local resistance to state violence and 
negligence by oil MNCs, but about the struggle for who controls the shadow economies and 
illicit businesses which often lead to all-out war between groups in the oil village communities 
of the Niger Delta. The engagement of groups in illegal oil bunkering has shifted from mere 
survivalist behaviour to multiple ventures in which rival groups deploy all violent means to 
control their hold. Often, these groups in the oil village communities see illegal oil bunkering 
as representing their share of the ‘oil money’ or benefits from the oil economy. 
 
9.2.2  Power struggle and oil-benefits and opportunities  
 
To gain an understanding of the growing trend of violent conflicts (especially non-state violent 
conflicts) in the oil village communities, the research sought to answer this question: To what 
extent have oil resources influenced the nature of politics, leadership and power struggles in 
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the oil village communities. The thesis reveals that oil resource benefits and opportunities 
seriously influence the nature of politics, leadership and power struggles in the oil village 
communities. These changes in the nature of politics, leadership and powers struggles are the 
resultant need to gain the control and distribution of oil resource benefits and opportunities. 
Thus, oil benefits and opportunities have become the defining factors of the new socio-
economic conditions and social relations which entire communities have to accept.  
Consequently, they have created new power relations in oil village communities which are 
sustained by violence and fierce struggles.  Thus, the wielding of power or local influence, or 
the possession of local governance and local rulership, guarantee access to the control and 
distribution of oil resource benefits and opportunities in oil village communities. Undoubtedly, 
as discussed in Chapter Seven, people within these oil communities now struggles for these 
positions of power, in order to profit from this new oil economy. For example, the case of the 
Ogoni uprising against Shell and the Nigerian state showed that some prominent Ogoni citizens 
were using their position to their advantage. Their position meant that they served as 
spokesmen and negotiators for their communities, and thus they were able to gain from the 
access these positions provided.  This was clearly demonstrated by the internal rivalry between 
Ogoni 4 led by Dr Garrick Leton and the Ogoni 9 led by Ken Saro-wiwa over the control the 
MOSOP (Movement for the survival of the Ogoni people), as a consequence of which violent 
conflicts ensued leading to the killing of the four prominent Ogoni Chiefs.  Importantly, the 
struggles for power, local governance and local rulership are made even fiercer because of 
access to oil benefits and opportunities, as groups and individuals within oil village 
communities take to violent conflicts in order to gain or remain in power 
 
Again, and very fundamentally, oil has changed the nature of power relations between the 
elders of oil village communities, who represent traditional authority, and partially replaced 
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these elders with community “youths” who have almost taken over the administration and 
governance of communities, especially as this concerns dealing with the oil MNCs. According 
to Faleti (2006), as explained in the structural conflict theory which is the anchor theory of the 
framework described in Chapter Three, the unequal distribution of advantages and 
disadvantages in society re-defines relationships and behaviour in the society, and this breeds 
violent conflict. “Youths” who are particularly disadvantaged in oil communities, owing to the 
loss of their source of livelihood, resort to violent behaviour and violence against oil MNCs 
and against the elders of their community whom they assumed to be benefiting from the new 
socio-economic conditions. Consequently, the ability of “youths” to exercise violence and 
militancy against oil MNCs and traditional authorities has led to youth leadership being given 
more important recognition by oil MNCs than traditional rulers/elders. Furthermore, the 
“youths” engaging in power struggles amongst themselves as well as against the traditional 
community rulers as they split into factions on which group represents their community, shows 
that they are not immured from aftermath of the new oil economy. 
 
In addition to the above, the study finds that socio-political cultures such as neo-patrimonalism, 
prebendalism, clientelism and other bad practices in governance are reinforced by oil resources 
not only at the centre – in this case at the federal level – but also at local community level, i.e. 
within local traditional authorities and governance. The way in which funds meant for the 
public good are stolen or embezzled at the centre is the way funds given to communities as 
general compensation and funds for development as part of CSR are stolen or embezzled by 
community leaders. For everyone, getting part of the funds is part of your ‘national cake’. With 
the competition and fierce struggle for leadership and power in these oil communities, violent 
conflicts often result.  Interestingly, the struggles to get into such positions are catalysed by the 
fact that such positions provide access to benefits and opportunities from oil resources. In many 
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oil village communities, it is common to see people fight over the chairmanship and 
membership of the Community Development Committee (CDC), because of the enormous 
funds put at their disposal by oil MNCs to carry out development work, or payments for the 
acquisition of land from communities or to compensate them for oil spills and other 
environmental damage.  Thus, as funds are stolen and embezzled, or opportunities such as 
scholarships and employment from oil MNCs are monopolised by those in authority and 
power, the desperation to be in such positions or maintain such positions increases, leading to 
violent killings and fierce struggles.  Cases that demonstrate this situation include:  the struggle 
of two warring youth factions in Effurun, Ovwie Local Government Area of Delta State; the 
killing of about 150 people in Port Harcourt by groups fighting over government hand-outs; 
and the murder of Mr. S.A.K. Metseagharun over the chairmanship of the Ogborodo 
Community Development Fund. 
 
 
This study also found that the struggle for oil resource benefits and opportunities created 
cultures of violence where violence was prized and well rewarded. The culture of violence 
means that whoever can threaten petrobusiness by any violent means is handsomely ‘settled’. 
On the other hand, it cultivates a culture of violence and militancy within oil communities, 
making resorting to violence a common occurrence. There are many cases of violent communal 
conflicts and group fights resulting in deaths and the displacement of many people. 
Incidentally, those who are selected to receive settlements are those considered as conflict 
ringleaders or masterminds, or those seen as very vocal. Their ‘settlement’ means that they are 
expected to cease to champion their communities’ agitation against oil MNCs. What is striking 
about this activity of settlement is that instead of dowsing violent tendencies, it increases them, 
either causing communities to rise against those whom they view as ‘sell-outs’, or leading to 
the emergence of other ringleaders or vocal champions of violence whom have to be ‘settled’. 
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This creates what Ibeanu (2002) describes as ‘concentric circles of payoffs and rewards’. This 
helps to explain the rise in the culture of violence in oil communities: the settlements paid by 
oil MNCs to violence leaders; or violence over non-inclusion in such settlements. 
 
Another important finding of the thesis is on the issue of how oil resources seriously affect 
power, leadership and governance in oil village communities. Clearly, as indicated by the 
study, because oil resources have become the major determinant in the local economy, access 
to oil now means access to a better livelihood. Therefore any opportunity that can provides 
such access becomes highly valued. Some of these opportunities are in the hands of traditional 
authorities, some are in the hands of politicians; some are obtained through community 
development associations, and some through “youth” leadership. These positions are fiercely 
contested by groups and communities, because of the access they provide to oil resource 
opportunities and benefits. In many cases, as indicated in the findings, many lives have been 
lost and people displaced. Coupled with this, the research found that “youth” leadership was 
gradually displacing the traditional rulers in communities, and was well supported by oil 
interests, which paid them off to keep violence away from their production activities. As this 
continues, the “youths” are carving out positions of authority for themselves and are major 
parties to all decisions. Their ability to wield violence remains their selling point. 
Consequently, like every group that wants to benefit from oil resources, they wage war not 
only against the oil MNCs, but against the established government authorities and against 
community leaders and they also spit into rival groups and fight each. 
9.2.3  When managing oil resource outcomes exacerbates violent 
conflicts 
 
 In answering the question: Has the style of management of oil resource problems, socio-
economic opportunities and the interests of oil village communities by the Nigerian state and 
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oil MNCs contributed to violent conflicts in the oil village communities, and if so, in what 
ways? The thesis reveals that the nature and patterns adopted by oil MNCs and the Nigerian 
State in managing oil-resource-related problems, socio-economic opportunities and other 
interests of the oil village communities exacerbated violent conflicts. The socio-economic 
conditions and social relations such as poverty, environmental degradation, unemployment and 
inequality mean that the oil village communities are reduced to ‘oil-resource-dependent 
communities’. And when benefits and opportunities are distributed to the advantage of some 
and to the disadvantage of others, suspicion and antagonism are created within groups or within 
a community or within oil village communities who share a neighbourhood within the radius of 
oil resource exploration and production.  
 
Generally, there are fierce struggle over the new relations of production in these oil village 
communities, as the new oil economy has re-structured the existing socio-economic conditions 
and social relations. It is easy to see two communities take to violent conflict resulting in 
countless deaths over compensation payment by oil MNCs or disputes about land earmarked 
for oil exploration and production. Clearly, as discussed in Chapter Eight, the economy of oil 
resources has brought changes to every aspect of the people’s existence and relationships, 
creating a ‘free for all’ struggle in pursuit of legal and illegal opportunities from oil resources. 
For example the conflict in Warri dates back to the period of colonial rule, but was never 
previously violent: the contestations were carried out using formal and legal means. However, 
the discovery of oil resource in Warri and neighbouring communities increased the resolve to 
lay claim to the area, especially when Warri became the operational headquarters of some 
major MNCs.   
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Another fundamental issue regarding the manner of managing oil resource fall-outs by oil 
MNCs and the Nigerian State is that some policies are assumed to exhibited a ‘divide and rule’ 
technique, policies such as the “host communities” policies. The labeling and rewarding of 
some communities as host communities and others as non-host communities has further 
increased the struggle over land ownership and the use of violence. Therefore, in a bid to 
curtail losses in production due to the vandalizing of pipelines, illegal oil bunkering and direct 
attacks on oil facilities by communities, “youths” and militant groups who felt excluded from 
oil opportunities and benefits, the Nigerian state formed a security task force, the Joint Task 
Force (JTF).  There is also oil MNCs’s arrangement for various private security organisations 
and vigilante groups to watch over the oil facilities. This study discovered that the use of the 
JTF as a method of securing oil village communities, a method which simply deepened the 
security culture built on state violence in the region. 
  
The use vigilante groups to guard oil pipelines was another aspect of ‘selective empowerment 
and settlement’ in which groups who were not able to benefit from oil-resource-backed 
opportunities resorted to illegal bunkering, waged a fight against those chosen to watch the 
pipelines, or  engaged in direct pipeline destruction, until they were recognised and ‘settled’. 
Thus the circle of violence, recognition and settlement continue.  
 
The implication of the failure of the state and oil MNCs to manage the fall-out from the new 
socio-economic conditions and social relations has been that power relations in the oil- village 
communities have tended toward demonstrations of violence as a means of getting recognition 
and benefits from oil resources. The thesis further argues that where state violence is used to 
calm the situation, it simply fuels more resentment against the state, the oil MNCs and against 
members of the communities who are considered as beneficiaries from oil resource 
opportunities. The situation of the state investing in security to protect oil business rather than 
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investing in human development (a choice which is the main driver of violent conflict) means 
that militancy against oil resource production and violent struggles to benefit from it will 
continue. 
 
9.2.4  Violent conflicts, oil resource and oil village communities 
 
Cumulatively, the study seeks to answer the question: To what extent and how have oil 
resources contributed to violent conflicts in oil village communities in Nigeria? The commonly 
cited causes of violent conflicts in oil village communities are armed reaction and struggle (see 
Chapter Two for the definition adopted by this thesis), especially where the Nigerian state 
unleashes physical violence on oil village communities, often referred to as state violence. 
Such state violence, which is mainly carried out to maintain oil production, could come as a 
reprisal against an oil village community for protesting against environmental hazards created 
by oil resource activities, or in a situation where a community takes action against another 
aspect of oil production which is affecting their livelihoods. For instance, Ibeanu (2000:19) 
while examining violent conflicts across oil village communities in the Niger Delta region 
argues that “paradoxically, the violent suppression of the Ogoni, which the military had hoped 
would cow the restive region and keep the oil wells flowing, unleashed a rash of further 
conflicts involving the state, oil companies and ethnic communities across the Niger Delta”. 
Thus, Ibeanu pointed out the relationship between oil production activities and the escalation of 
violent conflicts across the Niger Delta region. Le Billion (2001:23), on the other hand, 
contends that “distributional conflicts frequently arise relating to the ownership of natural 
resources and the allocation of the revenues they generate among the state, businesses, local 
communities, and other interest groups” This implies that the way in which revenues and 
benefits resulting from natural resources like oil are distributed among stakeholders is an 
important variable in oil resource conflicts. 
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Conversely, this research has shown that beyond the oil-fuelled state violence which involves 
the state actively taking part in a violent conflict, are the oil-fuelled non-state violent conflicts 
with their variables and influences derived from the political economy of oil resources, and are 
spearheaded by the structures and paradoxes of oil resources. Firstly, the structure of oil 
resources means that they monopolize the available land resources in an area of operation, 
thereby changing the nature of the livelihoods of the inhabitants, creating a form of inequality 
and new class relationships. Within this order, as seen in the Land Use Act of 1978, land 
belonging to a community can be commandeered at will for petrobusiness. But the interesting 
part comes with who is given the financial compensation for the community. A further 
implication of this is that the number of jobs the oil industry destroys is not in any way 
matched by the jobs it creates.  And even where it creates some jobs, it also creates a situation 
of struggle over who gets the jobs. In the communities’ bid to survive, a rent seeking culture 
similar to that which exists at the central level is created. Local oil communities, because of 
loss of livelihoods, loss of land, social exclusion and poverty, start informal rent seeking 
activities, from demands for settlements, to all forms of grievance- or greed-driven activities 
which  help them profit from oil resources.  
 
 As discussed in Chapter Six, with a change in socio-economic conditions, oil resource benefits 
and opportunities become the defining factor in new social relations, and achieving this is 
mainly possible either through the demonstration of violence or through threats of violence. In 
most cases, it is no longer a struggle against the state or oil MNCs, but violent struggles 
between groups or communities to decide who will get which oil benefits and opportunities, 
when and how. Secondly, access to such benefits and opportunities provided by oil resources, 
as shown in Chapter Seven, leads to violent struggles for power, leadership and ruling positions 
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in local communities, thus increasing and institutionalizing violence as a means of gaining 
access to oil benefits and opportunities. This consequently raises the status of “youths” in the 
communities as major decision makers, owing to their penchant for the use of violence. 
 
9.3  The   Contribution of the Study 
 
This work on oil resource conflict is a study of a critical component of a natural resources 
curse. The study has made an important contribution to the understanding of oil resource 
conflicts in local oil communities, particularly in Nigeria. The findings of the thesis have 
established that violent conflicts in local oil communities cannot be divorced from the changes 
that have occurred in their socio-economic and political structures due to the presence of oil 
resources. Therefore, in examining the effects of oil resources in creating violent conflicts in 
Nigeria, this research suggests a reappraisal of violent conflicts caused by oil resources, 
especially in oil village communities. This section presents the contributions of the study. 
 
First, in researching the effects of oil resources in creating violent conflicts in oil village 
communities, this study has deployed a micro-level analysis and community-based approach. 
This is contrary to most studies on oil resource conflicts which apply state-centric approaches 
and macro-level analysis.  The central argument of the contribution is that oil resources are a 
curse which fuels violent conflicts at the local level, just as it does at the state level. The 
paradoxes of oil exploitation, such as a rent-seeking culture, rentier characteristics, a resource 
curse, resource scarcity, and so on exist in local communities as well as at the state level. In 
this case, micro-level analysis provides a better approach for understanding the situation.  This 
therefore reinforces Okruhlik’s (1999:295) submission that “neither Weberian nor Marxist 
conceptions of statehood adequately account for development in oil states. The Weberian 
emphasis on extraction does not apply because oil states have been largely relieved of that 
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function. Thus, a defining exchange between state and society is absent”. Therefore, the 
structures and effects of oil resources in societies could today be examined independently of 
the state. This thesis has demonstrated that oil resources cause distinct and direct violent 
conflicts in oil village communities, which may not actually be linked to the state. 
. 
Second, this study, in an attempt to understand the relationship between oil resources and 
violent conflicts in local oil communities, the research employed an integration of 
environmental scarcity theory and greed vs. grievance theory into structural violence theory to 
serve as support in the providing full analysis of the research. Thus, the framework was able to 
explain the rise of oil-related violent conflicts in village communities. Again the possession of 
natural resources itself seems to be promoting political underdevelopment, thereby creating a 
vicious circle of negative outcomes (Moore, 2000). This point to lack of good governance, 
which promotes most negative variables associated with the exploration and exploitation of oil 
resources, one of them being violent conflicts over natural resources. This in most situations 
could arise out of perceived relative deprivation and insensitivity to environmental stress and 
degradation (Moore, 2000). The outcome of such situations, as shown in this study, is the 
establishment of an attitude of grievance which, where it is not reconciled, may result in greedy 
criminality such as kidnapping, illegal oil bunkering and militancy. 
 
 Finally, this study applied a non-state-actor perspective in examining the perpetuation of 
conflicts in local oil village communities. This is unlike many studies of oil-resource conflicts 
which rely on the concept of traditional conflicts which are related only to contemporary ideas 
of predation by the state.  This is because when such views are advanced, identical–driven 
conflicts, involving subjective and elusive categories such as ethnicity, religion, ideas, history, 
[which are]….hard to resolve are easily adopted and applied. Thus, many studies restrict their 
research primarily to rational–choice theory and the application of statistics, forgetting that one 
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case study is different from another (Berdal, 2005). This is a fundamental limitation of many 
previous studies on oil-related violent conflicts. 
 
9.4 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
The findings of this thesis are important from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, it 
important to note that that it is difficult to claim general generalizability beyond the Delta 
region because of difference in socio-economic, traditional, political and environmental factors. 
However, this research claims partial transferability of the research findings within the same 
population of study in this case, oil communities in Nigeria.  However, the findings of the this 
research provide further challenges to the study of resource conflicts, especially in respect of 
the on-going debate on the effects of natural resources on developing economies.  
 
In the context of this limitation of generalization, the findings of this study have set in motion 
the study of other important areas within the concept of resource conflicts.  For instance,   the 
study has shown that there may be a need to study the nature of informal rent-seeking fuelled 
by structural violence in Nigeria. As suggested by the study, as the state becomes weak, self-
help emerges, and cultures like rent-seeking and the struggle to control the distribution of 
opportunities arise. A further study of how dependence of oil rich developing states on rents 
from oil MNCs  can weaken a state control of its security in the long run may be worthwhile.  
 
  
 
. 
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APPENDIX G --TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF OIL SPILL IN THE NIGER DELTA 
 
S/N
O 
YEA
R 
NO. 
OF 
SPILL 
QTY 
SPILLED(BARRELS) 
QTY 
RECOVERED(BARRELS) 
NET 
VOLUME 
COST TO 
THE 
ENVIRONME
NT 
(BARRELS) 
1 1976 128 25,157.00 7,135.00 19,021.50 
2 1977 104 32,879.25 1,703.01 31,176.75 
3 1978 154 489,294.75 391,445.00 97,849.75 
4 1979 157 94,117.13 63,481.20 630,635.93 
5 1980 241 600,511.02 42,416.83 558,094.19 
6 1981 238 42,722.50 5,470.20 37,252.30 
7 1982 257 42,841.00 2,171.40 40,669.60 
8 1983 173 48,351.30 6,355.90 41,995.40 
9 1984 151 40,209.00 1,644.80 38,564.20 
10 1985 187 11,876.60 1,719.30 10,157.30 
11 1986 155 12,905    552.00 12,358.00 
12 1987 129 31,866.00 25,757.00 25,757.00 
13 1988 208 9,172.00 1,955.00 7,207.00 
14 1989 228 5,956.00 2,153.00 3,803.00 
15 1990 166 14,150.35 2,785.96 12,057.80 
16 1991 258 108,367.01 2,785.96 12,057.80 
17 1992 378 51,187.90 1,476.70 49,711.20 
18 1993 453 8,105.32 2,937.08 6,632.11 
19 1994 495 35,123.71 2,335.93 32,787.78 
20 1995 417 63,677.17 3,110.02 60,568.15 
21 1996 158 39,903.67 1,183,807 38,716.86 
 Total 4,647 2,369,470.04 549,060.38 1,820,410.50 
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APPENDIX H    ---TOPIC GUIDE 
 
Topic Guide for In-depth Interviews 
 
The following are some of the generic questions that were used for the in-depth interview 
with key participants and groups on the political economy of oil resources conflicts in the oil 
village communities of Nigeria.  The interviews were focused on oil fuelled socio-economic 
conditions, cultures of violence; governance, politics and leadership struggles, access to oil 
benefits and benefits; and state and oil MNC conflict handling mechanisms. 
 
SECTION A:  THE DEMOGRAPHY OF THE RESPONDENT. 
     Date & Time of Interview…………/……………. 
Nameof respondent ________________________________________ 
Occupation of Respondent   _________________________________ 
Respondent’s State/Local Govt. Area__________________________ 
Tribe of the Respondent _____________________ (e.g, Ijaw, Isoko, Igbo, etc) 
Place of Residence ___________________________ 
Sex ______________________(Male, Female). Age____________________ 
Dear Respondent, the information solicited here is for academic purpose only. It will be 
treated with confidence. 
 
 
PERCEIVED CAUSES OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN OIL VILLAGE 
COMMUNITIES: 
 
1. Is your community designated as an oil producing community? What are the benefits? 
 
2. How many times have you experienced violent conflicts between your community 
and your neighbouring community, and what were the causes? What is the nature of 
the relationship between your community and the oil producing company operating in 
your community? 
 
 
3. When was oil discovered in your community, and what year did the exploration     
activities start? 
4. What is the nature of the relationship between/among the three main ethnic groups 
before the discovery of oil resources?   
 
5. What is the nature of the relationship between /among the three main ethnic groups 
after the discovery of oil resources? 
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6. What effect did the discovery of oil resource in your community have on your sources 
of livelihood? How in your views will you describe your community without oil 
resources?   
 
7. What are the contributions of factors such as Landownership, unemployment, oil 
pollution and underdevelopment to the conflict in your community?  
 
 
 
8. What mechanisms do you use in attracting attentions of the government (Federal, 
state or local government) or the affected oil producing company to issues such as oil 
spill, gas flaring or underdevelopment? 
9. How can you describe the activities of youth in cases of ransom kidnapping of oil 
workers; arson and stoppage of oil production activities? 
 
10. Are there other oil related illegal activities (like oil bunkering- which is the act of 
breaking and stealing crude oil from the pipelines) which you think that can warrant 
youth groups to engage in fights or violence?   
 
11. What do you think are the contributions of land and land ownership to violent 
conflicts in your communities? 
 
 
12. What are your views about the role of youths in community leadership, and is this 
connected to oil resource activities? Do youthink that militancy has really helped in 
solving the problem or brought awareness? 
 
 
 
POLITICS, LEADERSHIP AND POWER IN OIL VILLAGE COMMUNITIES 
 
 
1. Considering the contribution of oil resources to Nigerian development, do you think 
there are the same amounts of development influence coming to the oil producing 
communities? 
 
2. How does politics in your community influence the violent conflicts being 
experienced? And how has the quest to gain access to ‘oil resource ‘such as (oil 
contracts etc) affected the nature of conflict in your communities 
 
3. Do you think is the role of oil resources in the violent struggle for political positions 
in your communities/area 
 
 
4. What would you say about the development agencies set up by the Nigerian state 
since the inception of oil production, such as OMPADEC, and now NDDC? How are 
their members selected? Do the oil village communities select their representatives? 
 
5. What do you think is the role of oil resource in the violent struggle for political 
positions in your communities/area 
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6. Are the youths of oil village communities not showing signs of greed or but if 
grievance why illegal oil bunkering and kidnapping for ransom?   
 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCARCITY, DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT 
 
1. In ways does your community benefit from the oil production going on in your 
community? 
 
2. Looking at the events that have taken place, especially since the 1990s, what do you 
make out of the whole conflict? Do you in your opinion think that it is an opportunity 
for some people to get rich? 
 
3. Given the nature of your community, how do you determine appointments or 
representation to oil companies for negotiation? 
 
4. How has the oil production affected your fishing areas, especially in contributing to 
environmental scarcity? In such cases, how do you resolve the conflict? And in cases 
where your land or fishing area are acquired for oil production, how do you continue 
your fishing and farming? 
 
5. Between lack of development and environmental degradation like oil spill which 
attracts most violent reactions from oil communities 
 
 
6. Between environmental problems which arise out of oil activities and issues of 
underdevelopment in these communities, which of these factors do communities react 
much violently to 
 
 
 
 
THE NIGERIAN STATE, THE MNC OIL COMPANIES AND CONFLICT 
HANDLING 
 
1. How do you determine the owner or owners of a particular piece of land where oil is 
found? In situations of claims and counter-claims of ownership, how do you found out 
the real owners? 
 
2. What are your parameters for designating a particular community ‘oil producing’ and 
the next community who shares the common boundary where the oil production is 
taking place,’ not oil producing’. 
 
 
3. Given the nature of oil activities taking place in the oil communities, in cases of oil 
spill, who exactly in the communities do you pay the claims to? Do you monitor the 
11 
 
distribution of the claims, to know if it gets to real residents of the community who 
are directly affected by the oil spill? 
 
 
4. In most cases, there have been protestations by some oil village communities over 
non-implementation of agreement, sometimes blockage of oil production sites, what 
are your conflict handling mechanisms in ensuring peaceful resolution? 
 
5. At what stage in a conflict situation do you ask for the services of the Nigerian 
security? 
 
6. In corporate social responsibility, who determines the projects you implement for the 
local oil village communities? 
 
7. In your view, do you think that your activities may have contributed to the escalating 
nature of violent conflict and insecurity in this area? 
 
8. Are your activities in any way affected by the national, local or ethnic politics in this 
region? Do local politicians, community leaders, women leaders and youth leader 
have influence during any negotiation and payment of claims in cases of oil site 
acquisition or oil spill? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
